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Abstract 
This thesis consists of three related essays that examine the role of information in the 
market for corporate debt. The three essays collectively examine the role of information 
produced by the firm and its agents on alleviating information asymmetries facing public 
debtholders. In particular, the thesis examines the impact of bondholders’ demand for 
reputation and information on the firm’s disclosure choices and accounting attributes; and 
the impact of information produced by monitoring the firm’s private debt before its entry to 
the public debt market on the yield spread of its initial bond.  
 
The first essay investigates the influence of public corporate debt on the willingness of UK 
firms to issue profit warnings. UK firms operate within a legal environment that is less 
litigious compared to their US counterparts. This setting allows for motives other than fear 
of litigation to affect UK companies’ decision to warn. The results of this essay indicate 
that UK firms with public debt are more forthcoming with the disclosure of permanent 
negative news. Also, the results show that UK firms without public debt are more likely to 
hide bad news when they are closer to financial distress. However, for firms with public 
debt, the results indicate that the effect of closeness to financial distress on the willingness 
to warn is attenuated. These findings suggest that firms with public debt are deterred from 
hiding negative news for fear of damaging their reputation for truthful and timely 
disclosure. Public debt appears to act as a disciplinary mechanism on corporate disclosure 
policy. 
 
The second essay examines the impact of the initial public debt offering (IPDO) on the 
timeliness properties of the firm’s accounting income. Firms are more likely to 
communicate with private lenders on a private, insider-basis, while they are more likely to 
communicate with bondholders using public information. Therefore, bondholders, 
compared to private lenders, are expected to be more sensitive to the quality of public 
information. The results indicate that firms adopt a timelier policy of economic loss 
recognition after their initial public debt offering using Basu’s (1997) time series measure 
of timely loss recognition. These findings suggest that firms face higher demand for public 
information from a large number of external and dispersed bondholders. 
 
The third essay investigates the impact of information associated with prior private debt 
financing on the yield spread of companies’ initial public debt offerings. Specifically, this 
essay focuses on information produced through monitoring by credit rating agencies and 
monitoring by banks. The findings indicate that IPDOs with the same or upgraded credit 
ratings enjoy significantly lower yield spreads. This finding suggests that changes in credit 
ratings could convey new information to investors regarding the firm’s commitment to 
maintain a high credit quality. In addition, the findings of this essay indicate that strong 
banking relationships significantly reduce yield spreads for initial public debt offerings. 
This suggests that a strong banking relationship conveys a positive signal to bondholders 
regarding the bank’s assessment of the quality of the firm. 
 
The University of Manchester 
Ghada Tayem 
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) 
Three Empirical Essays on the Role of Information in the Public Debt Markets 
December 2011 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1. Motivation of the Thesis 
The fundamental objective of this thesis is to empirically assess the role of favourable 
reputation; accounting information quality; and prior monitoring by rating agencies and 
banks in mitigating information asymmetries facing bondholders. I propose that 
investors in the market for corporate debt demand reputations for faithful and timely 
disclosure and demand high quality financial reporting. Therefore, a public debt issuer 
must promote investors’ confidence in its accounting and financial communication by 
committing to high quality disclosure and accounting policies in order to manage 
potential costs of information asymmetry. Also, I propose that monitoring the firm’s 
private debt by credit rating agencies and banks conveys valuable information to 
prospective bondholders about the quality of the firm. This in turn mitigates the 
information asymmetries facing prospective bondholders, and therefore, reduces the 
yield spread of corporate debt.  
 
The first proposition focuses on the impact of public debtholders’ demand for timely 
information on the evolution of the firm’s disclosure choices and accounting attributes. 
Bondholders are not likely to rely on monitoring to resolve information asymmetry 
problems as it may result in information production inefficiencies (Diamond, 1991; 
Fama, 1985; Smith & Warner, 1979). Instead, bondholders induce a demand for 
favourable reputation and high quality public information to alleviate information 
asymmetries. The firm respond to public debtholders’ demand because the firm’s 
credible commitment to these attributes creates valuable reputations that may reduce 
agency costs. Reneging on these reputations, on the other hand, could result in adverse 
price effects (Armstrong, Guay, & Weber, 2010; Diamond, 1989). In addition, 
producing information jointly useful for several agents can be cost efficient for firms 
contracting with multiple uncoordinated bondholders because it reduces the duplication 
of monitoring costs (Fama, 1985). 
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To examine the first proposition of this thesis, I investigate the firm’s policy of 
informing bondholders of bad news in a timely fashion. I focus on unexpected bad news 
because debtholders are subject to the downside risk of the firm but they do not share 
the upside gains. Therefore, they are more sensitive to the firm’s losses than they are to 
its profits. In other words, debtholders are concerned with unexpected events that 
increase the probability of default. It follows that debtholders may have asymmetric 
demand for information, with higher demand for timely information of events that 
increases the probability of financial distress (Watts, 2003a, 2003b). Since I am 
primarily concerned with unexpected events, I investigate elements in the firm’s 
conditional disclosure choices and conditional reporting attributes. Specifically, in the 
first essay I investigate the firm’s policy of event-driven disclosures by issuing profit 
warnings in the event of bad news; and in the second essay I investigate the timeliness 
properties of the firm’s income. 
 
The second proposition of this thesis focuses on the impact of information associated 
with monitoring the firm’s private debt on yield spreads when the firm issues an initial 
public debt offering (IPDO). Firm insiders have more information about its performance 
and investment set compared to public debtholders. This information asymmetry makes 
it difficult for external bondholders to value the firm, and therefore, leads to adverse 
selection problems (Boyd & Prescott, 1986; Leland & Pyle, 1977). Available and 
reliable information at the time of contract inception may reduce bondholders’ adverse 
selection hence the bonds’ yield spreads. In this thesis I investigate the impact of 
previous monitoring provided by credit rating agencies and by banks on mitigating 
information asymmetries facing prospective bondholders. I propose that information 
associated with monitoring the firm’s private debt, by credit rating agencies and banks, 
may convey valuable information to prospective bondholders. Higher initial bond 
ratings compared to prior private loan ratings assigned to previous private debt may 
signal the firm’s commitment to maintain a good credit record. Also, strong banking 
relationship signals information regarding the firm’s business and credit quality. 
Therefore I expect prior private loan ratings and strong banking relationships to be 
negatively associated with yield spreads of IPDOs. 
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This thesis has implications for research on the market for corporate debt. The first 
proposition of this thesis examines the effect of bondholders’ demand for favourable 
reputation and information quality on the firms’ disclosure choices and accounting 
income properties. The main implication of this research is that public debtholders exert 
a demand of timely disclosure of bad news and timely loss recognition in the financial 
accounts. Therefore, a firm with outstanding or initial public debt must promote the 
market’s confidence in the quality of its accounting and financial communication 
policies in order to mitigate possible agency conflicts. In addition, damaging the firm’s 
reputation for truthful and timely disclosures and reporting by following opportunistic 
disclosure and reporting policies is costly as it increases the interest rates charged by 
bondholders. Therefore, introducing public debt to the firm’s financial structure may 
have a disciplinary role on the corporate disclosure and financial reporting policies.  
 
The second proposition of this thesis attempts to estimate the impact of information 
produced by monitoring the firm’s private debt on its initial bond’s yield spread. 
Specifically, I focus on monitoring by credit rating agencies, approximated by the 
difference between credit ratings of the firm’s initial bond and its prior private loan 
ratings. I also focus on monitoring by banks, approximated by several measures of the 
strength of banking relationships. This research shows that monitoring the firm’s private 
debt has an impact over the yield spreads by signalling the firm’s quality through 
favourable rating upgrades and strong banking relations. Therefore, this research has 
implications for the firm’s choices of obtaining private loan ratings and building 
banking relationships. 
 
1.2. Research Focus and Contributions 
This thesis examines two main issues: the methods that firms can employ in order to 
manage potential costs of moral hazard; and the impact of information asymmetry on 
the yield spreads of corporate debt. The structure of the thesis, therefore, comprises 
three related essays that examines: (1) the impact of the firm’s current access to the 
public debt market on its decision to disclose bad news by issuing profit warnings; (2) 
the impact of the firm’s first access to the public debt market on its accounting reporting 
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attributes, in particular timely loss recognition; and (3) the impact of monitoring the 
firm’s private debt record before its first entry to the public debt market on the yield 
spreads of corporate debt. The empirical essays draw on several bodies of research 
including the disclosure literature; the accounting conservatism literature; the cross-
monitoring hypothesis and the value of banking relationships to external investors. 
Next, I outline in greater detail each of these research backgrounds, identify the gaps in 
extant literature, and highlight the additional contributions proposed by this thesis.   
 
1.2.1. The Influence of Public Debt on the Willingness of UK Firms to Issue 
Profit Warnings 
It is argued in the extant literature that the firm’s reputation, i.e., the firm’s commitment 
to trustworthy behaviour observable to external agents over a long time period, in the 
debt markets alleviates the moral hazard problem facing bondholders (Diamond, 1989, 
1991). In a repeated game setting, the value of the firm’s reputation depreciates if the 
firm acts opportunistically and consequently may lead to an increase in the price of 
credit. In the context of event-driven disclosures, I argue that the firm’s disclosure 
decision is influenced by its choice of debt markets. Public disclosures of unexpected 
news facilitate inexpensive monitoring. Thus, when the firm chooses to borrow from 
public debt markets, where monitoring is weak, the firm faces a greater demand for 
timely information. 1 The firm has incentives to establish a reputation of faithful 
disclosure by committing to a credible disclosure policy. The firm’s reputation serves as 
an implicit contract between the firm and its bondholders that complements the formal 
debt contract and aims at resolving agency conflicts (Armstrong et al., 2010). Reneging 
on this contract can result in a loss of the firm’s reputational capital and consequently in                   
an increase in the price of credit. 
                                            
1 As we will discuss in the Literature Review chapter, bondholders constitute by definition a large number 
of un-coordinated external investors. Therefore, they are unlikely to invest in utilizing expensive 
monitoring technologies such as lending at short maturities or writing complex debt contracts with many 
covenants. Monitoring by bondholders is inefficient because it leads to the duplication of monitoring 
costs and is subject to the free rider problem (Diamond, 1984, 1991). 
 18
The first essay builds on these theoretical premises by examining the effect of having a 
public debt outstanding in the firm’s capital structure on the firm’s motives to issue 
profit warnings. The empirical analysis utilizes the UK market for corporate debt. Prior 
US empirical evidence shows that the threat of litigation is the main driver for US firms 
to disclose bad news (Field, Lowry, & Shu, 2005; Kasznik & Lev, 1995; Skinner, 1994, 
1997). However, other motives to disclose may emerge in the presence of a weaker 
litigation threat (Helbok & Walker, 2003). Thus, the UK setting provides an 
advantageous opportunity since it is characterized by weaker litigation threat (Black, 
Cheffins, & Klausner, 2005; Armour, Black, Cheffins, & Nolan, 2009); and a high 
frequency of disclosure of bad news (Collett, 2004). In the empirical analysis I focus on 
companies subject to negative earnings surprise because I expect lenders will have a 
higher demand for timely information of events that increase the probability of default 
because of their asymmetric payoff function. 
 
The findings in the first empirical essay indicate that while firms closer to financial 
distress hide bad news to gain at the expense of third parties, firms with public debt do 
not, as I argue, due to reputational concerns. I also find that firms with public debt 
outstanding are more likely to issue a profit warning in case of permanent bad news 
compared to firms without public debt. These results support the general argument of 
the thesis that firm’s information-related choices are affected by demands from external 
bondholders for more transparent information, particularly in the event of bad news.  
 
These findings contribute to the literature on the role of disclosure in alleviating 
information asymmetry. This is the first documented evidence that shows that 
reputational concerns exert a significant effect on companies’ motives to make event-
driven (conditional) disclosures. This evidence is consistent with the theoretical 
prediction that the firm’s reputation plays a critical role in alleviating moral hazard 
problems facing bondholders and reduces agency costs. This complements the recent 
US evidence that accounting disclosure alleviates information asymmetry facing lenders 
and consequently reduces the cost of debt (Healy & Palepu, 2001; Sengupta, 1998; Yu, 
2005). 
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1.2.2. Initial Public Debt Offering and the Timeliness of Economic Loss 
Recognition  
Producing information jointly useful for several agents can be economical because it 
prevents the duplication of monitoring costs (Fama, 1985). Therefore, firms contracting 
with uncoordinated bondholders may find it cost efficient to respond to the demands of 
lenders for certain attributes of accounting by adjusting their financial reports. One 
reporting attribute of importance to this thesis is timely loss recognition, defined as the 
extent to which current period earnings asymmetrically incorporates economic losses 
relative to economic gains (Basu, 1997). Asymmetric timeliness adds value to 
information available in the financial reports for bondholders because of two reasons. 
First, the firm’s credible commitment to timely inform external bondholders of bad 
news alleviates moral hazard problems. Second, timeliness is useful for traders in the 
secondary bond market because it provides them with a reliable source of information to 
evaluate the firm leading to a decrease in their adverse selection problem. 
 
Debt contracts determine, at least partially, accounting choices in the firm’s financial 
reports (Leftwich, 1983; Watts, 2003a, 2003b; Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). Prior 
empirical evidence on asymmetric timeliness of loss recognition concentrates on time 
trends (Basu, 1997); equity demand for asymmetric timeliness (Ball & Shivakumar, 
2005); and cross-country variations (Ball, Kothari, & Robin, 2000; Ball, Robin, & 
Sadka, 2008). However, as Monahan (2008, p. 206) notes “additional evidence on the 
relation between asymmetric timeliness and the benefits of leverage as well as debt-
instrument attributes is needed.” The purpose of the second empirical essay is to fill this 
gap in the literature by providing further evidence on the effect of public debt on the 
level of asymmetric timeliness. 
 
In the second empirical essay, I examine the change in the degree of asymmetric 
timeliness in two states of the firm. The first state is before the firm issues its initial 
public debt offer (IPDO) and the second state is after that issuance. The findings 
indicate that US firms significantly increase their degree of asymmetric timeliness, 
using Basu’s (1997) measure after their IPDO compared to the degree of asymmetric 
timeliness before their IPDO. These results support the first proposition of the thesis 
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because it shows that firms modify their accounting to address greater demand for 
higher accounting quality from public debtholders. 
 
The findings of the second empirical essay contributes to the empirical literature on the 
influence of debt contracting agreements on accounting conservatism (Ball et al., 2000; 
Ball et al., 2008; Ball & Shivakumar, 2005). There is little single-country evidence 
documenting the influence of debt, or the type of debt, on the firm’s reporting 
behaviour. I find that, within the same country, incentives for financial reporting are 
significantly influenced by the demands of different segments of the debt markets.   
 
1.2.3. Monitoring the Firm’s Private Loans and the Yield Spread of the 
Initial Public Debt Offering 
Information asymmetry reflects the degree on which the lender must investigate and 
monitor the borrower (Sufi, 2007). Therefore, one could characterize a greater 
information asymmetry by a lower amount of publicly available information (Bharath, 
Dahiya, Saunders, & Srinivasan, 2009). Information produced by monitoring activities 
by credit rating agencies and financial intermediaries may have a greater impact than 
information produced by the firm because of its certification effect. One prominent 
hypothesis, the cross monitoring hypothesis proposed by Booth (1992), suggests that the 
overall monitoring costs fall when monitoring activities by one claimholder are 
observable to other claimholders. In the cross monitoring hypothesis, all monitors are 
concerned with contemporaneous information about the firm hence it is more consistent 
with reducing their moral hazard problem. I extend the cross monitoring hypothesis by 
suggesting that previous monitoring of the firm’s private debt is relevant to prospective 
bondholders because it may mitigate their  adverse selection. 
 
In the third empirical essay I investigate the impact of two elements of the firm’s record 
of private debt before its entry to the public debt markets on the yield spread of the 
initial public debt offer. These two elements are the difference between credit ratings of 
the firm’s initial bond and its prior private loan ratings and the strength of the 
relationship between the firm and its relationship bank. There is little research on the 
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benefits of private debt ratings, except for Sufi (2009) who investigates syndicated loan 
ratings on the financing and investment policies of the firm. Although, there are several 
studies examining the effect of banking relationships on equity returns (James & Wier, 
1990; Slovin, Sushka, & Hudson, 1990; Slovin & Young, 1990), there is little research 
on the value of banking relationships in the public debt markets. One exception is Datta, 
Iskandar-Datta, & Patel (1999) who investigate the effect of the presence of a bank loan 
at the time of issuing public debt on bonds’ yield spreads.  
 
The findings in the third empirical essay indicate that IPDOs assigned more favourable 
credit ratings compared to the loan credit rating before the firm’s first access to the 
public debt markets have significantly lower yield spreads. This result suggests that 
changes in the credit ratings reveal new information about the firm. In addition, the 
findings show that strong banking relationships significantly reduce yield spreads for 
initial public debt offerings. This result suggests that banking relationships may reduce 
prospective bondholders’ investigation costs because the maintenance of the 
relationship conveys a positive signal to bondholders regarding the bank’s assessment 
of the quality of the firm. 
 
The overall evidence presented in the third empirical essay contributes to the existing 
body of research on the role of information produced by third parties in reducing 
information asymmetry in the debt markets (Booth, 1992; Mansi, Maxwell, & Miller, 
2010). It also corroborates existing evidence on the benefits of bank loans in producing 
valuable information about the borrower (Datta et al., 1999; Hadlock & James, 2002; 
James, 1987; Lummer & McConnell, 1989). 
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1.3. Organization of the Thesis 
1.3.1. Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a review of the theoretical and 
empirical literature that focuses on information asymmetry in public debt markets. 
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 present three self contained empirical essays. The first essay of the 
thesis, which investigates the effect of having outstanding public debt issues on UK 
firms’ choice to issue profit warnings, is presented in chapter 3. The second essay, 
presented in chapter 4, investigates the change in the firm’s asymmetric timeliness of 
economic loss recognition after its initial public debt offering. Chapter 5 contains the 
third essay which examines the effect of monitoring the firm’s private debt record on 
the yield spread of the initial public debt offering. Chapter 6 provides a conclusion and a 
summary of the main findings of the thesis. 
 
Also, note that I use the term “we” rather than “I” and “our” instead of “my”, reflecting 
that the empirical chapters are associated with working papers co-authored with my 
supervisors; Martin Walker and Susanne Espenlaub.  
 
1.3.2. Note on the Sample Choice 
This thesis employs two data sets: one from the UK market and one from the US 
market. I use the UK sample in the first empirical essay because of its unique 
institutional and market settings. The motivation of the sample choice is explained in 
detail in Chapter 3. In brief, the UK setting, I argue, provides a useful opportunity to 
analyze the impact of factors besides litigation risk that influence companies’ decision 
to warn.  This is because the UK’s legal environment is substantially less litigious than 
the US and its market is dominated by high frequency of profit warnings (Black et al., 
2005; Armour et al., 2009; Collett, 2004).  
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I use the US sample in the second and third empirical essays because it requires a 
reasonable sample size of initial public debt offerings (IPDOs). I choose a sample of 
initial public debt offerings in the second empirical essay because it allows us to 
identify two contrasting states of the firm: one without public debt and one with public 
debt. This in turn should result in sharper inferences regarding the causality direction of 
the relationship between changes in the accounting attributes and issuing public debt. I 
use initial public debt offerings in the third empirical essay since these securities are 
subject to greater information asymmetry compared to seasoned debt offers (Cantillo & 
Wright, 2000; Diamond, 1991). The investigation of securities subject to great 
information symmetry is more relevant for the purpose of analyzing adverse selection 
problems, which is the aim of the third essay.  
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The prevalence of information asymmetry in the debt markets and its adverse impact on 
the valuation of newly issued and/or existing securities motivated a large number of 
studies that investigate how these asymmetries are resolved. The purpose of this chapter 
is to review the key theoretical and empirical contributions of the literature that 
examines how information asymmetries resolve in the debt markets; how the present 
thesis is positioned within this literature; and how it contributes to this literature.  
 
In this chapter I categorize the relevant studies into two groups based on the type of the 
information asymmetry problem addressed by those studies. Therefore, I organize the 
rest of this chapter into two sections that highlight the following issues: 
i) The role of monitoring by banks, reputation and financial reporting in the debt 
markets in mitigating the moral hazard problem. 
ii)  The role of information produced through monitoring by banks and rating 
agencies in reducing adverse selection problems. 
 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature on the 
mechanisms that resolve the moral hazard problem in the debt markets. In particular, it 
presents studies that focus on monitoring, reputation and financial reporting quality. 
Also, Section 2 presents the empirical evidence on the impact of monitoring costs and 
accounting quality on the choice of the lenders’ type. Section 3 reviews studies that 
focus on the bank’s comparative information advantage and how it overcomes problems 
of asymmetric information. It also surveys the extant empirical evidence that 
investigates the value of the bank’s informational advantage to the firm and to other 
agents in the capital markets. Section 4 summarizes the relevant literature and concludes 
by proposing the present thesis contributions. 
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Finally, it is important to note that the surveyed bodies of research overlap and 
complement each other. While I recognise that the structure of the chapter is to some 
extent arbitrary, it serves the purpose of ease of presentation. 
 
2.2. Monitoring, Reputation, Financial Reporting and Debt 
Contracting 
2.2.1. Monitoring and Reputation 
The firm has more information about its actions and intentions than creditors do, and 
therefore, it has incentives to act sub-optimally (from the view point of creditors) if its 
interests are not aligned with those of the creditors (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This 
moral hazard can give rise to several agency conflicts such as the underinvestment 
problem (Myers, 1977) and asset substitution (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The 
underinvestment problem arises when a levered firm rejects a positive net present value 
(NPV) project that adds value to the firm if the added value accrues to bondholders, in 
the form of decreasing the overall risk of the firm, not shareholders. Asset substitution 
occurs when the firm’s debt is valued at prices that correspond to a certain risk level, 
and then the firm undertakes high risk projects that increase the volatility of the firm. 
This will induce an increase in the value of the stockholders’ equity and a decrease in 
the value of the bondholders’ claims. Creditors, in turn, can limit divergences from their 
interests by incurring monitoring costs designed to limit the self-interested activities of 
the firm (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).   
 
Lenders can employ several mechanisms, such as writing complex debt contracts and 
utilizing short maturities, to monitor the use of the capital once committed. For 
example, Myers (1977) suggests that short term debt, i.e., debt that matures before the 
completion of the project, can be used in order to renegotiate the debt terms at each 
renewal interval. This allows the lender to monitor the firm’s operations and investment 
decisions. In addition, Smith and Warner (1979) and Smith (1993) note that contract 
clauses known as debt covenants can reduce debt agency conflicts. Covenants are 
written based on (accounting) numbers that restrict the firm’s investment and financing 
policies. In addition, some covenants require the firm to maintain a certain level of 
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assets and/or profits. Lenders can verify and evaluate compliance with these covenants 
when the firm announces its financial statements. The violation of covenants gives 
lenders the right to transfer control from shareholders. In most cases, however, covenant 
violations lead to renegotiation rather than forcing the firm into bankruptcy. This in turn 
allows lenders to gain access to more inside information and adjust some or all of the 
debt clauses. 
 
However, bondholders are less likely to monitor compared to private lenders. Dichev & 
Skinner (2002) note that a common practice among banks is to set unconditional, tight 
covenants to trigger frequent technical defaults and subsequent renegotiation. On the 
other hand, Blume, Lim, & Mackinlay (1998) observe that the use of covenants in the 
public debt contracts is declining. The difference between private and public 
debtholders in utilizing monitoring technologies arises due to bondholders’ diffused 
ownership. If all bondholders monitor they will inefficiently duplicate the monitoring 
costs (Diamond, 1991; Fama, 1985). If only one bondholder monitors she will bear the 
costs while the rest of bondholders will share the benefits. Therefore, bondholders use 
(demand) other mechanisms to solve the moral hazard problems they face.  
 
Diamond (1991) shows that the firm’s reputation mitigates the moral hazard problem 
when the firm issues public debt. According to Diamond, the firm borrows and repays 
monitored bank loans until it establishes a clean track record (reputation) as a result of 
its history of non-default. Bondholders observe the firm’s lending relationships and 
assign low probability of default to firms with a clean track record (reputable firms) and 
lend to those firms at lower rates. Therefore, firms with access to public debt have 
incentives to choose safe projects if the potential payoffs from undertaking risky 
projects do not offset the likely costs to the firm from damaging its reputation (costs 
such as a higher price of debt for future borrowings). 
 
The central proposition of Diamond’s model is that the firm has an incentive to build a 
reputation because bondholders will reward reputable firms with lower interest rates. I 
generalize the concept of reputation in Diamond’s model by incorporating the firm’s 
reputations for faithful disclosure and informative reporting policies. This is similar to 
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Armstrong, Guay & Weber (2010) who suggest that the firm’s reputations for high 
quality accounting practices can be viewed as informal contracts that complement the 
formal debt contracts. Bondholders value commitment to these implicit contracts and 
require lower interest rates ex ante. If the firm reneges on these implicit contracts it will 
incur a loss in its reputational capital. 
 
In the first empirical essay I argue that firms with outstanding public debt are more 
concerned with their reputation for truthful and timely disclosure than firms without 
public debt. The firm’s reputation can mitigate the agency costs of debt due to conflicts 
of interest between shareholders and debtholders. This is because it promotes 
confidence in the quality of the firm’s financial communication policies. This in turn 
reduces the need for expensive control mechanisms such as restrictive covenants and 
monitoring by debtholders and thus reduces debtholders’ monitoring costs. For repeat 
debt borrowers, taking an action that damages the firm’s reputation may lead to a higher 
cost of debt and may even lead to a loss of the credit lines. Therefore, firms with public 
debt have incentives to adopt disclosure policies that enhance their reputations for 
truthful and timely disclosure. 
 
2.2.2. Financial Reporting Quality 
2.2.2.1. Inside versus Outside Debt 
Fama (1985) suggests that the firm’s debt can be considered as inside and outside debt 
similar to the inside and outside equity in Jensen and Meckling (1976). The distinction 
between the inside and outside debt according to Fama arises from the ability of private 
lenders to get access to information that is not publicly available. Inside debtholders 
have access to information directly from the firm, while outside debtholders rely on 
publicly available information produced directly or sponsored by the firm, such as credit 
ratings.  
 
Lenders produce information in order to monitor their contracts, the lower the 
monitoring costs the lower the interest they charge. Therefore, it may be more 
economical for firms with large numbers of lenders to produce public information that 
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is jointly useful to multiple lenders to avoid the duplication of information production 
costs. However, producing large-scale information is costly, and therefore it may be 
more efficient for firms with small numbers of lenders to communicate with inside 
debtholders directly.  
 
While Diamond (1991) implicitly assumes that the firm’s information disclosure 
policies do not solve the inefficiency of the information duplication costs, Fama (1985) 
suggests that the firm can produce or purchase through a third party high quality public 
information that is jointly useful to multiple agents. I build on this notion in the second 
empirical essay to investigate the changes in one of the firm’s accounting attributes, 
namely timely loss recognition, before and after issuing public debt for the first time. I 
propose that bondholders, in contrast to private lenders, depend on public information 
instead of privately communicating with the borrower. Therefore, they are likely to be 
more sensitive to the quality of public information, especially accounting attributes that 
affect how early economic losses are recognized in financial statements. 
 
The theoretical motivation of the second essay is similar to Ball and Shivakumar (2005). 
In Ball and Shivakumar’s study, the authors investigate the effect of the firm’s equity 
status, private or public, on timeliness in the UK setting whereby firms are subject to 
similar reporting rules regardless of their equity status. The authors argue that 
communicating on an inside-basis becomes inefficient for firms with public equity 
because those firms contract with a large number of actual and potential investors and 
stakeholders. Therefore, private equity firms (inside equity) are more likely to 
communicate with their investors on an insider basis while public equity firms (outside 
equity) communicate through public information.  
 
In the next section, I will explain the concept of conservatism, unconditional and 
conditional, and discuss its relation to timely loss recognition. 
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2.2.2.2. Conditional and Unconditional Conservatism and Timeliness 
Accountants are reluctant to recognize unverifiable (unobservable to external parties) 
information about future, unrealized cash flows in audited financial statements, not least 
because it increases the litigation risk. However, values that relate to expected, 
unrealized cash flow are recognized in the financial statements as long as they are 
derived from verifiable predictors of future cash flows. Conservatism deals with the 
asymmetric verification requirements for unrealized gains and losses. The greater the 
difference in the degree of verification requirements for gains opposed to losses, the 
greater the conservatism in the firm’s financial reports (Watts, 2003).  
 
However, the definition of conservatism varies depending on its relation to the 
recognition of contemporaneous economic losses. The unconditional version of 
conservatism can be best described as in Watts & Zimmerman (1986, p. 205) who state 
that conservatism requires that accountants should: 
[R]eport the lowest value among the possible alternative values for assets and the 
highest alternative value for liabilities. Revenues should be recognized later rather 
than sooner and expenses sooner than later. 
Consequently, unconditional conservatism will result in a systematic understatement of 
book values of stockholders equity (Ball & Shivakumar, 2005; Watts, 2003). Examples 
of unconditional conservatism include the immediate expensing of research and 
development projects, and the recording of depreciation expense that is more 
accelerated than economic depreciation (Beaver & Ryan, 2005). 
 
Basu (1997, p. 7), on the other hand,  associates the recognition of losses with the 
presence of adverse circumstances. He defines conditional conservatism as the:  
[A]ccountant’s tendency to require a higher degree of verification to recognize good 
news as gains than to recognize bad news as losses. Under my interpretation of 
conservatism, earnings reflect bad news more quickly than good news. 
The focus under Basu’s interpretation of conservatism is on the timeliness of loss 
recognition. The incorporation of losses in reported earnings is conditional on firms 
experiencing contemporaneous economic losses (Ball & Shivakumar, 2005; Watts, 
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2003a). One implication of conditional conservatism is that it will induce an asymmetry 
in the timeliness of recognizing economic gains and economic losses, with economic 
losses being reflected more promptly than economic gains (Basu, 1997; Givoly & Hayn, 
2000; Holthausen & Watts, 2001; Pope & Walker, 1999).  
 
The distinction between conditional and unconditional conservatism is essential in 
understanding their influence in debt contracting. Lenders’ demand for unconditional 
conservatism is, arguably, weak for two reasons. Unconditional conservatism results in 
a predictable understatement of book values of assets. Lenders form rational 
expectations of the magnitude of the understatement in order to arrive at the true book 
value of assets (Ball & Shivakumar, 2005). Assume that the firm immediately expenses 
the research and development costs, which result in an understatement of assets by a 
proportion . This in turn may lead to the violation of the leverage covenant. However, 
lenders form rational expectations of the magnitude of the assets’ understatement and 
therefore account for this downward bias by adjusting the leverage covenant upward by 
a factor of (1-)-1. Consequently, this adjustment will not affect the circumstances under 
which covenants will be violated.2 In addition, unconditional conservatism might pre-
empt conditional conservatism (Pope & Walker, 1999), which in turn reduces the 
opportunity to account for economic losses in a timely fashion. This is important since 
lenders are concerned with surprise negative news that adversely affects the value of 
their holdings. If the firm’s financial statements do not reflect the bad news as it 
happens this will reduce the usefulness of those reports significantly. 
 
Conditional conservatism, on the other hand, can improve the efficiency of debt 
contracting in several ways. I discuss this point in the next section. 
 
2.2.2.3. Usefulness of Timely Loss Recognition 
The literature on conservatism suggests that timely loss recognition is especially 
“useful” to lenders because timeliness improves the efficiency of the transfer of control 
                                            
2 This example is adapted from Ball & Shivakumar (2005, p. 90). 
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rights from shareholders to lenders by speeding up the recognition of economic losses in 
the financial statements (Guay, 2008; Watts, 2003). Lenders are concerned with 
unexpected events that increase the probability of default since managers are more 
likely to expropriate creditors’ wealth in states of financial distress. An important event 
that signals a higher probability of default is the violation of debt covenants known as 
technical default (Beneish & Press, 1993). Technical default gives lenders the 
opportunity to reassess the probability of default and take appropriate actions to 
maximize the probability of loan recovery without necessarily going through 
bankruptcy procedures (Dichev & Skinner, 2002). Timeliness of loss recognition 
enhances the efficiency of debt contracting because it triggers debt covenant violations 
in a timely fashion, thus, transferring control rights from shareholders to lenders more 
quickly (Watts, 2003). This is because timely loss recognition is an asymmetric 
verification process, which immediately recognizes bad events while delaying the 
recognition of good events until they are verified (Basu, 1997).  
 
However, covenants in public debt contracts are expected to create more demand for 
timeliness than covenants in private debt contracts.3 Private debt contracts mostly use 
maintenance covenants that require companies to maintain certain financial ratios 
(Smith, 1993; Dichev & Skinner, 2002). In addition, private lenders set tighter debt 
covenants compared to bondholders which results in frequent (unconditional) violation 
of private debt covenants (Berlin & Mester, 1992; Rajan & Winton, 1995). 
Consequently, these covenants function as trip-wires that the company frequently 
violates which triggers subsequent renegotiations. The need for renegotiations 
substantially increases private lenders control over the company hence reducing the 
scope for managerial opportunism. On the other hand, public debt contracts employ 
negative covenants, which managers must meet before taking certain actions, including 
dividend payouts, acquisitions, and new issuance of debt, and they rarely require 
maintenance of accounting ratios due to the high renegotiation costs resulting from 
diffuse ownership. Therefore, timeliness enhances the efficiency of negative covenants 
by limiting actions that could lead to the expropriation of bondholders’ wealth. 
   
                                            
3 The following argument is adapted from Nikolaev (2010). 
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In addition, I focus on additional roles for timeliness in the market for corporate debt. 
These roles are closely related to the ownership and tradability of public debt. 
Timeliness can increase the usefulness of information available through the firm’s 
financial statements since the firm’s commitment to providing timely information about 
its financial conditions enables bondholders to value their holdings accurately. This is 
especially relevant for bondholders because most investors in public debt are 
institutional investors, who rebalance their holdings frequently based on the changes in 
the value of the underlying assets. Timely loss recognition is also important for traded 
debt because it provides traders with reliable source of information to evaluate the firm 
leading to a decrease in their adverse selection problems (Wittenberg-Moerman, 2009). 
 
It is important to note that timeliness may reduce the moral hazard problems facing 
bondholders if the firm commits to adopt a timely loss recognition policy. Similar to the 
discussion in the Section 2.2.1., in a repeated game setting, the firm has incentives to 
build a reputation for faithful and timely recognition of economic losses in its financial 
reports. Bondholders will reward reputable firms with lower interest rates ex ante. On 
the other hand, the firm’s failure to commit to timeliness will result in a loss of the 
firm’s reputational capital and consequently to a higher interest rates charged by 
bondholders for future borrowings. 
 
2.2.3. Empirical Evidence on Monitoring Costs 
This section surveys the empirical evidence on the impact of monitoring costs on the 
firm’s choice of issuing public debt and the mix of public and private debt; and on the 
ownership percentage of the lead bank in syndicated loans. In addition, this section 
surveys the empirical evidence on the association between accounting choices and the 
firm’s choice of issuing public debt and on the ownership percentage of the lead bank in 
syndicated loans. It also presents evidence on the association between accounting 
choices and interest rates charged by lenders. Finally it presents the empirical evidence 
on the effect of debt contracting on the degree of timeliness.  
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2.2.3.1. Monitoring Costs and Debt Ownership 
Choice of the type of the Lender 
 
The extant empirical evidence places a particular emphasis on how the choice of the 
lender’s type resolves the information asymmetry problem in the debt markets. The 
general notion is that the firm can overcome moral hazard problems by choosing private 
lenders who invest in costly monitoring technologies. This in turn reduces agency 
conflicts between the firm and its lenders. The empirical implication of this notion is 
that firms with characteristics that are associated with lower costs of monitoring are 
likely to issue public debt.  
 
The firm’s size and its set of growth opportunities are the key firm characteristics that 
influence the costs of agency conflicts and costs of monitoring. Smith (1986) and 
Blackwell & Kidwell (1988) suggest that economies of scale exist in issuing public debt 
because a great portion of the flotation costs do not vary with the size of the issue. This 
fixed component is larger for debt issued publicly than it is for debt issued privately. 
Similarly, Fama (1985) notes that the costs of information production required for 
public debt financing is large and fixed to a significant extent. Therefore, economies of 
scale exist in public debt because of the fixed costs of information production. Larger 
firms may find it more economical to produce public information useful to outside 
investors than small firms. Several empirical studies find that the firm size is positively 
associated with having public debt (Cantillo & Wright, 2000; Hadlock & James, 2002), 
and with a greater portion of public debt in the capital structure mix (Johnson, 1997; 
Krishnaswami, Spindt, & Subramaniam, 1999).  
 
In addition, there are some empirical implications regarding the effect of growth 
opportunities on the choice of public debt. The extent of the underinvestment due to the 
conflict between shareholders and bondholders and the debt overhang increases with the 
amount of growth opportunities available to the firm (Myers, 1977). These conflicts can 
be mitigated using various monitoring mechanisms. As discussed before, private lenders 
are more likely to use monitoring mechanisms and therefore firms with high growth 
opportunities are expected to rely more on private debt. Consistent with this view, 
Krishnaswami et al., (1999) and Johnson (1997) find that firms with greater growth 
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opportunities, measured by the market to book ratio of assets, rely more on private debt 
sources.  
 
However, the evidence on the impact of growth opportunities on the choice of debt is 
not conclusive. Houston and James (1996) find that the relationship between bank 
borrowing and the size of growth opportunities depends on the firm’s use of multiple 
banking relationships or the use of public debt.  Firms with a single bank relationship 
have a negative and significant relation between the reliance on bank debt and the 
importance of growth options. In contrast, firms with multiple banking relations have a 
positive relation between the reliance on bank debt and the importance of growth 
opportunities. Similarly, for firms with public debt outstanding the reliance on bank 
debt is positively related to the importance of growth opportunities.  
 
This evidence indicates that the importance of growth opportunities possibly interacts 
with the hold-up problem as described in Rajan (1992). The hold-up problem occurs if 
the bank has a substantial bargaining power over the firm. This power enables the bank 
to threaten to liquidate the project, although profitable, by cutting-off credit unless it 
gets a share of the projects’ surplus. The bank gains this bargaining power because of its 
access to the firm’s inside information that is not available to outside banks. If the firm 
decides to borrow from another bank, the outside bank will be at an information 
disadvantage because the inside bank has monitored and knows the firm’s project type 
while the uninformed outside banks do not. Thus, the outside bank will offer high 
interest rates leading the firm to be held-up by its inside bank. 
 
The evidence in Houston and James (1996) suggests that although bank relationships 
have potential benefits in terms of reducing information problems, the bank’s 
information monopolies may impose offsetting costs. In this setting, multiple banking 
relationships, or having access to public debt, mitigates potential bank information 
monopolies. 
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Ownership of Syndicated Loans 
 
There is a growing body of literature that investigates the institutional features of the 
syndicated loan market and the possible adverse selection and moral hazard problems 
arising from the structure of the syndicate. With respect to moral hazard problems, 
syndicate participants delegate most of the monitoring activities at the loan origination 
and post-closing loan stages to the lead bank (Dennis & Mullineaux, 2000; Standard & 
Poor’s, 2006). The lead bank, therefore, is responsible for the administration of loan 
documentation, debt repayment, and collateral as well as the enforcement of covenants. 
In short, the lead bank is responsible for monitoring the borrower. However, monitoring 
is a costly activity and the benefits of monitoring are shared between all the syndicate 
members. The lead bank incentives to monitor ex post increases with the amount of the 
loan facility it retains (Dennis & Mullineaux, 2000; Sufi, 2007). On the extreme, if the 
lead bank syndicates the entire amount of the loan facility it will have few incentives to 
monitor once the loan is closed. Therefore, the lead bank ownership percentage of the 
syndicated loan potentially resolves the moral hazard problems facing the syndicate 
participants.  
 
Dennis & Mullineaux (2000) suggest that the borrowers’ information environment plays 
a role in exacerbating or alleviating the information asymmetry problem between the 
syndicate members. Syndicate loans that involve transparent information, such as loans 
with credit ratings or loans originated by a listed-equity borrower, reduce the 
information asymmetry facing syndicate participants. Dennis & Mullineaux (2000) find 
that the lead bank retains a smaller proportion of the loan as information about the 
borrower becomes more transparent. Similarly, Sufi (2007) finds that the lead bank 
retains a smaller proportion of loans originating from firms that require less monitoring 
costs, such as firms with SEC filings or firms with credit ratings. 
 
2.2.3.2. Monitoring and Accounting Choices 
Financial Reporting and Debt Ownership 
 
Recently, accounting studies have focused on how accounting policies influence the 
accessibility to different segments of the debt markets. The underlying assumption of 
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this body of research is that easy to verify accounting information and disclosures 
facilitates inexpensive monitoring. This in turn alleviates information asymmetries 
between the firm and outside investors, and therefore, increases the probability of 
having public debt.  
 
Bharath, Sunder & Sunder (2008) suggest that firms with lower accounting quality are 
more likely to borrow from banks whereas firms with higher accounting quality are 
more likely to borrow publicly. This is because private lenders have superior access to 
private information, and therefore are subject to lower information asymmetry 
problems. Consistent with their prediction, the authors find that accounting quality has a 
significant impact on the choice of debt type. Firms with higher accounting quality, 
evidenced by lower earnings and accruals management, borrow from public debt 
markets, while firms with lower accounting quality borrow from private lenders. 
 
The evidence from the syndicated loans market suggests that the lead bank retains a 
smaller proportion of the syndicate when the borrowers’ accounting policies facilitate 
better monitoring. For example, Sufi (2007) finds that the lead bank ownership of the 
syndicated loan is positively related to the ratio of accruals to total assets. Ball, 
Bushman, & Vasvari (2008) find that the lead bank retains a smaller proportion of the 
syndicate when the financial reports provide informative signals about the future credit 
quality. In addition, Wittenberg-Moerman (2008) finds that the lead bank holds a  
smaller proportion of the syndicate when the borrowers’ financial reports are more 
conservative.  
 
Financial Reporting and Disclosure Quality and Interest Rates 
 
The other key aspect of the role of financial accounting in debt contracting is the 
association between the quality of financial reporting and the cost of debt. If the firm’s 
financial reporting and communication policies facilitate better monitoring and reduce 
agency costs, lenders will reward high quality accounting with lower interest rates 
(Francis, LaFond, Olsson, & Schipper, 2005).  
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In an early work by Ahmed, Billings, Morton, & Stanford-Harris (2002), the authors 
find that the firm’s debt rating, which they propose as a proxy for the cost of debt, is 
negatively related to market-based and accrual-based measures of conservatism. Zhang 
(2008) builds on Ahmed et al., (2002) by investigating the association of measures of 
conditional conservatism, in particular timeliness of loss recognition, and interest rate 
spreads. She finds that the firm’s timeliness measures are negatively related to the 
spread of a sample of syndicate loans. In addition, Bharath et al. (2008) show that the 
price benefits of accounting attributes varies according to the type of debt. They find 
that the reduction in spreads for each unit of increase in the quality of accruals is greater 
for public debt issues compared to private debt issues.  
 
The empirical evidence also indicates a negative association between the quality of the 
firm’s disclosure policy and interest rates. Sengupta (1998) finds that the yield to 
maturity is negatively related to a score of disclosure quality developed by the Financial 
Analysts Federation (FAF). He argues that the firm’s reputation for timely disclosure 
reduces the lender’s perception of default risk hence yield to maturity. Yu (2005) 
examines the impact of the annual Association for Investment Management and 
Research (AIMR) corporate disclosure rankings, which represents financial analysts’ 
assessments of the completeness, clarity, and timeliness of firms’ disclosure policies, on 
the term structure of credit spreads. He finds that firms with more accurate information 
disclosure have lower short-term credit spreads. 
 
Evidence on the Influence of Contracting Arrangements on Timeliness 
 
The firm’s financial reporting choices evolve over time, in part, to solve agency 
conflicts caused by contracting with different agents including managers, shareholders, 
and lenders (Leftwich, 1983; Watts, 2003; Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). Therefore, one 
expects to observe heterogeneity of accounting choices of firms operating within the 
same legal jurisdiction or between different legal jurisdictions depending on the 
variation in their contractual arrangements. This also implies that there is no optimal set 
of accounting choices since certain accounting attributes work more efficiently within 
certain business environments (Armstrong et al., 2010; Ball & Shivakumar, 2005). 
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Early empirical attempts to examine the effect of contracting arrangements on 
accounting choices employed the cross-country setting. This is because the single 
country evidence is unlikely to capture significant variation between individual public 
firms because within the same country firms operate under a single reporting, litigation 
and regulatory regime (Ball, Robin, & Sadka, 2008). In Ball, Kothari, & Robin (2000), 
the authors argue that accounting income in common-law countries is significantly 
timelier than in code-law countries. In code-law countries outside stakeholders, 
including capital suppliers, government and labour, are represented in the firm’s 
corporate governance systems. Therefore, one expects that insider communication 
solves the information asymmetry between managers and stakeholders. In common-low 
countries, however, shareholders alone elect members of the governing board and 
therefore there is a higher demand for public disclosure. Ball et al., study the timeliness 
properties of accounting income for a sample of more than 40,000 firm-years reported 
during 1985-1995, under the accounting rules of seven countries classified into 
common-law and code-law. Australia, Canada, UK and USA are classified as common-
law countries and France, Germany and Japan are classified as code-law countries. They 
find that the asymmetric timeliness of accounting income is substantially lower for 
code-law countries than for common-law countries using the Basu’s (1997) earnings 
response coefficients measure. 
 
To examine the particular influence of debt contracting on the firm’s accounting 
choices, Ball, Robin, & Sadka (2008) examine the variation in accounting attributes that 
relate to timeliness and conservatism between 22 countries. The authors hypothesize 
that demands from capital markets and particularly debt markets will influence the 
country-level accounting attributes. Countries with smaller capital markets generate less 
demand for effective financial reporting and hence devote fewer resources to 
developing and operating costly financial reporting systems, while countries with larger 
capital markets can devote more resources to effective financial reporting. The authors 
estimate individual country measures for accounting attributes including timeliness and 
market to book and find that these measures are positively associated with the size of 
the country’s debt markets, approximated by the ratio of total debt over GNP. On the 
other hand, they do not find evidence of a positive association between the measures of 
the country’s accounting attributes and the size of its equity market. This evidence 
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suggests that the country-level financial reporting choices are influenced significantly 
by debt market demand. 
 
In a single-country setting Ball & Shivakumar (2005, 2008) utilize the setting of the UK 
firms to investigate the variation in UK firms’ accounting attributes depending on their 
equity status (private versus public). The authors argue,  the demands for private and 
public financial reporting are significantly different because “public-company investors, 
lenders and other financial statement users are at greater “arm’s length” than in a private 
company, and consequently demand higher quality reporting to resolve the information 
asymmetry” (Ball & Shivakumar, 2008, p. 325). In Ball and Shivakumar (2005), the 
authors investigate the effect of the firm’s current equity status, private or public, on 
timeliness. The authors find evidence that private equity firms in the UK are less timely 
in recognizing economic losses even though they are subject to reporting rules similar to 
public equity firms. Ball and Shivakumar (2008) support their previous evidence by 
documenting that initial public offering (IPO) firms report more conservatively using an 
abnormal accruals measure. The authors compare two sets of financial data for UK IPO 
firms available for the same firms and fiscal years: financial data prepared when the 
firms were private and data subsequently restated to be included in the IPO 
prospectuses. They find that the restated financials of UK firms exhibit a significant 
lower earnings management compared to the original financials of the same firms when 
they were private. 
 
In both articles Ball and Shivakumar note that debt contracting is potentially an 
important influence over the demand of certain accounting attributes in public equity 
firms. For example, Ball and Shivakumar (2005, p. 97) states that: 
Debt-contracting differences between private and public [equity] companies 
constitute a potentially important determinant of financial reporting quality . . . We 
have been unable to uncover reliable information on systematic differences (if any) 
between UK private and public company debt agreements. We suspect private 
companies communicate with lending banks on a more private, "insider" basis than 
public companies, thereby reducing the demand for financial reporting quality, but 
we cannot confirm this. 
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In the third empirical essay I address this aspect by investigating the influence of debt 
on the firm’s reporting choices. 
 
2.2.4. Summary 
In summary, the literature focuses on the role of costly monitoring mechanisms such as 
debt maturity and debt covenants in alleviating potential moral hazard problems and 
agency costs in the debt markets. It also shows that public debtholders do not invest in 
monitoring technologies because of their diffused ownership that may lead to the free 
rider problem or the duplication of monitoring costs. Therefore, the extant research 
proposes that other mechanisms that resolve the moral hazard problems may exist in the 
market for corporate debt. Specifically, these mechanisms include the firm’s reputation 
and the production of high quality information jointly useful to multiple investors.  
 
The empirical research reviewed above focuses on how the choice of private lenders 
resolves moral hazard problems since bank monitoring mitigates agency conflicts. Also, 
it focuses on how financial reporting facilitates inexpensive monitoring and thus is 
associated with debt ownership choices and interest rates charged by lenders. However, 
to the best of my knowledge, the empirical evidence does not investigate the impact of 
the firm’s reputations in the market for corporate debt. In addition, it does not examine 
the change in the firm’s reporting quality in response to demands from debt markets, 
although there are important contributions on the change on the firm’s reporting quality 
when the firm transits from private to public equity status.  
 
This thesis builds on these theoretical premises and complements the extant empirical 
research by investigating the firm’s response to lenders’ demand for reputation and 
information quality. Public lenders do not rely on monitoring and bonding mechanisms 
to resolve information asymmetry problems. Rather they demand a favourable 
reputation and high quality public information. This thesis investigates the methods that 
firms employ in order to manage potential costs of moral hazard if they have access to 
the market of corporate debt. I argue that firms wishing to access the public debt market 
have to alter their information communication policies in order to facilitate inexpensive 
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monitoring. Specifically, I examine two aspects of the firm’s communication channels: 
(1) the policy of disclosure of bad news by issuing profit warnings; (2) the timely loss 
recognition in the firm’s financial accounts.  
 
2.3. Costly Information Production and Debt Contracting 
2.3.1. Private Lenders’ Information Advantage 
The firm’s insiders possess more information about the expected value of the current 
and future prospects of the firm. In order to alleviate this information asymmetry, 
lenders may engage in costly information production to assess the value of the firm. In 
this respect, private lenders have an advantage over public lenders because they are 
specialized in information production, i.e., the business model of private lenders is 
organized around  producing information and investing (extending credit) based on this 
information (Boyd & Prescott, 1986; Leland & Pyle, 1977).  
 
The literature suggests that private lenders acquire their information advantage through 
several influences. Firms are more willing to give access to their private (proprietary) 
information to one or a limited number of investors, but are reluctant to share their 
private information with a large number of investors (Bhattacharya & Chisea, 1995). 
For instance, firms supply private lenders with inside information at the time of contract 
inception and during the life of the loan including budgets, internal financial forecasts, 
and detailed sales data (Wittenberg-Moerman, 2009). Also, private lenders, in particular 
banks, provide transaction and other services to their borrowers. Therefore, they obtain 
private information not available to other lenders (Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 1994). For 
example, Fama (1985) notes that the firm is likely to borrow from the same bank that 
provides current account services. Thus, banks have access to private information about 
the firm’s transactions that public debtholders are not likely to have.  
 
In addition, many studies suggest that banks obtain firm-specific information because it 
develops a relationship with the borrower (Boot, 2000; Boot & Thakor, 1994; Elyasiani 
& Goldberg, 2004; Rajan, 1992; Sharpe, 1990). In relationship banking, the lender 
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invests in obtaining borrower-specific information over multiple interactions and often 
through multiple services (Boot, 2000). Therefore, the bank acquires inside information 
that is available only to the borrower and to the relationship bank. This information is 
obtained at the loan origination when the bank provides screening and during the life of 
the loan when it provides monitoring (Boot, 2000). Through screening and monitoring 
the bank accumulates information that is soft in its nature. For example, the bank learns 
how to deal with the firm’s management, how to evaluate the financial data, and where 
and who to ask for data (Schenone, 2010). This learning improves the bank’s gathering, 
processing, and interpretation of the borrower’s information which adds to the bank’s 
comparative advantage (Schenone, 2010). Further, it reduces the bank’s due diligence 
costs for repeat lending with the same borrower hence mitigating the bank’s adverse 
selection problems. 
 
Also, it is important to note that other agents in the market may perceive the uniqueness 
of banks in producing valuable information about the borrower, especially the bank’s 
assessment of the long-term profitability of the firm. Boot, and Boot & Thakor (2000; 
2000) note that relationship banking permits the funding of loans that are not profitable 
in the short run but may be profitable if the relationship with the borrower continues 
long enough. Fama (1985) argues that borrowing from banks can reduce information 
costs for all of a firm’s claimants by providing a credible signal about the firm’s 
creditworthiness. Therefore, the maintenance of banking relationships may convey 
signals about the long-term quality of the firm to investors in the equity and public 
markets.  
 
In the next section, I present the empirical evidence on the bank’ information advantage 
in pricing debt securities. I also survey the evidence on the value of bank relationships 
to claimants in capital markets.  
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2.3.2. Empirical Evidence on the Uniqueness of Banks in Valuing Firms 
The empirical evidence focuses on whether the bank’s informational advantage 
facilitates accurate pricing of securities subject to adverse selection problems. This 
section presents empirical studies that examine the choice of borrowing privately versus 
publicly for firms subject to greater adverse selection problems. In addition, it presents a 
number of studies that investigate the effect of bank loan announcements on stock 
market returns. Lastly, it present evidence suggesting that investors in capital markets 
value banking relationships.  
 
A number of studies examine the choice of borrowing from private or public sources. 
The evidence suggests that firms facing significant adverse selection have a preference 
for borrowing privately. The main assumption underlying this notion is that banks have 
a comparative advantage in valuing securities. Hadlock and James (2002) investigate 
the influence of possible adverse selection costs on the choice of financing through a 
bank loans versus public securities (both debt and equity). They find that stock return 
volatility is positively and significantly related to the probability of having a bank loan. 
This finding suggests that firms subject to high information asymmetry, and possible 
mis-valuation, prefer to contract with an informed lender. In addition, the authors 
calculate the cumulative stock return over the last 12 months to approximate possible 
mis-valuation, the higher the cumulative return the lower the mis-pricing. They propose 
that firms with mis-priced stock are more likely to use bank financing. The authors find 
that the firm’s cumulative return is negatively related to the probability of announcing a 
bank loan. This evidence suggests that firms with favourable private information and 
mis-priced equity prefer to borrow from banks since the latter will value the loan 
accurately. Krishnaswami et al., (1999) document similar evidence on the relation 
between undervalued firms and the choice of bank debt. They find that firms subject to 
high information asymmetry and with positive earnings surprises have a larger 
proportion of private debt in their debt structure. 
  
In addition, market participants, including shareholders, expect that banks will 
accurately value loans given the bank’s informational advantage. Therefore, the 
announcement of new bank loans can result in a non-negative stock price reaction 
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(compared to a negative stock price reaction if the market expects that banks will mis-
value the loan). As James (1987) suggests, bank debt can be viewed as an inside source 
of capital similar to financial slack in the context of Myers and Majluf’s  (1984) pecking 
order of financing sources. Moreover, the announcement of new bank loans could result 
in a positive market reaction since it may convey a positive signal about the prospects of 
the firm. James (1987) investigates a sample of 80 announcements of bank loan 
agreements and documents a significant positive announcement effect. He also 
documents non-positive responses to the announcements of other types of securities 
including debt private placements (negative and significant) and public debt offerings 
(negative but insignificant).4  
 
Lummer and McConnell (1989) suggest that the bank learns about the firm through 
continuing lending relationships. Therefore, the information the bank learns about the 
firm is revealed when a loan is renewed or restructured but not when the bank contracts 
with the firm for the first time. Lummer and McConnell classify bank loans into new 
bank loan agreements and revisions to agreements already in place. In addition, they 
classify announcements relating to bank agreements in place into announcements 
containing positive information and those containing negative information. Their 
findings indicate that the announcements of new agreements are not associated with a 
significant market reaction. The market reaction to the announcements relating to 
existing agreements, on the other hand, depends on the type of information contained in 
the announcement. The market reaction for existing agreements is positive for 
favourable renewals and negative for renewals with negative information. 
 
Further, there is evidence suggesting that the information advantage of bank debt 
extends to other agents in capital markets because banks provide signals about the 
quality of the firm through its monitoring and certification activities. A number of 
studies examine the effect of banking relationships on equity returns. James & Wier 
(1990) examine how the presence of banking relationship affects the underpricing 
associated with initial public offerings (IPO) of equity. They investigate the 
                                            
4 The latter finding is supported in Hadlock & James (2002) who document that the announcement of 
seasoned public debt issues is associated with a significant but small negative market reaction; and Datta, 
Iskandar-Datta, & Patel (2002) who document a significant negative market reaction for firm issuing 
public debt for the first time. 
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underpricing the firm experience when it issues an IPO for companies with a borrowing 
relationship, as reported in the firm’s prospectus, and those without it. The authors 
document that the average initial return for the 455 firms in their sample with previously 
established borrowing relationships is 9%, while the average for the remaining 94 firms 
without debt is 31%. Similarly, Slovin & Young (1990) find that,  for a sample of 316  
initial public offering, the presence of bank debt is negatively and significantly related 
to the ratio of the first reported closing bid to the offering. This finding supports the 
evidence in James & Wier (1990) in that IPO firms experience less underpricing when 
they have a banking relationship. Slovin, Sushka, & Hudson (1990) investigate the 
market reaction to announcements of seasoned stock offerings. They find that the stock 
price reaction is significantly more negative for firms without bank debt compared to 
firms with the largest debt ratios in their sample.  
 
However, there is little research on the value of banking relationships in the public debt 
markets, with the exception of Datta, Iskandar-Datta, & Patel (1999) who investigate 
the effect of the presence of a bank loan at the time of issuing public debt on bonds’ 
yield spreads. They estimate a model of the cost of debt for initial public debt offers. 
The authors select a sample of 98 initial public offers of straight debt issued over the 
period 1971-1994. Out of their initial sample, 64 firms had bank debt at the time of 
bond issue while the remaining 34 firms did not. They find that the presence of a bank 
loan at the time of issuing public debt bank relation reduces the spread by around 84 
basis points.  
 
2.3.3. Public Debt and Information Produced by Third Parties 
Bondholders in comparison to private lenders do not have an information advantage 
since they do not specialize in producing costly information about the borrower 
(Hadlock & James, 2002). Therefore, bondholders are likely to face greater adverse 
selection problems which results in a higher cost of public debt in terms of a higher risk 
premium, or spread, charged by corporate bondholders over and above the risk free 
interest rate. Information asymmetry determines the degree to which the lender must 
investigate the borrower (Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, & Srinivasan, 2009; Sufi, 2007). 
Therefore, publicly available information produced by third parties or inferred from 
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monitoring third parties activities can be relevant to bondholders if it reduces their 
adverse selection. 
 
Fama (1985) suggests that it is more economical for firms with a large number of 
outside creditors to produce information or purchase information produced by third 
parties such as credit ratings agencies. This will be cost efficient since the produced 
information is jointly useful for creditors, and this in turn reduces the costs of 
duplicating monitoring costs among creditors. Booth (1992), however, notes that the 
diversity of financial claims puts a limit on the degree to which information production, 
centralized or delegated, can reduce monitoring costs. This is because claimants have 
various demands for information, making it difficult to produce jointly useful 
information. In this instance, cross-monitoring between financial claim holders can 
reduce the overall monitoring costs. 
 
Booth (1992) proposes that information produced through monitoring by claimholders 
may reduce the monitoring costs of another claimant. Cross monitoring takes place if 
two agents monitoring the firm could benefit, in terms of reducing monitoring costs, 
from monitoring each other. For example, public debt monitoring is provided, for the 
most part, by credit rating agencies who assign bond ratings. Other claimants, such as 
banks, may find the information produced by credit rating agencies useful. Cross 
monitoring is beneficial if bond ratings in this example reduce the bank’s monitoring 
costs. As Booth suggests, cross monitoring could also include inferred information such 
as the mere presence of other claimants or the observation of prices of other assets in the 
secondary market. 
 
In the cross monitoring hypothesis, monitoring activities by one agent reduces the 
monitoring costs for other agents if all monitoring takes place simultaneously. In other 
words, all monitors are concerned with contemporaneous information about the firm. 
Booth’s hypothesis, therefore, is more consistent with reducing the moral hazard 
problem facing lenders, i.e., catching the firm if it acts opportunistically. In the third 
empirical essay I extend the cross monitoring hypothesis by suggesting that the prior 
monitoring by third parties for the benefit of other financial claimholders, such as 
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ratings assigned to syndicated loans, certifies the true quality of the firm and 
consequently reduces the bondholders’ adverse selection problem. In this context, 
monitoring activates by third parties do not have to be contemporaneous as long as they 
convey information about the true quality of the firm.  
 
In the setting of initial public debt offers, monitoring provided to the firm’s private 
loans may convey valuable information to prospective bondholders. The firm’s private 
loans are monitored by the private lenders themselves. In addition, some private loans 
are monitored by rating agencies when the firm obtains a credit rating for its loan (Fenn, 
2000; Sufi, 2009). As discussed in Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2., strong banking relationship 
indicate that the firm’s business is viable and its credit trustworthy. Also, favourable 
initial bond ratings, compared to loan ratings obtained for private loans issued before 
the firm’s first access to the public debt market, convey a positive signal on the firm’s 
commitment to a high quality credit policy.   
 
2.3.4. Summary 
In summary, the theoretical literature shows that lenders specialize in costly information 
production which gives them an information advantage. The empirical evidence shows 
that firms subject to large information asymmetries are more likely to choose private 
debt. Also, the findings document a positive announcement effect when the firm 
announces the renewal of a bank loan. These findings suggest that banks may possess a 
comparative information advantage which facilitates accurate pricing of information 
problematic securities. It also shows that the presence of banking relationships affect 
equity returns and debt interest rates, that in turn suggests that banks reduce information 
costs for other claimants in capital markets. The literature also suggests that because 
bondholders are not specialized in information production they are likely to depend on 
publicly available information, including information produced by third parties. Public 
information, therefore, plays an important role in determining the degree on which the 
lender must investigate the borrower.  
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The present thesis builds on this literature by examining the effect of aspects of the 
firm’s history of private debt financing on the interest rates charged by prospective 
bondholders, which is a largely ignored topic in the literature. I build on the cross 
monitoring hypothesis by noting that information-related production provided to the 
firm’s private loans may convey valuable information to prospective bondholders. The 
firm’s private loans are monitored by the private lenders themselves and some private 
loans are monitored by rating agencies. I expect that the information conveyed by 
monitoring activities related to the firm’s private debt may affect the investigation costs 
and hence the yield spreads of the initial time bond offer. 
 
2.4. Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter provides a survey of the most influential contributions of the literature that 
examines how information asymmetries resolve in debt markets. I review these 
contributions in two sections depending on the type of the information asymmetry 
problem addressed by the study. 
 
In Section 2.1., I review studies that focus on moral hazard problems in debt markets. 
The theoretical findings of these studies indicate that monitoring activities mitigate the 
moral hazard problem in debt markets. They also show that bondholders are not likely 
to invest in expensive monitoring technologies because of their diffused ownership. 
Therefore, other mechanisms that resolve the moral hazard problems exist in the market 
for corporate debt such as the firm’s reputation. Also, the literature suggests that high 
quality financial reporting facilitates inexpensive monitoring and therefore mitigates 
moral hazard problems facing bondholders.  
 
The empirical evidence focuses primarily on bank monitoring as a mechanism to 
resolve the information asymmetry problem. Specifically, the literature investigates how 
the choice of the lender type (public or private) resolves the information asymmetry 
problem. The empirical findings indicate that firms with characteristics that require less 
monitoring, such as large firms, are likely to issue public debt. Similarly, the empirical 
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findings on the syndicated loan ownership suggest that the lead bank percentage of 
ownership is higher for firms that requires more monitoring.   
 
In addition, a number of studies examine the role of accounting in debt markets. The 
underlying assumption of this body of research is that high quality accounting and 
disclosure policies facilitate better monitoring which result in lower agency costs hence 
a reduction in the cost of debt. The findings of this body of research indicate that firms 
with higher accounting quality are more likely to borrow from public debt markets. The 
findings also indicate that the lead bank retains a smaller proportion of the syndicated 
loan when the borrowers’ accounting systems facilitates better monitoring. In addition 
the empirical evidence documents a negative association between the quality of the 
firm’s accounting and disclosure policy and interest rates. Also, a number of studies 
show that contracting arrangements, in particular debt contracts, induce a demand for 
high quality financial reports. 
 
The first two essays of this thesis focus on the firm’s reputation for high quality of 
financial reporting and communication policies as mechanisms to resolve moral hazard 
problems in the market for corporate debt. I propose that investors in the market for 
corporate debt demand reputations for faithful and timely disclosure and financial 
accounting characterized by timely recognition of economic losses. In order for a firm 
to be a public debt issuer, therefore, it has to promote investors’ confidence in its 
accounting and financial communication policies in order to manage potential costs of 
moral hazard. In the first and second empirical essays, I focus on two methods of 
information communication, namely the issuance of profit warnings in the context of 
low litigation threat and the adoption of timely loss recognition policy in the context of 
accessing the public debt markets for the first time. 
 
The first empirical essay contributes to the extant literature by investigating the effect of 
reputational concerns on companies’ motives to make event-driven (conditional) 
disclosures. This investigation is consistent with the theoretical prediction that the 
firm’s reputation for faithful and timely disclosure plays a critical role in alleviating 
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moral hazard problems facing bondholders and reduces agency costs. To the best of my 
knowledge, this is the first study to examine this effect.  
 
The second empirical essay contributes to the empirical literature on the influence of 
debt market demand on accounting attributes, in particular timely loss recognition. To 
the best of my knowledge, this is the first study that examines the change in the firm’s 
asymmetric earnings timeliness when a firm transits from private to public debt status. 
 
In Section 2.3., I review studies that focus on adverse selection problems in debt 
markets, in particular studies that analyze the bank’s comparative information 
advantage. These studies show that private lenders specialize in costly information 
production which allows them to obtain firm-specific information about the firm. The 
information advantage of private lenders overcomes the problem of asymmetric 
information since it facilitates accurate valuation of the firm. The empirical evidence 
finds that information problematic securities are more likely to borrow privately. In 
addition, the evidence shows that the announcement of renewals of bank loans is 
positive and significant which suggests that the renewal of bank loans convey positive 
signals about the firm quality. In addition, the evidence suggests that other agents in the 
capital markets, both equity and debt, value banking relationship because it conveys 
positive signals about the firm’s quality.  
 
In addition, the literature suggests that bondholders do not have an information 
advantage since they do not specialize in producing costly information about the 
borrower and therefore may face greater adverse selection problems. Since information 
asymmetry is characterized by the level of publicly available information and reflects 
the degree on which the lender must investigate the borrower, information produced by 
third parties could play an important role in determining the degree on which the lender 
must investigate the borrower.  
 
In this thesis, I focus on information available to bondholders and produced by third 
parties, as opposed to information produced by the firm, specifically information 
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produced by credit rating agencies and financial intermediaries. I also investigate 
information that is not produced directly for the benefit of the firm’s bondholders. I 
suggest that bondholders observe the information-related services provided by third 
parties for the holders of other financial claims, such as syndicated loans, to infer the 
true quality of the firm. This proposition resembles the cross monitoring hypothesis that 
suggests that monitoring by one type of investor can be valuable for other types of 
investors because it reduces the latter’s costs of monitoring the firm. 
 
In the third empirical essay I employ the setting of initial public debt offers to 
investigate the effect of monitoring activates by third parties on interest rates. The 
firm’s private loans issued before its entry to the public debt market are monitored by 
the private lenders themselves. Monitoring by lenders as evident from the literature is 
valuable for investors in the equity and debt markets. Also some private loans are 
monitored by rating agencies if the firm obtains a credit rating for those loans. In the 
third empirical essay I examine the impact of two elements of the firm’s record of 
private debt financing before its entry to the public debt markets on the yield spread of 
the initial public debt offering. These two elements are the difference between the credit 
ratings between the firm’s initial bond and its prior private loan rating; and the strength 
of the relationship between the firm and its relationship bank. To the best of my 
knowledge, this is the first study to examine these effects. The overall evidence 
presented in the third empirical essay contributes to the existence body of research on 
cross monitoring. It also corroborates existing evidence on the benefits of bank loans in 
producing valuable information about the borrower.  
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Chapter 3 
The Influence of Public Debt on the Willingness of UK Firms to 
Issue Profit Warnings5 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This study investigates empirically the influence of public corporate debt on the 
willingness of UK firms to issue profit warnings. UK firms operate within a legal 
environment that is less litigious compared to their US counterparts. In contrast to the 
US, this setting allows for motives other than fear of litigation to affect firms’ decisions 
to warn. Our results indicate that UK firms with public debt are more forthcoming with 
the disclosure of permanent negative news. Also, our results show that UK firms 
without public debt are more likely to hide bad news when they are closer to financial 
distress. However, we fail to find similar evidence for UK firms with public debt. These 
findings suggest that firms with public debt are deterred from hiding negative news for 
fear of damaging their reputation for truthful and timely disclosure. Public debt appears 
to act as a disciplinary mechanism on corporate disclosure policy. 
 
 
JEL classification: G18; G32; G38; K22, N24 
Keywords: Profit Warnings; Earnings Surprise; Public Debt; Financial Distress; Threat 
of Litigation 
 
 
                                            
5 We thank participants at the 34th EAA annual congress especially Pauline Weetman;  participants at the 
10th Trans-Atlantic Doctoral Conference; and at the 3rd Doctoral Symposium in Accounting and Finance 
at Monash's Prato Centre especially our discussant Allan Hodgson, for providing useful comments. 
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3.1. Introduction 
This study investigates empirically the influence of public corporate debt on the 
willingness of UK firms to issue profit earnings. There are different incentives that 
motivate the firm’s decision to voluntarily disclose, positive private information and 
negative private information (Dye, 2001; Healy & Palepu, 2001). One important but 
largely unexplored motive to disclose bad news is the firm’s reputational concerns. 
Skinner (1994) suggests that firms who fail to disclose bad news promptly may incur 
reputational costs. In this study we investigate the firm’s reputational concerns by 
identifying a sub-set of firms who are likely to have reputational capital, namely 
companies with outstanding public debt issues. We choose firms with public debt 
because their long-run reputation for faithful and timely disclosure alleviates moral 
hazard problems faced by bondholders (Diamond, 1989, 1991). We focus on the UK 
experience because it provides an interesting contrast to the US where profit warnings 
are driven largely by fear of litigation. In the UK the frequency of profit warnings is 
high even though the risk of legal action by shareholders or debtholders against 
companies is low. 
 
Investigating the motives for disclosing bad news is interesting. A priori one may expect 
that managers have incentives to disclose only relatively good news (Skinner, 1994). 
However, if investors discount the share price whenever they infer that managers are 
withholding information, then managers have incentives to disclose all news (including 
bad news) to prevent share prices from falling beyond their true values. On the other 
hand, this argument may not hold for several reasons. Dye (1985), for example, 
proposes that investors may not be certain about the existence of private information 
and therefore cannot infer from managers’ silence that they are withholding bad news. 
In addition, managers’ information consists of proprietary and non-proprietary 
components. Failure to release news regarding the non-proprietary component may not 
necessarily cause a fall in the firm’s share price since investors form estimates on both 
components of managers’ information (Dye, 1984). Therefore, it is not obvious why 
firms would voluntarily disclose bad news.  
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US based research predicts that fear of litigation is the main reason for disclosing 
negative news (Skinner, 1994). Failing to disclose a large negative earnings surprise 
may expose the firm to potential lawsuits from shareholders and other affected parties. 
Empirical evidence suggests that US firms subject to a higher probability of shareholder 
litigation are more likely to disclose bad news (Kasznik & Lev, 1995). In the US, 
disclosure deters some types of litigation (Field, Lowry, & Shu, 2005) and leads to a 
lower settlement amount even if a lawsuit cannot be avoided (Skinner, 1997).  
 
The present study focuses on the UK market that has experienced a high frequency of 
profit warnings (Collett, 2004; Helbok & Walker, 2003), although the legal environment 
is substantially less litigious than the US (Black, Cheffins, & Klausner, 2005; Armour, 
Black, Cheffins, & Nolan, 2009). We argue that this setting provides a useful 
opportunity to analyse the impact of factors besides litigation risk that influence 
companies’ decision to warn.  
 
The disclosure literature shows that accounting disclosure can reduce information 
asymmetries between the firm and its investors and potentially lower the firm’s cost of 
capital (Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991; Healy & Palepu, 2001; Verrecchia, 2001). In 
addition, Lambert, Leuz and Verrecchia (2007) show that in a multi-security setting, 
disclosure can reduce the firm’s cost of capital by affecting investors’ assessments of 
the distribution of the firm’s cashflows, thereby reducing the firm’s non-diversifiable 
risk.6 In this chapter we argue that the firm’s long-run reputation of speedy and faithful 
disclosure of bad news reduces the moral hazard problems faced by public bondholders. 
The firm’s reputation overcomes the free rider problem and the inefficient duplication 
of monitoring costs resulting from contracting with multiple uncoordinated investors 
(Diamond, 1989, 1991). Therefore, we expect public debt issuers to face incentives to 
establish and maintain reputations for truthful and timely disclosure of information in 
                                            
6 The negative association between disclosure and the cost of capital depends on several assumptions 
including that the changes in the disclosure policy are exogenous. However, Larcker and Rusticus (2010) 
note that endogenous disclosure choice might lead to an ambiguous relation between disclosure and cost 
of capital. In this respect, Clinch and Verrecchia (2011) show that endogenous voluntary disclosure and 
the cost of capital could be positively related. For instance, if the level of investors’ risk aversion 
increases, investors will discount the price of the security more severely and at the same time the firm will 
disclose more to counter the higher discount. 
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order to reduce agency costs of debt. Hence, we predict companies with public debt to 
be more likely than companies without public debt to disclose bad news.  
  
In addition to the lower litigation risk, UK regulations give managers leeway to delay 
disclosure of bad news in the event of financial distress. The UK regulator, the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA), allows companies to delay the disclosure of inside 
information in the interests of shareholders in cases where “the financial viability of the 
issuer is in grave and imminent danger” (Disclosure and Transparency Rules, Section 
2.5.3). In this study we examine if managers of UK firms facing financial difficulties 
are less likely to warn the market of bad news in order to avoid or reduce financial 
distress costs.  
 
In this respect, our study is similar to Helbok and Walker (2003) who find evidence that 
UK firms withhold disclosure when they are closer to financial distress. However, our 
sample period is characterized by the introduction of more rigorous market abuse rules 
compared to Helbok and Walker’s sample period. In 2000, the Financial Services and 
Markets Acts (FSMA) came into effect in the UK market. The FSMA prohibits 
practices and statements for the purpose of misleading the market and introduces civil 
penalties for market abuse. It also allows civil penalties for market abuse by the FSA 
and civil liability actions by investors. Theoretically, the threat of litigation post 2000 is 
expected to be higher compared to the threat of litigation prior to 2000. However, in 
practice the UK legal system still makes it difficult for investors to sue the firm or its 
directors, and thus, fear of litigation is still less dominant in the UK market. Thus, it is 
interesting to examine if the evidence documented in Helbok and Walker continues after 
the introduction of the Market Abuse Rules. 
 
Our results show that UK firms with public debt are more likely to warn the market if 
the bad news is permanent. Also, our findings indicate that UK firms closer to financial 
distress, approximated by the interest cover ratio, are more likely to delay the disclosure 
of bad news until the announcement of the firm’s annual results. However, when we 
control for the issue of public debt, we find that it is only companies without public debt 
who delay warnings in the case of financial distress, while we find no financial-distress 
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effect on disclosure for companies with public debt. These results suggest that firms 
with public debt have incentives to adopt disclosure policies that protect their valuable 
reputations with bondholders for timely disclosure.  
 
Our study contributes to the disclosure literature, in particular the literature on 
companies’ motives to make event-driven (conditional) disclosures. This is the first 
study to show that reputational concerns exert a significant influence on the decision to 
warn in a context where litigation concerns are relatively insignificant. In addition, the 
present study tests the robustness of Helbok and Walker (2003) closeness to financial 
distress effect using out-of-sample data for a significantly larger sample size. The 
findings of this study also complement the recent US evidence that accounting 
disclosure alleviates information asymmetry facing lenders and consequently reduces 
the cost of debt (Sengupta, 1998; Yu, 2005). 
 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the UK institutional 
framework with particular emphasis on the UK regulations related to the timely 
dissemination of price sensitive information. Section 3 outlines our hypotheses, and data 
and methodology. Descriptive statistics are presented in Section 4, and the results of our 
analysis are reported in Section 5. We summarize the findings and conclude in Section 
6. 
 
3.2. Literature Review 
3.2.1. Comparison of the Threat of Litigation in the UK and the US 
It is important to recognize the limits of the threat of litigation within the UK regime of 
public disclosure, especially in comparison to the US regime. This is necessary in 
assessing the extent to which other motives may influence UK firms’ disclosure 
decisions. Both the UK and the US are common-law jurisdictions with quite similar 
scores on measures of legal quality such as the efficiency of the judicial system and the 
rule of law (La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, 1998). Also the UK and the 
US companies score similarly on measures of minority shareholders protection (La 
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Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, 1999). However, in practice, there is an 
evident divergence of the enforcement of the legal rules between the UK and the US. 
 
Black et al. (2005), Coffee (2008), and Armour et al. (2009) argue that several features 
of the US legal system and its corporate law encourage private litigation in comparison 
with the UK and other legal systems. We summarize these features in Table 1.  
 
Table 3.1: Comparison of the US and UK Legal Systems 
 
 US UK 
Legal Expenses Each party pays its own legal 
expenses (in successful derivative 
suits the corporation will pay the legal 
expenses of the shareholder litigant)
The loser pays 
Class Actions Plaintiffs routinely bring class actions 
against directors under corporate and 
securities law. 
Not available 
Contingency Fees Widely used Prohibited 
Directors’ Duties Owed directly to shareholders Owed to the company 
Direct Suits Possible if the injury is direct to 
shareholders’ interest
Not available since directors 
owe their duties to the company
Derivative Suits Fairly easy to obtain Theoretically possible but in 
practice very difficult to sustain a 
derivative suit 
Directors’ 
Liability in Case 
of  Misleading 
disclosure 
Available under the SEC Rule  
10(b) – 5 
Liability for companies not 
directors 
 
With respect to the US legal system, Black et al. (2005) and Coffee (2009) note that the 
US legal system encourages litigation for several reasons. First, in the US, each party in 
a law suit pays its own legal expenses regardless of the outcome of the claim. Thus, a 
claimant (plaintiff) could bring a minor case to court since she does not have to pay the 
defendant’s expenses in the event the claim is dismissed. In the UK, however, the loser 
pays the winner’s costs, making it difficult for smaller investors to take action. Second, 
class actions, in which a large group of plaintiffs collectively bring a claim to court 
and/or in which a class of defendants is being sued, are a US phenomenon. Class actions 
encourage private litigation because it lowers the cost of litigation on individual 
plaintiffs. The recovery amount of an individual plaintiff could not provide her with 
enough incentive to bring a case to the court taking into account the litigation costs. 
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Third, US law firms offer contingent fees plans based on a percentage of damages 
awarded to their clients. Contingent fees provide plaintiffs the incentives to sue since 
they do not bear the risk of having to pay the entire costs of unsuccessful lawsuits. This 
practice is prohibited in the UK. 
 
In addition, Armour et al. (2009) note that under US corporate law, directors owe duties 
of loyalty and care directly to shareholders. In comparison, under the UK’s Companies 
Act the directors owe duties to act in the best interests of the company. The implication 
of this is that “the company is the only “proper plaintiff” in a suit alleging breach of 
duty” (Armour et al., 2009, p. 695). In other words, the board of directors of a UK 
company controls litigation decisions arising from potential breach of directors’ duties. 
This could lead to conflict of interest since directors will rarely sue each other. In 
addition, investors in the US can sustain and commence law suits against a company in 
the form of a direct suit or a derivative suit.7 In practice, it is often possible for 
shareholders in the US to bring direct and derivative suits against a director. In the UK, 
however, direct suits are not available because there is little foundation for a “direct” 
breach of duty as directors owe their duties to the company not to shareholders. In 
addition, derivative suits are difficult to sustain and are rarely admitted by courts under 
UK case law.8  
 
In relation to the company’s liability for withholding disclosure, the US specifies the 
SEC Rule 10(b)-5 which prohibits making “any untrue statement of a material fact or to 
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made”. Investors 
can enforce the requirements of rule 10b-5 through lawsuits by holding liable any 
person (including directors) responsible for making the misleading disclosure. In 
contrast, the statutory liability in the UK is for companies but not directors. 
 
                                            
7 In direct suits, the director’s breach of duty has to injure shareholders directly. Comparatively, in 
derivative suits, the injury is principally to the company, and therefore, shareholders bring derivative suits 
against a director for violating his or her duties on behalf of the company. 
8 See the Companies Act 2006, Part 11, Chapter 1, Section 263 for details of the conditions under which 
UK courts permit derivative suits. 
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With respect to the extant empirical evidence on the comparative private enforcement of 
litigation in the UK and the US, Armour et al. (2009) find that in the UK the number of 
claims against directors of publicly traded (listed companies in the LSE or AIM) 
amounted to 6 cases during the period 2004-2006. In comparison, the number of cases 
in the US amounted to 399 during the period 2000-2007. Armour et al. (2009, p. 700) 
conclude that: 
[W]e cannot say with confidence that directors of publicly traded U.K. companies 
face no risk of being named as a defendant in a claim in English courts under U.K. 
company law, but can say with reasonable confidence that the risk is very low.  
 
In summary, we argue that the nature of the UK legal system limits the threat of legal 
action against the company by investors disgruntled with the lack of corporate 
disclosure.  
 
3.2.2. Regulatory Framework in the UK 
This section outlines the regulatory framework in the UK and its evolution starting from 
the issuance of the Guidance on the Dissemination of Price Sensitive Information (PSI) 
in 1994. We aim to show that UK regulations favour shareholders at the expense of 
other interested parties in the event of financial distress.  
 
The first UK market rules to deal with the fair dissemination of corporate private 
information that could affect the value of the firm’s securities were issued by the 
London Stock Exchange (LSE) in 1994. The LSE Listing Rules (LR) of 1994, Chapter 
9 “Continuing Obligations” states that:  
A company must notify the Company Announcement Office without delay of any 
major new developments in its sphere of activity which are not public knowledge 
which may, by virtue of the effect of those developments on its assets and liabilities 
or financial position or on the general course of its business, lead to substantial 
movement in the price of its listed securities . . . or significantly affect its ability to 
meet its commitments (Listing Rules 1994, paragraph 9.1) 
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Due to the considerable ambiguity with regard to what constitutes a substantial 
movement in a security’s price, the LSE published the Guidance on the Dissemination 
of Price Sensitive Information (PSI). The purpose of publishing the Guidance was to 
assist the company’s judgment by giving examples of situations that may fall under the 
definition of PSI (paragraphs 4 and 5). One situation is the case of profit warnings, the 
Guidance states: 
It is in the nature of analysts’ forecasts that they should differ - sometimes 
significantly. In most circumstances a company is not obliged to make an 
announcement correcting public forecasts by analysts. However, a company should 
correct serious and significant errors which come to its attention which in its view 
have led to a widespread and serious misapprehension in the market (The Guidance 
1996, paragraph 21). 
 
Up to 2000, however, the Listing Rules and the accompanying Guidance did not specify 
any penalties for firms in breach of the rules. In May 2000 the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) took over the supervision of the UK Listing Authority (UKLA) from 
the London Stock Exchange. The FSA is given its legal power by the Financial Services 
and Market Act of 2000 (FSMA). The FSMA prohibited practices and statements for 
the purpose of misleading the market: 
Any person who does not act or engages in any course of conduct which creates a 
false or misleading impression as to the market in or the price or value of any 
relevant investments is guilty of an offence if he does so for the purpose of creating 
that impression and of thereby inducing another person to acquire, dispose of, 
subscribe for or otherwise those investments or to refrain from doing so or to 
exercise, or refrain from exercising, any rights conferred by those investments 
(FSMA 2000, Section 397). 
 
Firms or directors in breach of the FSMA are liable to be prosecuted by the FSA and 
may be subject to civil liability actions by investors. In addition, the FSMA required the 
FSA to publish a code that gives guidance to whether or not behaviour amounts to 
market abuse. On the 1st of December 2001 the Code of Market Conduct came into 
effect. After 2000, subsequent editions of the Guidance acknowledge that acts that 
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breach the Listing Rules may also breach the market abuse regime outlined in the 
FSMA and the Code. 
 
In 2005, changes to the Listing Rules and to the FSMA took place to reflect the 
implementation of the EU Market Abuse Directive (MAD) in the UK. The 
implementation of the Market Abuse Directive involved changes to the rules governing 
the dissemination of price sensitive information (PSI). As a result, new disclosure rules, 
known as the Disclosure and Transparency Rules (DTR), replaced the previous regime 
for public disclosure of information outlined in Chapter 9 of the UKLA’s Listing Rules 
and the Guidance. In a special issue of List!, the FSA clarifies the relation between the 
Guide and the new Disclosure Rules: 
[M]uch of the PSI Guide is either general in its application and not relevant to a 
specific rule (such as the general guidance relating to ‘A framework for handling 
price sensitive information’) or simply a repetition or restatement of the rules (such 
as the guidance relating to ‘Exemptions from the duty to disclose’). While other 
elements of the PSI Guide represent ‘good practice’ (such as web-casts of 
presentations and regular trading updates) . . . We therefore consider that the bulk of 
the PSI Guide is not suitable to be retained as formal guidance (FSA, 2005, p. 2). 
 
It is vital to note that both the DTR and the Guide deal with the dissemination of PSI 
and inside information, although using different terms. In the above mentioned issue of 
List!, the FSA states that: 
As was the case under the previous rules governing the dissemination of Price 
Sensitive Information (PSI), it remains vital that a company is able to ensure that its 
systems, controls and internal procedures enable it to identify inside information and 
once identified, publish that information to the market as soon as possible (FSA, 
2005, p. 1).  
In another section, it states that: 
In implementing relevant requirements of MAD through the Disclosure Rules, we 
have attempted to make the Disclosure Rules follow the language of MAD as 
closely as possible. We have largely achieved this aim. The result is that the 
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language and format of the Disclosure Rules are different from those of the Listing 
Rules. In the light of this, simply carrying forward the existing PSI Guide in its 
entirety was not an option (FSA, 2005, p. 2).  
 
In this study, we argue that the UK regulations give managers leeway to withhold 
disclosure of unexpected and significant bad news. According to the Disclosure and 
Transparency Rules (DTR), issuers must notify a Regulatory Information Service (RIS) 
with information that: 
Would be likely to be used by a reasonable investor as part of the basis of his 
investment decisions and would therefore be likely to have a significant effect on 
the price of the issuer’s financial instruments (DTR, Section 2.2.4).  
 
However, Section 2.5.3 of the Disclosure and Transparency Rules (DTR) states that 
delaying disclosure is legitimate in case of: 
[N]egotiations in course, or related elements where the outcome or normal pattern of 
those negotiations would be likely to be affected by public disclosure (DTR, Section 
2.5.3).  
 
This section continues to explain that the exemption is intended to aid the long-term 
recovery of the company and to protect the interests of existing and potential 
shareholders, arguably at the expense of other parties including lenders and suppliers:  
In particular, in the event that the financial viability of the issuer is in grave and 
imminent danger, although not within the scope of the applicable insolvency law, 
public disclosure of information may be delayed for a limited period where such a 
public disclosure would seriously jeopardise the interest of existing and potential 
shareholders by undermining the conclusion of specific negotiations designed to 
ensure the long term financial recovery of the issuer (DTR, Section 2.5.3). 
 
In terms of the implementation of the rules, the willingness of the FSA to penalize firms 
in breach of disclosure rules has been called into question. For instance, Dedman (2004) 
argues that the FSA is lenient when it comes to enforcing sanctions on firms who 
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commit market abuse. In addition, Coffee (2009) reports that during the period 2001-
2006, the SEC brought over 300 insider trading enforcement actions. In addition the US 
Department of Justice criminally convicted 88 prosecutions over the same period. While 
in the UK the number of insider trading enforcement actions brought by the FSA 
amounted to 8 only cases over the period 2001-2008. 
 
In conclusion, we argue that if a conflict of interest over disclosure arises between 
shareholders and a third party, including lenders, the rules and their implementation 
support the interest of shareholders.  
 
3.2.3. Prior Research 
3.2.3.1. Threat of Litigation 
Skinner (1994) suggests that managers’ decisions to warn are heavily influenced by the 
litigation threat especially when the firm is subject to a large negative earnings surprise. 
This is because stockholders can establish that managers failed to disclose adverse 
earnings news promptly. Therefore, managers have incentives to pre-empt negative 
earnings news by disclosing the information voluntarily prior to the mandated 
announcement date. Following this strategy minimizes the expected legal costs in two 
ways. First, disclosing early weakens the plaintiff’s argument that managers withheld 
bad news since it is difficult to establish when the manager became informed by the bad 
news. Second, early disclosure limits the number of potential trades of shares during the 
period of nondisclosure (only buyers and sellers during the class period can sue, 
therefore, the shorter the period the smaller the number of investors who qualify as 
members of a class action suit).  
 
How difficult is it to bring a law suit against the firm or its directors to the US courts? 
Skinner (1994, p. 41) points out that: “While each of these  requirements [of Rule 10b-
5] involve subtle and complex issues of law, there is evidence to suggest that the law 
operates more simply”. According to Skinner, there are at least two reasons why it is 
easy to bring a lawsuit under Rule 10b-5: i) most 10b-5 cases are brought as a result of a 
large share price decline (which then can be tied to a previous misleading or omitted 
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disclosure); and ii) most cases are settled outside the court due to managers fear of 
reputational costs, and thus, the legal technicalities become less significant than the 
triggering event. If investors can easily bring a lawsuit against the firm and/or its 
directors as a result of a large price movement, potentially caused by substantial new 
information in the earnings announcement, then managers have strong incentives to 
disseminate adverse information more quickly to deter the threat of litigation. 
 
The empirical evidence that examines the litigation motives for voluntarily disclosing 
bad news provides conflicting evidence on the causal relation between warnings and the 
incidence of lawsuits.9 Francis, Philbrick, & Schipper (1994) find that warnings in their 
sample tend to be followed by lawsuits, which appears to suggest that disclosure results 
in more, rather than less, litigation. To account for the endogeneity between warnings 
and the incidence of lawsuits  Field et al. (2005) use a simultaneous equations system 
and find a negative but insignificant relationship between lawsuits and disclosure. 
However, when the authors exclude dismissed lawsuits, which arguably add noise to the 
regression, they find that lawsuits are negatively related to disclosure at the 5% 
significance level. Skinner (1997) finds that the settlement amounts, controlling for 
estimated stockholder damages, are smaller for lawsuits with more timely disclosures 
(measured as the number of days between the disclosure and the end of the fiscal 
quarter). Although the overall evidence is not conclusive, it seems to suggest that even 
if warning may not deter litigation it could lead to lower settlement amounts.  
 
In the next section we present the main empirical studies, relevant to this work, on the 
determinants of issuing a profit warning. Specifically, we describe in detail Kasznik and 
Lev’s (1995) investigation of the warning choice for US companies. Then, we highlight 
Helbok and Walker’s (2003) extension of Kasznik and Lev’s model.   
 
 
                                            
9 As Skinner (1997) notes this could be, in part, due to methodological issues. The probability of warning 
and the probability of getting sued are not observable, and more importantly, are endogenous. Firms 
subject to large adverse earnings surprises have strong incentives to disclose the bad news, but at the 
same time, these particular firms face the highest probability of litigation. Therefore, the association 
between warning and being sued may appear to be positive instead of negative, meaning that warning did 
not deter litigation. 
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3.2.3.2. Motives for Issuing Profit Warnings 
Kasznik and Lev (1995) investigate the disclosure policies of firms facing a large 
earnings surprise. Their sample consists of US firms with an earnings surprise in the 
fourth fiscal quarter of the years 1988-1990. They identify the sample firm-years by 
measuring the deviation of actual earnings from the analyst consensus forecast at the 
start of the fourth quarter. They select all firms with deviations greater than or equal to  
-1% (in absolute value) relative to the market price.  
 
The authors’ final sample consists of 565 firm-years, out of which 394 had negative 
earnings surprise and 171 had positive earnings surprise. The authors document 
considerable variation in US firms’ disclosure policies, with 293 firms disclosing prior 
to the announcement date and 272 firms withholding from disclosure. Out of the 293 
disclosure firms, 219 disclosed bad news and only 74 disclosed good news. The 
frequency of disclosing to non-disclosing firms for firms facing a negative earnings 
surprise is 56%, while the frequency of disclosure for firms facing good news is 43%. 
 
To investigate the determinants of disclosure of bad news, the authors estimate the 
following model: 
 1regulated techhigh surpriseearningssize    warning
4321    
They find that larger firms are more likely to disclose bad news. They also find that 
firms facing larger earnings surprise are more likely to disclose. Finally, they find that 
firms in high-tech industries are more likely to disclose bad news, while firms in 
regulated industries are less likely to disclose bad news. These results are consistent 
with Skinner’s (1994) argument that litigation threat is the dominant motive for 
disclosing bad news. Larger firms operating in high-tech technologies and facing larger 
surprises are expected to be subject to higher litigation threat, and thus, have higher 
incentives to disclose to minimize the risk of litigation. 
 
Helbok and Walker (2003) extends Kasznik and Lev’s (1995) warning model (equation 
1) by examining the potential impact of debt agency conflicts on the issuance of profit 
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warnings. They note that the LSE rules allow for a delay in the disclosure of bad news 
when the firm’s financial health is in question, which gives management more control 
over the timing of the disclosure. The authors suggest that the management, acting in 
the best interest of shareholders, could take advantage of the delay in the announcement 
of bad news by transferring wealth from lenders to shareholders. To test if UK firms 
exhibit opportunistic behaviour with regard to the timing of the disclosure decision, the 
authors model the decision to warn by including an interest cover ratio in their 
disclosure choice model. The interest cover captures the closeness to financial distress, 
whereby firms with lower interest cover ratio are more likely to be closer financial 
distress. They find that interest cover is negatively related to the decision of warning 
implying that firms closer to financial difficulties are less willing to warn.  
 
3.2.3.3. Stock Returns for Warning and Non-Warning Firms and 
Permanence of Bad News 
Kasznik and Lev (1995) also compare the stock returns of firms that experience 
negative earnings surprises and warned the market with the returns of firms that did not 
warn. They find that the stock returns of firms that issued profit warnings are 
significantly lower than the returns of the firms that did not issue warnings. This finding 
suggests that the market is rewarding the non-warning firms and is penalizing the 
warning firms. As Tucker (2007) notes, if investors penalize disclosure then the 
frequency of issuing profit warnings should decline. However, the frequency of warning 
has been increasing steadily. Several studies propose different explanations for this 
result.  
 
Kasznik and Lev (1995) propose that the significant lower stock returns for warning 
firms compared to non-warning firms is a result of investors’ anticipation of the 
persistence of the earnings surprise over several periods. To support their explanation, 
Kasznik and Lev show that analysts revise their one-year ahead earnings forecasts more 
negatively for warning firms than for no-warning firms. In spirit of Kasznik and Lev 
explanation, Xu (2006) finds that the stock returns are not significantly different 
between warning and non-warnings after controlling for the revisions of analysts’ one-
year ahead forecasts.  
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In addition, Tucker (2007) argues that managers self-select warning the market of 
negative earnings surprises based on their private information of ‘other bad news’. 
Tucker does not find a significant difference between stock returns for the warning and 
non-warning firms once she controls for the self selection in the managers’ decision to 
warn. 
 
In this study, we follow on this literature by investigating the impact of the permanence 
of bad news on the UK companies’ decision to warn the market of bad news.  
 
3.3. Research Design 
3.3.1. Hypotheses Development 
The importance of the threat of litigation on the firm’s decision to disclose bad news 
depends on the nature of the legal system. As discussed in the previous section, the legal 
environment in the UK is considerably less litigious than in the US. Therefore, we 
expect motives other than litigation risk to influence the warning choices of UK firms. 
Our first hypothesis focuses on the effect of the presence of public debt on the firm’s 
decision to warn. Companies that are caught hiding bad news may face a loss to their 
reputational capital, and therefore we expect them to be less likely to opportunistically 
withhold bad news. We argue that companies with outstanding public debt are more 
concerned with their reputation for truthful and timely disclosure than firms with no 
debt or with only private debt.10 Reputation helps companies limit the agency costs of 
debt due to conflicts of interest between shareholders and debtholders. It reduces the 
need for expensive control mechanisms such as restrictive covenants and monitoring by 
debtholders (Diamond, 1989), and reduces debtholders’ monitoring costs (Diamond, 
1991). If a company takes an action that damages its reputation, its cost of debt rises, 
and it may even lose its credit lines. Thus, firms with public debt have incentives to 
                                            
10 Diamond (1989, p. 829) views reputation as “arising from learning over time from observed behaviour 
about some exogenous characteristics of agents. Reputation effects on decisions arise when an agent 
adjusts his or her behaviour to influence data others use in learning about him”. According to this 
definition, reputation has the following attributes: it is acquired over potentially a long time horizon and it 
becomes valuable asset that could depreciate in value in case of unfavourable event. In this study, the 
firm’s reputation arises from its commitment to timely disclosure. In the event the firm fails to disclose in 
a timely fashion bondholders are expected to undervalue the firm’s reputation (commitment to timely 
disclosure).  
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adopt disclosure policies that enhance their reputations. Our first hypothesis predicts 
that: 
H1: Firms with public debt are more likely to issue profit warnings than firms without 
public debt. 
 
Another factor that emerges in the context of low threat of litigation is the firm’s 
willingness to issue profit warnings when it faces financial difficulties. Kothari, Shu & 
Wysocki (2009) argue that managers incur direct and indirect costs resulting from the 
disclosure of bad news.11 These costs are likely to amplify in times of financial 
difficulties. Therefore, managers of companies facing financial difficulties face 
incentives to hide bad news to gain at the expense of stakeholders. However, we argue 
that in companies with significant debtholders, managers face even greater incentives to 
hide bad news. This is because companies facing financial difficulties may be unable to 
fulfil their contractual obligations with third parties. Examples of third parties include 
current and potential lenders, suppliers, and customers. Disclosure of bad news when 
the firm is facing financial difficulties may lead third parties to renegotiate their current 
contracts to reflect the new state of the firm. Third parties may also refuse to enter into 
new contracts or charge higher rates/fees than they would normally charge. Thus, firms 
have incentives to hide bad news from third parties when they are facing financial 
difficulties. Also, the Institutional Background section shows that UK regulation 
exempts firms from disclosure due to ongoing negotiations. Hence, we predict that: 
H2: Firms facing financial difficulties are less likely to issue a profit warning. 
 
3.3.2. Data and Methodology  
The sample includes all UK listed, non-financial firms available from the FactSet 
database during the period 2001-2008. FactSet has comprehensive coverage of profit 
warnings starting from 2001. The data items collected from FactSet include the firms’ 
fiscal dates, annual and interim announcement dates, profit warnings dates, and actual 
                                            
11 Disclosing bad news could result in indirect costs since it can affect managers’ promotion 
opportunities, and raise the possibility of terminating their contracts and revising their short and long term 
compensation plans. Direct costs of disclosing bad news include the reduction in managers’ bonuses and 
the loss of their wealth as a result of the stock price decline. 
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EPS. FactSet also provides information related to consensus forecasts including the 
mean and median consensus, number of analysts, and forecasts for one period ahead. 
We match the International Securities Identification Numbers (ISIN) of UK companies 
identified in FactSet with companies’ ISINs identified in Datastream. Then, we select 
all firm-years with negative earnings surprises as outlined below. We exclude 
observations if the annual announcement date is recorded before the fiscal year-end 
date. We also exclude observations if the time period between the annual announcement 
date and the fiscal date is more than 7 months. The final sample consists of 829 firm-
year observations with negative earnings surprises and with all necessary data.12 The 
sample selection process is described in Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2: Sample Selection 
 
Table 3.2 reports the sample selection process. The sample consists of UK firms subject to a negative 
earnings surprise over the period 2001-2008. 
Number of firm-years subject to a negative earnings surprise with all necessary information 1204 
Number of firm-years with a negative earnings surprise greater than 1% 836 
Number of firm-years with annual announcement date before the fiscal year end (3) 
Number of firm-years with time period between annual announcement date and fiscal date 
more than 7 months 
(4) 
Final Sample 
Firm-years subject to a negative earnings surprise of greater than 1% 
829
 
We examine the factors that motivate companies facing unexpected bad news (in terms 
of negative earnings surprises) to make profit warnings. This requires identifying bad-
news companies using a proxy for the earnings surprise. Following Kasznik and Lev 
(1995), we assume that managers have accurate private information about the firm’s 
earnings for some time before the earnings announcement, and that the earnings surprise 
represents the difference between the managers’ private information and the market’s 
expectations about the upcoming earnings. Therefore, we use the actual EPS to proxy 
                                            
12 Helbok and Walker (2003) sample consists of 208 observations over the period 1995-1998. The 
distribution of warning and non-warning firms is remarkably different between the two studies. While 
Helbok and Walker report 106 warning and 102 non-warning observations, we report 180 warning and 
649 non-warning observations. The increase of warning observations is more likely to be due to the 
longer sample period. However, the increase of the non-warning observations is potentially due to the use 
of a different database (we use FactSet, while Helbok and Walker use IBES). We believe that FactSet 
database provides a better source of information on the UK market as it has an extensive coverage of 
small UK firms. Small firms are more likely to exit the market earlier compared to larger firms, in part 
due to financial difficulties. One of our main hypotheses examines the effect of the firm’s financial 
position on its disclosure behaviour. Therefore, it is important to include firms with low probability of 
survival as their incentives to disclose bad news could be different compared to firms with high 
probability of survival. 
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for managers’ expectations of the upcoming earnings. To proxy for the market’s 
expectation, we use analysts’ consensus EPS forecast after the announcement of interim 
results (or in case of quarterly reports, after the publication of the third-quarter results). 
 
Most UK firms report semi-annually, but some choose to report on a quarterly basis. For 
firms that report semi-annually we focus on the earnings surprise for the second half of 
the year and calculate the earnings surprise using the consensus earnings forecast for the 
year t at the start of the second half (after the announcement of interim results). For 
firms that report on a quarterly basis, we focus on the earnings surprise for the fourth 
quarter of the year and calculate the earnings surprise using the consensus earnings 
forecast for the year t at the start of the fourth quarter (after the announcement of third 
quarter results). 
 
Following Kasznik and Lev (1995) we calculate the earnings surprise (ES) as follows: 
   21P FAES )erim(int,i
t
)erim(int,iit
it 

 
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where Ait is the actual announced EPS; Fti,t(interim) is the analysts’ mean (median) 
consensus forecast of EPS after the announcement of semi annual results (or third 
quarter results in case of quarterly reports); and  Pi,t(interim)  is the share price at the end of 
the second quarter (or third quarter results in case of quarterly reports). 
 
We include in our sample all firm-years during 2001-2008 with economically 
significant, or material, bad news. We define material bad news as firm-years with an 
earnings surprise of 1% or more, or in other words, firm-years when the reported 
earnings per share (EPS) falls short of the consensus EPS forecast by 1% or more of the 
share price. 
 
We collect information on profit warnings from the FactSet database. Profit warnings 
(PW) are defined as statements of negative information content released by the firm to a 
Regulatory Information Service (RIS). FactSet provides the company name and the date 
the profit warning was released. We collect data on the public debt status and the 
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frequency of public debt issuance of UK firms from two sources: The Thomson One 
Banker (TOB) database and the firms’ financial statements. The TOB database has 
limited coverage of debt issued by UK firms. To overcome this problem we check the 
firms’ financial statements and the accompanying notes for information on public debt 
issues. We find that out of a total number of 829 firm-year observations, there are 138 
firm-year observations with public debt status. Finally, we collect insider ownership 
data from the BoardEx database and block-holding ownership data from the Thomson 
One Banker database. 
 
3.3.3. Determinants of Profit Warnings 
We estimate a probit model of the decision to make a profit warning. Our dependent 
variable is a warning dummy that is coded one if the firm released a warning after the 
announcement of its semi-annual results (or after the publication of third quarter results 
in case of quarterly reports) and before the announcement of the annual results and zero 
otherwise.  
 
According to the FactSet database, which is our primary source for profit warnings, a 
profit warning is a statement issued by a company in the press or announced at press 
conferences and consists of the company’s forecasts adjusted for its changing 
circumstances. The content of the profit warning could be quantitative but mostly has 
qualitative nature that gives guidelines of what the expected EPS should be. FactSet 
records all press releases irrespective of whether they triggered an adjustment in the 
analysts’ forecasts. 
 
The main explanatory variables of interest are proxies for whether or not the company 
has public debt outstanding and the company’s closeness to financial distress. In the rest 
of this section we define and motivate the inclusion of the independent variables in our 
model. 
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Public Debt Status 
To test our first hypothesis regarding the influence of the presence of public debt on the 
firm’s incentives to make a profit warning, we include a public debt indicator variable 
(PD) that is coded one if the firm has public debt and zero otherwise. The purpose of 
including an indicator variable for public debt is to focus on information demand from 
the different types of debt markets. However, in using an indicator variable we assume 
that bondholders’ demand for timely disclosures, and consequently the firm’s response 
to this demand, is equal regardless of the relative importance of public debt in the firm’s 
financial structure. Therefore, we include a second variable that accounts for the number 
of public debt issues outstanding (ISSUES). We also include PD/LTD which accounts 
for the importance of public debt financing relative to long-term financing. 
 
Financial Difficulties  
One likely outcome of facing financial difficulties is the violation of debt covenants. In 
case of UK companies, Christensen, Lee & Walker (2009) report empirical evidence on 
UK debt contracts using DealScan data. They find that interest cover is the most 
common covenant in UK debt contracts, and that an interest cover covenant is included 
in almost all the contracts recorded in DealScan. Therefore, we focus on the likelihood 
of violating the interest cover on the willingness of the UK firms to warn the market of 
bad news. 
 
COVLOG is calculated as the natural logarithm of one plus the interest cover ratio 
multiplied by -1. The cover ratio is defined as earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) divided by interest payments. We calculate 
this transformation because the cover ratio becomes extremely large when the interest 
payments are very low. COVLOG is re-coded zero for observations with negative 
EBITDA. A value of zero indicates that all EBITDA (if any) are committed to paying 
interest. We multiply the natural logarithm by -1 for ease of presentation, so the higher 
COVLOG the closer the firm is to financial distress. Therefore, we expect COVLOG to 
be negatively related to the probability of issuing a profit warning.  
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Firm Size 
Large firms potentially have a larger number of shareholders, and thus, face higher 
investor demand for timely information (Kasznik & Lev, 1995). Further, large firms are 
more exposed to litigation due to the large number of traded shares (Skinner, 1994), and 
because of the deep pockets effect, the settlement size for larger firms is larger than 
smaller firms (Field et al., 2005). Therefore, we expect larger firms to be more likely to 
issue profit warnings. We measure firm size as the natural logarithm of the market 
capitalization lagged one year (MVL).  
 
Size of the Earnings Surprise 
Kasznik and Lev (1995) predict that the larger the earnings surprise the higher the 
probability that investors will be disappointed and will sue the firm. Therefore, the 
larger the earnings surprise the more likely it is that the company will issue a profit 
warning. We measure the size of the earnings surprise (ES) using the expression in 
Equation (3); which indicates that the larger the earnings surprise the greater the bad 
news. 
 
Permanence of the Bad News 
Kasznik and Lev (1995, p. 132) suggest that managers will issue a warning when they 
perceive the earnings surprise to be permanent, while transitory surprises may go 
largely unwarned. We include a variable that measures the permanence of bad news 
(PERM). PERM is calculated as the revision in analysts’ forecasts of fiscal year t+1 
earnings made between the announcement of the fiscal year t semi-annual results and 
the announcement of the fiscal year t annual results. In the case of quarterly reporting, 
the revision in fiscal year t+1 earnings forecast is calculated between the time of the 
announcement of the fiscal year t third quarter results and the announcement of the 
fiscal year t annual results. For ease of presentation and consistency with the earnings-
surprise measure we multiply PERM by -1. Thus, a positive value of PERM indicates a 
pessimistic revision of the forecast of next year’s earnings, and hence suggests that the 
bad news is more permanent.  
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We interpret PERM as an imperfect proxy for management’s perception of the 
permanence of the bad news. We realise that there is likely to be bias in our estimates as 
a result of the measurement error in this variable. Instrumental variable estimation ought 
to be used but we were unable to identify suitable instruments for PERM. Measurement 
error typically biases the coefficient estimate downwards.13 Thus one might expect the 
biased (inconsistent) coefficient estimate to be more likely to be statistically 
insignificant. Also the bias is likely to be limited to PERM given the relatively low 
correlations between PERM and the main variables of interest (see Table 7). 
 
Number of Analysts 
We expect firms followed by a larger number of analysts to face a higher demand for 
timely disclosure of negative information. For example, Kasznik and Lev (1995) argue 
that one of the firm’s disclosure objectives is to avoid “embarrassing” analysts by 
surprising them. To proxy for analysts following (NUMBER), we use the number of 
analysts publishing EPS forecasts around the time of the announcement of the semi-
annual results (or the third quarter results in case of quarterly reporters). 
 
Book to Market Ratio 
We include the book to market ratio (BTM) defined as book value of assets divided by 
market value of equity plus book value of debt. This ratio is the inverse of the market to 
book ratio, therefore, a smaller BTM indicates greater growth opportunities. We expect 
that firms with larger growth opportunities, hence smaller BTM ratios, are more likely 
to warn the market of bad news. Firms with larger growth opportunities tend to have 
more volatile earnings, thus, they may attempt to reduce uncertainty regarding their 
earnings by promptly warning investors of bad news (Field et al., 2005; Kothari, Shu, & 
Wysocki, 2009). 
 
                                            
13 The magnitude of the estimate is usually lower than expected at least in linear models. In non-linear 
models such as the probit model estimated here, the likely direction of the bias is difficult to predict.  
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Quarterly Results and Cross Listing 
We also include a variable specific to the UK market, PUB_Q, which is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if the firm reports quarterly results and zero 
otherwise. Firms reporting only semi-annually may face greater investor demand for 
additional disclosure due to the longer intervals between scheduled earnings releases. 
Therefore, we expect the coefficient sign of the quarterly results dummy to be 
negatively related to the probability of issuing profit warnings. In addition, some firms 
reporting quarterly are cross-listed in the US. Therefore, they may be more likely to 
make profit warnings since they may be subject to greater litigation threat due to their 
cross-listing in the US. Therefore, we include a dummy variable that accounts for cross 
listing, CROSS, which takes the value of one if the firm is cross listed in the US and 
zero otherwise. We expect CROSS to be positively related to the probability of issuing 
profit warnings.  
 
Prior Stock Return 
We also include a six-month stock return before the event date (the profit warning date 
for warning firms and the earnings announcement date for non-warning firms). The 
purpose of including this variable is to control for the market expectations with regard 
to the firm’s financial position.  
 
We summarize the variable definition in Table 3.3.  
 
Finally, our profit-warning model is specified in Equation (3) and estimated using 
probit: 
 
 Q_PUBBTM
MVLNUMBERPERMES PDCOVLOG  PW 
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 (3) 
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Table 3.3: Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
Profit Warnings (PW) Dummy variable coded 1 if the firm released a profit warning 
statement after the announcement of semi-annual results (or third 
quarter results in case of quarterly results) and before the 
announcement of the annual results and 0 otherwise. 
Public Debt (PD) Dummy variable coded 1 if the firm has a public debt issue in its 
financial structure at fiscal year t-1 and 0 otherwise. 
Number of Issues 
(ISSUES) 
The number of public debt issues outstanding at fiscal year t-1.  
Ratio of Public Debt over 
Long Term Debt (PD/LTD) 
The ratio of the amount of public debt at fiscal year t-1 divided by the 
amount of long-term debt at fiscal year t-1. 
Interest Cover (COVLOG) The log of 1 plus the interest cover ratio multiplied by -1. COVLOG is 
re-coded to zero for observations with negative EBITDA indicating that 
all current periods’ EBITDA are committed to pay interest expense. 
COVLOG is measured at t-1. 
Earning Surprise (ES) The difference between actual announced EPS (Ait) and analysts’ 
mean consensus forecast of EPS after the announcement of semi-
annual results (or third quarter results in case of quarterly results) 
Fti,t(interim). The difference is deflated by the share price at the beginning 
of the period Pi,t(interim) and multiplied by -1. This can be expressed as: 
ESit = - (Ait - Fti,t(interim))/Pi,t(interim)   .  
Permanence of News 
(PERM) 
The difference between analysts’ mean consensus forecast of EPS 
one period ahead after the announcement of annual results Ft+1i,t   and 
analysts’ mean consensus forecast of EPS after the announcement of 
semi-annual results (or third quarter results in case of quarterly 
reports) Ft+1i,t(interim). The difference is deflated by the share price at the 
beginning of the period Pi,t(interim) and multiplied by -1. This can be 
expressed as: 
PERMit = - (Ft+1i,t - Ft+1i,t(interim))/Pi,t(interim)  
Number of Analysts 
(NUMBER) 
Number of analysts publishing EPS forecasts for a given sample firm 
at the announcement of semi-annual results (or third quarter results in 
case of quarterly reports). 
MV The natural log of the firm’s market value measured at the start of the 
second fiscal quarter in case of semi-annual results or the start of the 
third fiscal quarter in case of quarterly results. 
ASSETS The natural log of the firm’s total assets measured at t-1. 
PUB_Q An indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the firm reports quarterly 
results. 
CROSS An indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is cross-listed in 
the US. 
Growth opportunities (BTM) Book to Market ratio (BTM) defined as book value of assets divided by 
market value of equity plus book value of debt. BTM is measured at t-
1. 
Prior Stock Return (PRIOR 
RETURN) 
Six-month stock return before the event date (the profit warning date 
for warning firms and the earnings announcement date for non-
warning firms). 
 
Data Sources: Profit warnings, earnings surprise, permanence of bad news, and number of analysts are 
based on data collected from the FactSet database. Data for Public debt and number of public debt issues 
outstanding are collected from the Thomson One Banker database (TOB) and the firm’s financial 
statements. The firm’s characteristics proxies and the stock returns are measured using data collected 
from Datastream. Insider ownership is collected from BoardEx and block-holding ownership is collected 
from TOB. Unless specified, all variables are measured at time t-1. 
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3.4. Descriptive Statistics 
3.4.1. Industry Composition of the Sample and Time Trends 
Table 3.4 reports the distribution of warning firms relative to non-warning firms across 
industries and time.14 The sector with the lowest frequency of warnings is the utilities 
sector. This finding is consistent with the Kasznik and Lev (1995) finding that regulated 
firms are less likely to warn. The sector with the highest frequency of warnings is the 
consumer discretionary sector, which is consistent with the US evidence reported in 
Field et al. (2005). One potential reason is that these firms release regular sales 
information, and therefore, the marginal costs of disclosing earnings-related statements 
is lower compared to other industries (Field et al., 2005). Perhaps surprisingly, high 
technology industries such as information technology and telecommunication do not 
have the high frequency of warning predicted by Kasznik and Lev (1995). This may be 
due to the fact that fear of litigation, which is the major motive for issuing profit 
warnings by US firms in these sectors, does not apply to UK firms. 
 
The second panel in Table 3.4 shows that the number of firms subject to negative 
earnings surprises differs between normal periods and periods of crisis. Perhaps 
surprisingly, the number of firms with negative earnings surprises decreases in periods 
of crisis, such as the Credit Crunch of 2008. One potential reason for this drop is that 
analysts are more likely to be pessimistic about the firm’s performance in times of a 
crisis. This lowers their forecasts, which in turn, leads to a smaller number of firms with 
negative earnings surprises. Another reason is that the year 2008 was affected by the 
increasing use of the interim management statement which resulted in a decrease in the 
issuance of profit warnings.  
                                            
14 For ease of presentation, we use the term firm instead firm-year. 
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Table 3.4: Distribution of Profit Warnings 
 
This table reports the distribution of warning and non-warning firm-years for each industry (GICS 
classification) and across time. It also reports the frequency of warning (warning/non-warning) in the 
third column. The sample consists of UK firms subject to a negative earnings surprise over the period 
2001-2008. 
 
 
Warning 
Firms 
Non-Warning  
Firms 
Warning/Non-
Warning 
Total 
Industries 
Energy 4  58  7%  61 
Materials 11  57  19%  68 
Industrials 49  134  37%  178 
Consumer Discretionary 73  147  50%  206 
Consumer Staples 9  29  31%  38 
Health 10  72  14%  80 
Information Technology 22  131  17%  151 
Telecommunications 2  11  18%  13 
Utilities 0  10  0%  10 
Total 180  649  28%  829 
Years
2001 36  80  45%  116 
2002 22  75  29%  97 
2003 13  72  18%  85 
2004 17  90  19%  107 
2005 17  87  20%  104 
2006 33  83  40%  116 
2007 31  92  34%  123 
2008 11  70  16%  81 
Total 180  649  28%  829 
 
3.4.2. Surprise Attributes and Firm Characteristics 
Throughout the analysis we compare the sample statistics with Kasznik and Lev (1995) 
and Helbok and Walker (2003). Table 3.5 reports summary statistics for the surprise 
attributes and the firm characteristics. In terms of surprise attributes, we document that 
the average size of the earnings surprise for non-warning firms is larger than the average 
of warning firms (6% and 9% respectively). However, the difference in the mean 
earnings surprise between warning and non-warning firms is insignificant. Helbok and 
Walker report a similar average earnings surprise for warning firms of -6%, however, 
they report a smaller average earnings surprise for non-warning firms of -4%. Kasznik 
and Lev report a sample mean for the earning surprise of -7% which is similar to our 
sample mean. 
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As predicted, we find that warning firms have a higher mean permanence of bad news, 
PERM, compared to non-warning firms. The difference in means is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Helbok and Walker report a mean PERM of -5% for warning 
firms and -2% for non-warning firms, while Kasznik and Lev report a mean PERM of   
-7% and -3% for warning and non-warning firms respectively. Similar to our findings, 
Helbok and Walker and Kasznik and Lev report significantly higher permanence for 
warning firms compared to non-warning firms.15 
 
Consistent with the notion that warning firms are more visible, Table 3.5 indicates that 
warning firms have higher analyst following (NUMBER); larger assets size (ASSETSL) 
and market value (MVL). The differences in means for NUMBER, ASSETSL, and 
MVL are significant at the 1% level. These results are similar to those in Helbok and 
Walker and Kasznik and Lev.  
 
Further, we test whether firms with more growth opportunities, hence smaller book to 
market ratio (BTM), are more likely to warn. Consistent with our prediction we find that 
warning firms have smaller BTM compared to non-warning firms. However, similar to 
Helbok and Walker, we find that the difference in the mean BTM between warning and 
non-warning firms is insignificant. In addition, we find that non-warning firms are more 
likely to report quarterly compared to warning firms. This finding suggests that firms 
reporting only on a semi-annual basis are more likely to issue profit warnings in 
response to investors’ demand for additional disclosure due to the length of the 
reporting interval. Finally, contrary to our prediction we find that non-warning firms are 
more likely to be cross listed in the US but the test statistics results are insignificant. 
 
 
 
                                            
15 The distribution of PERM (not reported) shows that the optimistic revisions of next years’ earnings 
account for 10% of the observations for warning firms and 25% of the observations for non-warning 
firms. This explains why the mean value of PERM for non-warning firms is zero. Optimistic revisions of 
next years’ earnings (negative PERM) indicate that the bad news is transitory and it does not have an 
effect for future periods. Therefore, it is reasonable to have observation with negative (transitory) earning 
surprise and yet an optimistic revision of the one-year ahead earnings. 
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Table 3.5: Summary Statistics 
 
Table 3.5 reports descriptive statistics for a sample of UK firms with negative earnings surprise over the period 2001-2008. PD is a dummy variable equals 1 if the firm has a 
public debt issue in its financial structure and zero otherwise. ISSUES is the number of public debt issues outstanding. PD/LTD is the amount of public debt divided by the 
long term debt. COVLOG is the log of 1 plus the interest cover ratio multiplied by -1. COVLOG is re-coded to zero for observations with negative EBITD. ES is the 
difference between actual announced EPS and analysts’ mean consensus forecast of EPS after the announcement of semi-annual results (or third quarter results) deflated by 
the share price at the beginning of the period. PERM is the difference between analysts’ mean consensus forecast of EPS one period ahead after the announcement of annual 
results and analysts’ mean consensus forecast of EPS after the announcement of semi-annual results (or third quarter results) deflated by the share price at the beginning of the 
period. NUMBER is the number of analysts publishing EPS forecasts for a given sample firm. BTM is the book value of assets divided by market value of equity plus book 
value of debt. PUB_Q is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the firm reports quarterly results. CROSS is an indicator variable taking the value 1 if the firm is cross-
listed in the US. MV is the natural log of the firm’s market value measured at the second (third) fiscal quarter end. ASSETS is the natural log of the firm’s total assets. MV(£) 
is the firm’s market value measured at the second (third) fiscal quarter end measured in Millions of Pounds. ASSETS(£) is the firm’s total assets measured in Millions of 
Pounds. PRIOR RETURN is the six-month stock return before the event date (the profit warning date for warning firms and the earnings announcement date for non-warning 
firms). All ratios are expressed in decimal points. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 3.5 continued 
 
Panel 1: Firm-Years 829 Observations 
 Warning Firm-Years (Obs. 180) Non-Warning Firm-Years (Obs. 649) 
ttest Wilcoxon 
 Mean Med SD Min Max Skew Kurt Mean Med SD Min Max Skew Kurt 
PD 0.16 0  ‐  ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.11 0 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐1.92* ‐1.91* 
ISSUES 0.77 0  2.47  0 17 4.46 25.29 0.72 0 3.31 0 54 9.40 122.88 ‐0.18 ‐1.05 
PD/LTD 0.06 0  0.19  0 1 3.41 14.05 0.05 0 0.18 0 1 4.17 19.74 ‐0.96 ‐1.50 
ES 0.06 0.04  0.07  0.01 0.66 4.92 36.41 0.09 0.03 0.30 0.01 5.01 12.32 176.63 1.33 0.37 
PERM 0.03 0.02  0.05  ‐0.07 0.28 2.18 10.64 0.00 0.00 0.08 ‐0.69 0.80 ‐1.67 32.89 ‐4.34*** ‐6.74*** 
NUMBER 6.44 3  6.15  1 32 1.37 4.49 4.80 2 5.90 1 46 2.68 13.19 ‐3.27*** ‐4.55*** 
BTM 0.40 0.34  0.56  ‐3.51 2.27 ‐1.57 16.92 0.46 0.43 0.85 ‐3.64 6.67 0.57 12.97 0.96 1.98** 
PUB_Q 0.01 0  ‐  ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.05 0 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 2.35** 2.34** 
CROSS 0.01 0  ‐  ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 0.02 0 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 1.10 1.10 
MV 5.23 5.00  1.64  1.83 9.37 0.54 2.91 4.67 4.46 1.81 0.74 11.61 0.71 3.58 ‐3.77*** ‐4.22*** 
ASSETS 5.23 5.06  1.85  0.78 10.08 0.30 2.92 4.76 4.58 2.00 0.18 12.12 0.53 3.30 ‐2.79*** ‐3.13*** 
MV(£) 839 148  1994  6 11717 3.66 16.52 1143 86 7668 2 110365 12.02 152 ‐ ‐
ASSETS(£) 1087 158  2950  2 23826 4.83 30.10 1587 97 10706 1 183543 12.88 186 ‐ ‐
PRIOR 
RETURN ‐0.03  ‐0.05  0.28  ‐0.76  1.59  2.43  16.07  ‐0.01  ‐0.04  0.37  ‐0.92  3.97  3.86  35.71  0.68  0.26 
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Table 3.5 continued 
 
Panel 2: Firm-Years 795 Observations 
 Warning Firm-Years (Obs. 174) Non-Warning Firm-Years (Obs. 621) 
ttest Wilcoxon 
 Mean Med SD Min Max Skew Kurt Mean Med SD Min Max Skew Kurt 
PD 0.17  0  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  0.12  0  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐2.05**  ‐2.05** 
ISSUES 0.80  0  2.51  0  17  4.38  24.43  0.76  0  3.38  0  54  9.20  117.74  ‐0.16  ‐1.05 
PD/LTD 0.06  0  0.20  0  1  3.34  13.53  0.05  0  0.18  0  1  4.07  18.81  ‐0.92  ‐1.46 
COVLOG ‐2.67  ‐2.42  1.78  ‐8.81  0  ‐0.82  4.07  ‐1.89  ‐1.86  1.70  ‐9.85  0  ‐1.14  5.02  5.25***  5.55*** 
ES 0.06  0.04  0.07  0.01  0.66  4.87  35.54  0.09  0.03  0.30  0.01  5.01  12.06  169.28  ‐1.37  0.09 
PERM 0.03  0.02  0.05  ‐0.07  0.28  2.23  10.81  0.00  0.00  0.09  ‐0.8  0.80  ‐1.64  32.55  4.25***  6.72*** 
NUMBER 6.57  4  6.21  1  32  1.32  4.35  4.90  2  5.96  1  46  2.65  13.01  ‐3.23***  ‐4.37*** 
BTM 0.41  0.34  0.56  ‐3.51  2.27  ‐1.58  16.66  0.47  0.43  0.86  ‐3.64  6.67  0.57  12.62  0.87  1.74* 
PUB_Q 0.01  0  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  0.05  0  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  2.31**  2.31** 
CROSS 0.01  0  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  0.02  0  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  0.92  0.92 
MV 5.26  5.04  1.66  1.83  9.37  0.50  2.83  4.71  4.52  1.81  0.74  11.61  0.68  3.58  ‐3.61***  ‐3.97*** 
ASSETS 5.28  5.11  1.86  0.78  10.08  0.25  2.90  4.83  4.69  2.00  0.18  12.12  0.50  3.30  ‐2.64***  ‐2.97*** 
MV(£) 864  154  2024  6.22  11717  3.59  15.94  1178  92  7832  2.1  110365  11.77  146  ‐  ‐ 
ASSETS(£)  1123  166  2995  2.19  23826  4.74  29.11  1654  109  10942  1.2  183543  12.60  178  ‐  ‐ 
PRIOR 
RETURN 
‐0.02  ‐0.05  0.28  ‐0.76  1.59  2.52  16.31  ‐0.01  ‐0.04  0.38  ‐0.92  3.97  3.88  35.49  0.60 0.26 
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3.4.3. Financial Distress and Debt Ownership Structure 
Table 3.5 also reports descriptive statistics for different measures of capital structure 
and public debt status for warning and non-warning firms. Table 3.5 shows that the 
mean value of PD is higher for warning firms compared to non-warning firms. 
However, the difference in means is significant only at the 10% level. However, the 
mean values for ISSUES and PD/LTD are not significantly different between warning 
and non-warning firms. 
 
In Panel 2 we report statistics for COVLOG. The mean of COVLOG corresponds to an 
interest cover of 13.44% and 5.62% for warning and non-warning firms, respectively. 
The difference in means is statistically significant at the 1% level indicating that non-
warning firms have significantly lower interest cover. Helbok and Walker report mean 
interest cover ratios of 78% and 63% for warning and non-warning firms respectively. 
There is a notable difference between the cover ratios in both studies. However, both 
studies arrive at the same conclusion that non-warning firms have significantly lower 
interest cover.  
 
Table 3.6 presents separate descriptive statistics for firms with public debt and those 
without. Within each group, Table 3.6 presents the characteristics of warning and non-
warning firms. We are most interested in the behaviour of the two groups when they are 
closer to financial distress. Among the firms with public debt, warning and non-warning 
firms have similar COVLOG. Among firms without public debt, non-warning firms 
have significantly higher COVLOG compared to warning firms. This finding is 
consistent with our prediction that firms with public debt are less likely to withhold 
information from their bondholders when they face financial difficulties. 
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Table 3.6: Summary Statistics – Firm-Years with and without Public Debt 
 
Table 3.6 shows summary statistics for a sample of UK firms with negative earnings surprise over the period 2001-2008. COVLOG is the log of 1 plus the interest cover ratio 
multiplied by -1. COVLOG is re-coded to zero for observations with negative EBITD. ES is the difference between actual announced EPS and analysts’ mean consensus 
forecast of EPS after the announcement of semi-annual results (or third quarter results) deflated by the share price at the beginning of the period. PERM is the difference 
between analysts’ mean consensus forecast of EPS one period ahead after the announcement of annual results and analysts’ mean consensus forecast of EPS after the 
announcement of semi-annual results (or third quarter results) deflated by the share price at the beginning of the period. NUMBER is the number of analysts publishing EPS 
forecasts for a given sample firm. BTM is the book value of assets divided by market value of equity plus book value of debt. PUB_Q is an indicator variable taking the value 
of 1 if the firm reports quarterly results. CROSS is an indicator variable taking the value 1 if the firm is cross-listed in the US. MV is the natural log of the firm’s market value 
measured at the second (third) fiscal quarter end. ASSETS is the natural log of the firm’s total assets. MV(£) is the firm’s market value measured at the second (third) fiscal 
quarter end measured in Millions of Pounds. ASSETS(£) is the firm’s total assets measured in Millions of Pounds. PRIOR RETURN the six-month stock return before the 
event date (the profit warning date for warning firms and the earnings announcement date for non-warning firms). All ratios are expressed in decimal points. *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 
 Firm-Years with Public Debt (Obs. 138) Firm-Years without Public Debt (Obs. 691) 
 
Warning Firm-Years 
Obs. 35 
Non-Warning Firm-Years 
Obs. 103  
Warning Firm-Years 
Obs. 145 
Non-Warning Firm-Years 
Obs. 546  
 Mean Med SD Mean Med SD ttest Mean Med SD Mean Med SD Ttest 
COVLOG* ‐1.99  ‐2.00  0.90  ‐1.84  ‐1.95  0.84  0.86  ‐2.84  ‐2.74  1.90  ‐1.91  ‐1.83  1.82  5.32*** 
ES 0.06  0.03  0.11  0.05  0.03  0.08  0.26  0.05  0.04  0.06  0.09  0.03  0.32  1.34 
PERM 0.03  0.02  0.06  0.01  0.00  0.03  ‐3.28***  0.03  0.02  0.04  0.00  0.01  0.11  ‐3.72*** 
NUMBER 13.37  14  7.07  12.12  11  8.43  ‐0.79  4.77  3.00  4.55  3.42  2.00  4.00  ‐3.50*** 
BTM 0.41  0.37  0.60  0.23  0.34  0.83  ‐1.15  0.40  0.32  0.55  0.53  0.45  1.06  1.48 
PUB_Q 0.03  0  ‐  0.10  0  ‐  1.29  0.01  0.00  ‐  0.04  0.00  ‐  2.06** 
CROSS 0.03  0  ‐  0.09  0  ‐  1.16  0.01  0  ‐  0.01  0  ‐  0.59 
MV 7.22  7.30  1.49  6.98  6.91  1.62  ‐0.77  4.76  4.80  1.27  4.23  4.15  1.49  ‐3.86*** 
ASSETS 7.67  7.57  1.33  7.39  7.14  1.58  ‐0.93  4.65  4.67  1.44  4.27  4.14  1.65  ‐2.57** 
MVQ (£) 3102  1478  3524  4888  1000  15350  ‐  293  122  682  437  63  4759  ‐ 
ASSETS(£) 4445  1941  5515  6724  1260  18994  ‐  295  107  662  611  63  7902  ‐ 
PRIOR RETURN ‐0.05  ‐0.07  0.21  ‐0.002  ‐0.03  0.25  0.93  ‐0.02  ‐0.04  0.29  ‐0.01  ‐0.04  0.39  0.43 
* For the variable COVLOG, The number of firm-years with public debt is 137 (warning 35 and non-warning 102) and without public debt is 658 (warning 139 and non-
warning 519). 
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Table 3.7: Correlation Matrix 
 
Table 3.7 presents the correlation between the variables used in the study. PW is a dummy variable equals 1 if the firm released a profit warning statement after the 
announcement of semi-annual results (or third quarter results in case of quarterly reports) and before the announcement of the annual results. COVLOG is the log of 1 plus the 
interest cover ratio multiplied by -1. COVLOG is re-coded to zero for observations with negative EBITD. ES is the difference between actual announced EPS and analysts’ 
mean consensus forecast of EPS after the announcement of semi-annual results (or third quarter results) deflated by the share price at the beginning of the period. PERM is the 
difference between analysts’ mean consensus forecast of EPS one period ahead after the announcement of annual results and analysts’ mean consensus forecast of EPS after 
the announcement of semi-annual results (or third quarter results) deflated by the share price at the beginning of the period. NUMBER is the number of analysts publishing 
EPS forecasts for a given sample firm. BTM is the book value of assets divided by market value of equity plus book value of debt. PUB_Q is an indicator variable taking the 
value of 1 if the firm reports quarterly results. CROSS is an indicator variable taking the value 1 if the firm is cross-listed in the US. MV is the natural log of the firm’s market 
value measured at the second (third) fiscal quarter end. ASSETS is the natural log of the firm’s total assets. PRIOR RETURN is the six-month stock return before the event 
date (the profit warning date for warning firms and the earnings announcement date for non-warning firms). a denotes significance at the 5% level or better.  
 PW PD COVLOG ES PERM NUMBER BTM PUB_Q CROSS MVL ASSETSL PRIOR RETURN 
PW 1     
PD 0.054  1    
COVLOG ‐0.177a  0.007 1    
ES ‐0.045  ‐0.050 ‐0.044 1    
PERM 0.150a  0.045 0.166a 0.132a 1    
NUMBER 0.138a  0.552a ‐0.152a ‐0.061a 0.084a 1   
BTM ‐0.040  ‐0.116a 0.026 0.039 ‐0.014 ‐0.208a  1  
PUB_Q ‐0.080a  0.052 0.065a ‐0.023 ‐0.005 0.231a  ‐0.062a 1  
CROSS ‐0.038  0.156 a 0.023 0.014 ‐0.009 0.423 a  ‐0.043 0.423 a 1  
MV 0.164a  0.549a ‐0.152a ‐0.128a 0.077a 0.776a  ‐0.258a 0.172a 0.248 a 1  
ASSETS 0.138a  0.562a ‐0.178a ‐0.091a 0.119a 0.751a  ‐0.092a 0.162a 0.233 a 0.887a 1  
PRIOR 
RETURN ‐0.024  ‐0.002 ‐0.003 ‐0.027 ‐0.107 a 0.051  ‐0.064 ‐0.026 0.079 0.061 0.080 a 1 
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3.5. Results and Analysis 
3.5.1. Economic Importance of Profit Warnings 
We first examine the market reaction around the release of profit warnings to assess the 
economic importance of the warnings in our sample. Table 3.8 shows that warning 
firms experience a large and statistically significant negative return on the day of the 
warning. The mean market adjusted return is about -17% on the day of the warning. 
This evidence is similar to the UK evidence reported in Helbok and Walker (2003) and 
Collett (2004). Helbok and Walker report a statistically significant abnormal return of -
18.51% on the day of the announcement of the profit warning, while Collett reports a 
statistically significant abnormal return of -15.10% on the day of the announcement of a 
trading statement of negative content. The market reaction to the warning is confined to 
the day of the warning. None of the other days in the window around the warning 
exhibit a significant negative return. This result is similar to the findings of Collett 
(2004) and Helbok and Walker (2003).16  
 
In addition, we examine the market reaction around the release of profit warnings for 
firms with and without public debt. Table 3.8 shows that both group of firms experience 
a large and statistically significant negative return on the day of the warning. The size of 
the negative return is comparable for firms with and without public debt and the mean 
difference is not statistically significant.  
                                            
16 The US evidence of the market reaction around the announcement of profit warnings shows that the US 
market reaction is considerably lower. For example, Jackson & Madura (2003) report a significant 
abnormal returns of -10.75% on the day of profit warning announcement during the period 1998-2000. 
Similarly, Bulkley & Herrerias (2005) report a significant negative return of -8.5% for the same period.  
However, Jackson & Madura (2007) report an abnormal return of only -2.82% after the introduction of 
the Regulation Fair Disclosure (RFD) in 2000. 
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Table 3.8: Market Reaction for Warning in the Event of Material Bad News 
 
Table 3.8 reports the market reaction for a sample of UK firms with negative earnings surprise who 
issued a profit warning over the period 2001-2008. Abnormal Returns is the cumulated market adjusted 
(FTSE all shares) returns. The event date t is the date of issuing a profit warning. Returns are expressed in 
decimal points. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Window Obs. Mean Median SD Min Max Skewness Kurtosis
All Warnings 
t-4 180  ‐0.004  ‐0.003 0.029 ‐0.155 0.128  ‐0.703  9.762
t-3 180  ‐0.008  ‐0.004 0.034 ‐0.161 0.127  ‐0.808  7.658
t-2 180  ‐0.009  ‐0.002 0.037 ‐0.193 0.061  ‐1.890  9.109
t-1 180  ‐0.013  ‐0.004 0.041 ‐0.268 0.075  ‐2.597  13.868
t 180  ‐0.177***  ‐0.147 0.154 ‐0.748 0.106  ‐1.102  4.230
t+1 180  ‐0.004  ‐0.001 0.086 ‐0.385 0.630  1.253  21.489
t+2 180  0.011  0.001 0.072 ‐0.131 0.696  5.568  49.740
t+3 180  0.000  ‐0.001 0.051 ‐0.132 0.379  2.737  20.939
t+4 180  ‐0.003  ‐0.001 0.034 ‐0.159 0.126  ‐0.690  7.362
Warnings with Public Debt 
t-4 35  ‐0.008  ‐0.008 0.032 ‐0.082 0.073  ‐0.110  3.483
t-3 35  ‐0.006  ‐0.003 0.030 ‐0.104 0.041  ‐1.446  5.867
t-2 35  ‐0.010  ‐0.002 0.032 ‐0.139 0.024  ‐2.617  10.519
t-1 35  ‐0.011  ‐0.007 0.032 ‐0.107 0.044  ‐1.006  4.610
t 35  ‐0.146***  ‐0.122 0.134 ‐0.553 0.028  ‐1.330  4.435
t+1 35  ‐0.022  ‐0.007 0.071 ‐0.313 0.072  ‐2.589  10.342
t+2 35  0.003  ‐0.005 0.039 ‐0.082 0.122  0.996  4.846
t+3 35  ‐0.004  ‐0.005 0.033 ‐0.108 0.066  ‐0.457  4.836
t+4 35  ‐0.002  ‐0.003 0.038 ‐0.088 0.126  0.438  6.241
Warnings without Public Debt 
t-4 145  ‐0.003 ‐0.002 0.028 ‐0.155 0.128  ‐0.886  12.300
t-3 145  ‐0.009 ‐0.004 0.036 ‐0.161 0.127  ‐0.698  7.753
t-2 145 ‐0.009 ‐0.002 0.038 ‐0.193 0.061  ‐1.777  8.788
t-1 145 ‐0.014 ‐0.004 0.043 ‐0.268 0.075  ‐2.683  13.779
t 145 ‐0.184*** ‐0.158 0.158 ‐0.748 0.106  ‐1.038  4.121
t+1 145 0.000 ‐0.001 0.089 ‐0.385 0.630  1.654  21.751
t+2 145 0.013 0.001 0.078 ‐0.131 0.696  5.384  44.554
t+3 145 0.001 0.000 0.055 ‐0.132 0.379  2.764  19.487
t+4 145 ‐0.003 0.000 0.034 ‐0.159 0.093  ‐1.064  7.685
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3.5.2. Determinants of the Decision to Issue a Profit Warning 
3.5.2.1. Analysis of the Full Sample 
Presence of Public Debt 
Table 3.9 reports the results of three models of the determinants of the decision to issue 
a warning based on equation (3). The dependent variable PW is coded one for firm-
years with profit warnings and zero otherwise. The main variables of interest are proxies 
of the firm’s access to the public debt market. 
 
To test H1 we estimate three models using three alternative proxies for the availability 
of public debt outstanding. In the first model, we include PD which captures the 
presence of public debt in the companies’ debt structure. In the second model, we 
include ISSUES which accounts for the frequency of accessing the public debt market. 
In the third model, we include PD/LTD which accounts for the importance of public 
debt financing relative to the assets size. We expect PD, ISSUES, and PD/LTD to be 
positively related to the probability of issuing profit warnings. We report the results in 
Table 3.9. The first column in Table 3.9 shows that PD does not significantly affect the 
probability of warning. The second and third columns in Table 3.9 report similar result. 
The likelihood of warning is not significantly affected by the number of public debt 
issues outstanding or the size of public debt relative to the assets size. 
 
The correlation matrix reported in Table 3.7 indicates that some of the explanatory 
variables, especially the firm’s size and analysts following, are significantly correlated 
with most other variables. This raises the possibility that mutlicollinearity is present. In 
order to quantify the impact of correlations among the independent variables we 
compute the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for each variable and report the findings in 
Table 3.9. We find that all the VIF values are less than five which is the cut-off point 
suggested in the literature.17  
                                            
17 As an additional check, we identify the variables with the highest VIF figures. As reported in Table 3.9, 
we find that the variables NUMBER and MVL have VIF figures above three. We run separate regressions 
first without including MVL, then without including NUMBER, then without including both MVL and 
NUMBER. We find qualitatively similar results to the ones reported in Table 3.9. Similar checks are 
performed to all regressions reported in the rest of this chapter. 
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Table 3.9: Profit Warnings and Access to the Public Debt Market 
 
Table 3.9 reports probit estimation results for the determinants of profit warnings including three proxies 
for having access to the debt market: PD, ISSUES, and PD/LTD. The sample consists of UK firms 
subject to a negative earnings surprise during the period 2001-2008. The dependent variable PW is a 
dummy variable equals 1 if the firm released a profit warning. PD is a dummy variable equals 1 if the 
firm has a public debt issue in its financial structure and zero otherwise. ISSUES is the number of public 
debt issues outstanding. PD/LTD is the amount of public debt divided by the long term debt. ES is the 
difference between actual announced EPS and analysts’ mean consensus forecast of EPS deflated by 
share price. PERM is the permanence of bad news approximated by revisions of analysts’ forecasts for 
one period ahead. NUMBER is the number of analysts publishing EPS forecasts for a given sample firm. 
MV is the natural log of the firm’s market value measured at the second (third) fiscal quarter end. BTM is 
the as book value of assets divided by market value of equity plus book value of debt. PUB_Q is an 
indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the firm reports quarterly results. CROSS is an indicator 
variable taking the value 1 if the firm is cross-listed in the US. PRIOR RETURN is the six-month stock 
return before the event date (the profit warning date for warning firms and the earnings announcement 
date for non-warning firms). All specifications include industry and time dummies. Probits are estimated 
with robust standard errors. We report the marginal effects, except for the constant term where we report 
the coefficient size. z-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% respectively. 
 
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
PD  ‐0.046  (‐1.14)  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
ISSUES  ‐  ‐  ‐0.007  (‐1.14)  ‐  ‐ 
PD/LTD ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐0.069  (‐0.79) 
ES ‐0.210  (‐1.16)  ‐0.210  (‐1.16)  ‐0.231  (‐1.26) 
PERM 1.253***  (4.20)  1.252***  (4.20)  1.257***  (4.20) 
NUMBER 0.023  (1.00)  0.021  (0.92)  0.022  (0.94) 
MV 0.032**  (2.12)  0.031**  (2.08)  0.029*  (1.95) 
BTM ‐0.063**  (‐2.43)  ‐0.065**  (‐2.48)  ‐0.065**  (‐2.52) 
PUB_Q ‐0.172***  (‐3.11)  ‐0.172***  (‐3.08)  ‐0.171***  (‐3.07) 
CROSS ‐0.039  (‐0.39)  ‐0.028  (‐0.26)  ‐0.037  (‐0.36) 
PRIOR RETURN ‐0.018  (‐0.51)  ‐0.017  (‐0.48)  ‐0.016  (‐0.43) 
Cons ‐1.801***  (‐3.70)  ‐1.667***  (‐3.52)  ‐1.745***  (‐3.72) 
Obs. 829    829    829   
Pseudo R2 0.158    0.158    0.157   
Correctly Classified
Warning 16.67%    16.67%   16.11%   
Non-warning 97.07%    96.76%   97.07%   
Total 79.61%    79.37%   79.49%   
Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) 
PD  1.49    ‐    ‐   
ISSUES  ‐    1.35    ‐   
PD_LEVEL ‐    ‐    1.37   
ES 1.04    1.04    1.04   
PERM 1.05    1.05    1.05   
NUMBER 3.2    3.17    3.17   
MVL 3.66    3.59    3.57   
LBTM 1.08    1.08    1.08   
PUB_Q 1.25    1.25    1.24   
CROSS 1.3    1.35    1.31   
PRIOR RETURN 1.03    1.03    1.03   
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Financial Difficulties 
To test our second hypothesis, H2, that firms facing financial difficulties are less willing 
to disclose negative earnings surprises, we estimate the profit warning model including 
the likelihood of violating the interest cover covenant (COVLOG). Hypothesis H2 
predicts a negative relation between PW and COVLOG. We report the results in Table 
3.10. We find the coefficient of COVLOG is negative and statistically significant at of 
the 1% level. This result indicates that firms with high probability of breaching their 
interest cover covenant are less likely to warn the market of negative news. This finding 
is consistent with our hypothesis that firms facing financial difficulties are less likely to 
warn the market of bad news. 
 
Other Determinants of Issuing Profit Warnings 
As for the other determinants of the probability of issuing profit warnings, Kasznick and 
Lev (1995) find that US firms are more likely to warn the larger the firm and the larger 
the earnings surprise. We only find evidence of a significant effect of the firm size 
(MVL) on the decision to warn. We document a positive relation between MVL and the 
probability of warning at the 5% level. However, our results indicate that the size of the 
earnings surprise and analysts following do not significantly influence the UK firms’ 
decision to warn. 
 
Our findings indicate that the permanence of bad news measured using PERM has a 
significant effect on the probability of warning at the 1% level. This result is consistent 
with our prediction and with previous results reported in Helbok and Walker (2003). We 
also find a negative relation between BTM and the probability of issuing profit 
warnings. This finding indicates that firms with low growth opportunities, or high BTM, 
are less likely to warn. This result is consistent with our prediction and with results 
reported by Kothari et al. (2009). Also, we find that firms reporting quarterly (PUB_Q) 
are less likely to issue a profit warning. This finding suggests that UK firms reporting 
semi-annually face greater demand from investors for additional disclosure due to the 
longer reporting interval. However, we find that UK firms cross listed in the US are less 
likely to warn but the impact of CROSS is statistically insignificant. 
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Table 3.10: Profit Warnings and COVLOG 
 
Table 3.10 reports probit estimation results for the determinants of profit warnings including COVLOG. 
The sample consists of UK firms subject to a negative earnings surprise during the period 2001-2008. The 
dependent variable PW is a dummy variable equals 1 if the firm released a profit warning. PD is a dummy 
variable equals 1 if the firm has a public debt issue in its financial structure and zero otherwise. COVLOG 
is the log of 1 plus the interest cover ratio multiplied by -1. COVLOG is re-coded to zero for observations 
with negative EBITD. ES is the difference between actual announced EPS and analysts’ mean consensus 
forecast of EPS deflated by share price. PERM is the permanence of bad news approximated by revisions 
of analysts’ forecasts for one period ahead. NUMBER is the natural logarithm of the number of analysts 
publishing EPS forecasts for a given sample firm. MV is the natural log of the firm’s market value 
measured at the second (third) fiscal quarter end. BTM is the as book value of assets divided by market 
value of equity plus book value of debt. PUB_Q is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the firm 
reports quarterly results. CROSS is an indicator variable taking the value 1 if the firm is cross-listed in the 
US. PRIOR RETURN is the six-month stock return before the event date (the profit warning date for 
warning firms and the earnings announcement date for non-warning firms). All specifications include 
industry and time dummies. We report the marginal effects, except for the constant term where we report 
the coefficient size. z-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% respectively.  
 
                           Model 4 
PD  ‐0.026 (‐0.61) 
COVLOG ‐0.025*** (‐3.21) 
ES ‐0.187 (‐1.07) 
PERM 1.232*** (3.94) 
NUMBER 0.018 (0.75) 
MV 0.030* (1.95) 
BTM ‐0.056** (‐2.08) 
PUB_Q ‐0.173*** (‐2.95) 
CROSS ‐0.010 (‐0.03) 
PRIOR RETURN ‐0.012 (‐0.31) 
Cons ‐1.932*** (‐3.77) 
Obs. 795  
Pseudo R2 0.161  
Correctly Classified 
Warning 18.97%  
Non-Warning 97.10%  
Total 80.00%  
Variance Inflation Factors (VIF)
PD  1.51  
COVLOG 1.07  
ES 1.04  
PERM 1.07  
NUMBER 3.27  
MVL 3.68  
LBTM 1.08  
PUB_Q 1.24  
CROSS 1.28  
PRIOR RETURN 1.03  
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Ownership Effects 
In the previous analysis we assume that managers’ interests are aligned with 
shareholders’ interests. We also assume that large and institutional shareholders’ 
interests are aligned with minority shareholders’ interests. In this section, we examine 
the impact of potential conflicts between managers and shareholders and between large 
and small shareholders on managers’ decisions to warn. 
 
Kothari et al. (2009) argue that managers incur several costs resulting from the 
disclosure of bad news. Some of these costs are indirect in the form of career concerns. 
For example the disclosure of bad news may affect the managers’ promotion 
opportunities, raise the possibility of terminating their contracts, and revising their short 
and long term compensation plans. Other costs are direct such as the reduction in their 
bonuses and the loss of their wealth as a result of the stock price decline. We focus on 
the latter costs and examine the effect of the managers’ ownership on the likelihood of 
issuing a profit warning. We expect that managers face incentives to delay the 
disclosure of bad news especially if they expect that subsequent events will allow them 
to bury the bad news (Kothari et al., 2009). Therefore, we predict that managers’ 
ownership is negatively related to the likelihood of issuing profit warnings. To test our 
prediction we include INSIDER, which is equal to the percentage of shares owned by 
the company’s directors and divided by its total shares outstanding.  
 
In addition, we examine the impact of large shareholding on the company’s decision to 
issue a profit warning. Large shareholders may increase the probability of issuing profit 
warnings by providing the firm’s management with incentives to act in the best interest 
of all shareholders (Helbok and Walker, 2003). Under this monitoring role of large 
shareholders the interests of large shareholders are aligned with small shareholders. 
However, large shareholders may benefit from the delay of bad news if, for example, 
their performance measures are tied to the short-term performance of the company. To 
empirically assess the impact of large shareholders’ ownership on the decision to warn 
we include the total ownership by large institutional shareholders, INSTITUTIONAL. 
This variable is calculated as the percentage of shares owned by large institutional 
shareholders (owning 3% and above) divided by the firm’s total shares outstanding. We 
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also include the total ownership by large non-institutional shareholders, 
NON_INSTITUTIONAL, which is measured as percentage of shares owned by large 
non-institutional shareholders (owning 3% and above) divided by the firm’s total shares 
outstanding.  
  
We report the estimation results in Table 3.11. The results show that the impact of 
INSDIER is negative which is consistent with our prediction. However, the coefficient 
of INSIDER is statistically insignificant. With regard to other ownership variables, we 
find that INSTITUTIONAL and NON_INSTITUTIONAL are negatively related to the 
probability of issuing profit warnings but statistically insignificant.18 
                                            
18 We exclude MV from the estimation reported in Table 3.11 because the VIF score for MV is above the 
threshold of 5. However, the estimation results with and without MV are qualitatively similar. 
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Table 3.11: Profit Warnings and Ownership Structure 
Table 3.11 reports probit estimation results for the determinants of profit warnings including ownership 
structure variables. The sample consists of UK firms subject to a negative earnings surprise during the 
period 2001-2008. The dependent variable PW is a dummy variable equals 1 if the firm released a profit 
warning. PD is a dummy variable equals 1 if the firm has a public debt issue in its financial structure and 
zero otherwise. COVLOG is the log of 1 plus the interest cover ratio multiplied by -1. COVLOG is re-
coded to zero for observations with negative EBITD. ES is the difference between actual announced EPS 
and analysts’ mean consensus forecast of EPS deflated by share price. PERM is the permanence of bad 
news approximated by revisions of analysts’ forecasts for one period ahead. NUMBER is the number of 
analysts publishing EPS forecasts for a given sample firm. MV is the natural log of the firm’s market 
value measured at the second (third) fiscal quarter end. BTM is the as book value of assets divided by 
market value of equity plus book value of debt. PUB_Q is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the 
firm reports quarterly results. CROSS is an indicator variable taking the value 1 if the firm is cross-listed 
in the US. PRIOR RETURN is the six-month stock return before the event date (the profit warning date 
for warning firms and the earnings announcement date for non-warning firms). INSIDER is the 
percentage of shares owned by directors divided by the firm’s total shares outstanding. 
INSTITUTIONAL is the percentage of shares owned by large institutional shareholders divided by the 
firm’s total shares outstanding. NON_ INSTITUTIONAL the percentage of shares owned by large non-
institutional shareholders divided by the firm’s total shares outstanding. All specifications include 
industry and time dummies. Probits are estimated with robust standard errors. We report the marginal 
effects, except for the constant term where we report the coefficient size. z-statistics are in parentheses. 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.  
                                    Model 5 
PD  ‐0.024  (‐0.54) 
COVLOG ‐0.018**  (‐1.98) 
ES ‐0.198  (‐0.94) 
PERM 1.231***  (3.47) 
NUMBER 0.062***  (2.96) 
BTM ‐0.076**  (‐2.48) 
PUB_Q ‐0.184***  (‐2.64) 
CROSS ‐0.016  (‐0.14) 
PRIOR RETURN ‐0.014  (‐0.31) 
INSIDER ‐0.0026  (‐0.72) 
INSTITUTIONAL ‐0.0003  (‐0.39) 
NON_INSTITUTIONA ‐0.0007  (‐0.86) 
Cons ‐1.316***  (‐2.81) 
Obs. 680   
Pseudo R2 0.146   
Correctly Classified 
Warning 18.83% 
Non-Warning 96.96% 
Total 79.26%   
Variance Inflation Factors (VIF)
PD  1.38   
COVLOG 1.1   
ES 1.04   
PERM 1.06   
NUMBER 1.93   
LBTM 1.07   
PUB_Q 1.28   
CROSS 1.29   
PRIOR RETURN 1.02   
INSIDER 1.29   
INSTITUTIONAL 1.11   
NON_INSTITUTIONA 1.32   
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Comparison with Helbok and Walker (2003) 
In this section we compare our results with the ones presented in Helbok and Walker 
(2003). Helbok and Walker examine the determinants of issuing profit warnings of UK 
companies during the period 1995-1998, that is after the introduction of the London 
Stock Exchange guidance notes on the dissemination of price sensitive information in 
1994. In comparison, we examine the determinants of issuing profit warnings during the 
period 2001-2008. The choice of our sample period is influenced by data availability. In 
this study we use profit warnings data from the Factset database that provides 
comprehensive coverage of profit warnings issued by UK firms starting from the year 
2001. In Helbok and Walker (2003), the authors identify profit warnings manually. 
Identifying profit warnings manually is difficult and subject to errors. Possible 
disadvantages of manual identification of profit warnings include the elimination of one 
or more media sources that publish warnings due to the high labour costs; and the 
failure to identify all profit warnings in the chosen media sources since identifying 
profit warnings is based on searching key words. 
 
It is important to note that our sample period is characterized with more rigorous rules. 
The Financial Services and Markets Acts (FSMA) and the Code of Market Conduct 
came into effect in 2000 and 2001 respectively. Arguably, the threat of litigation post 
2000 is expected to be higher compared to the threat of litigation prior to 2000. Thus, it 
is useful to examine if the evidence documented in Helbok and Walker continues after 
the introduction of the Market Abuse Rules. 
 
Table 3.12 presents the results of Helbok and Walker (2003). Similar to our results, the 
permanence of the negative news and the likelihood of breaching the interest cover ratio 
are statistically significant. In addition, both studies document that the permanence of 
bad news has the greatest impact on influencing managers’ decisions to issue profit 
warnings. In contrast, Helbok and Walker document a negative and significant 
directors’ ownership effect. We fail to find a similar result for our sample period.  
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Table 3.12: Summary of Helbok and Walker (2003) Results 
 
Table 3.12 reports the estimation results reported in Helbok and Walker (2003). These results are 
estimated using a logit model of the determinants of profit warnings of UK companies subject to a 
negative earnings surprise during the 1995-1998. The dependent variable PW is a dummy variable equals 
1 if the firm released a profit warning. COVLOG is the EXTEL period t-1 percentage of earnings before 
interest and tax (EBIT), which is used for interest payments. COVLOG is re-coded to zero for 
observations with negative EBITD. ES is the difference between mean IBES analysts’ forecast in the 6th 
month prior to IBES period t full year earnings announcement and IBES period t full year earnings 
announcement deflated by the Datastream share price in the beginning of the 6th months  prior to IBES 
period t full year earnings announcement. PERM is the difference between the first available IBES 
analysts forecast of for the period t+1 earnings following the period t EXTEL interim earnings 
announcement and the last available analysts’ forecast for period t+1 earnings preceding period t EXTEL 
full-year earnings announcement deflated by the share price in the beginning of the 6th months  prior to 
IBES period t full year earnings announcement.  NUMBER is the EXTEL number of analysts which 
publish forecasts over the 12 month prior to period t full year earnings announcement.  natural logarithm 
of the number of analysts publishing EPS forecasts for a given sample firm. MTB is the Datastream 
market to book value at the beginning of the 6th month before period t IBES full year earnings 
announcement.  INSIDER is the EXTEL directors’ beneficial holding of shares as percentage of total 
shares in issue. TOTAL LARGEST OWNERSHIP is the EXTEL percentage holding of ordinary shares 
of the three major outside shareholders. The table report the marginal effects. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.  
 
                   Marginal Effects 
COVLOG ‐2.03***  
ES ‐2.31  
PERM ‐14.66***  
NUMBER 0.78  
MTB 0.31  
INSIDER ‐2.70**  
TOTAL LARGEST OWNERSHIP 0.77  
Cons ‐  
Obs. 208  
Pseudo R2 ‐  
                                        Correctly Classified 
Warning 78.30%  
Non-Warning 58.82%  
Total 68.75%  
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3.5.2.2. Analysis of Issuers and Non-Issuers of Public Debt 
Next, we revisit the first hypothesis (H1) that predicts firms with public debt are more 
likely to issue profit warnings due to their debt reputational concerns. In the first part of 
this section we did not find evidence that firms with public debt are more likely to issue 
profit warnings in the event of bad news compared to firms without public debt. In this 
section, we examine and compare the determinants of profit warnings for firm-years 
with and without public debt. Specifically, we test if firms with public debt are more 
likely to issue profit warnings than those without when they face financial difficulties. 
We expect that while firms closer to violating their debt covenants face incentives to 
hide bad news, firms with public debt are unlikely to do so given the risk of damage to 
their reputation. In addition, we examine if firms with public debt are more likely to 
issue profit warnings in the event of permanent bad news compared to firms without 
public debt. We expect that firms with public debt are more forthcoming with the 
disclosure of bad news. 
 
To test our predictions we estimate the probit model separately for public debt issuers 
and for other companies. We report the results in Table 3.13.  
 
In the separate models of public debt issuers and non-issuers, we find that COVLOG is 
negative and significant for firms without public debt (as in the probit model estimated 
on the full sample). However, for the public debt issuers the effect of COVLOG is 
statistically insignificant. These results suggest that the decision to issue a profit 
warning when the company is closer to financial distress is influenced by whether or not 
the company has public debt. Firms without public debt are likely to hide bad news 
from third parties while firms with public debt are less likely to engage in this 
behaviour. 
 
We also test whether public debt reinforces the effect of the permanence of bad news 
(PERM) on the companies’ decisions to make profit warnings. The coefficient of PERM 
is statistically significant for both issuers and non-issuers of public debt. However, the 
size of the PERM coefficient for public debt issuers is larger. This result indicates that 
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firms with public debt are more likely to issue profit warnings in the event of permanent 
bad news. 
 
Ideally, we want to examine the significance of the difference between the coefficients 
in the separate models by including interaction terms between PD and the variables of 
interest. However, PD is highly correlated with its interaction terms. In addition, when 
we estimate the regression with the interaction terms between PD and the variables of 
interest, we find that the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) values are close to or above 5 
which is the threshold value used in the literature. This raises the possibility that 
multicollinearity is present and influences the results of our estimations. Therefore, we 
only report the results of the test that the coefficients of COVLOG and PERM do not 
vary significantly between firm-years with and without public debt.19 The results show 
that the coefficient of COVLOG is not statistically different between firms with and 
without public debt. However, we find that the coefficient PERM is statistically 
different between firms with and without public debt.  
 
 
                                            
19 We use the suest command in Stata to test the null hypothesis that the coefficients of COVLOG and 
PERM do not vary significantly between firm-years with and without public debt.  
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Table 3.13: Profit Warnings and Firm-Years with and without Public Debt 
 
Table 3.13 reports probit estimation results for the determinants of profit warnings for firm-years with 
and without public debt. The sample consists of UK firms subject to a negative earnings surprise during 
the period 2001-2008. The dependent variable PW is a dummy variable equals 1 if the firm released a 
profit warning. PD is a dummy variable equals 1 if the firm has a public debt issue in its financial 
structure and zero otherwise. COVLOG is the log of 1 plus the interest cover ratio multiplied by -1. 
COVLOG is re-coded to zero for observations with negative EBITD. ES is the difference between actual 
announced EPS and analysts’ mean consensus forecast of EPS deflated by share price. PERM is the 
permanence of bad news approximated by revisions of analysts’ forecasts for one period ahead. 
NUMBER is the number of analysts publishing EPS forecasts for a given sample firm. MV is the natural 
log of the firm’s market value measured at the second (third) fiscal quarter end. BTM is the as book value 
of assets divided by market value of equity plus book value of debt. PUB_Q is an indicator variable 
taking the value of 1 if the firm reports quarterly results. CROSS is an indicator variable taking the value 
1 if the firm is cross-listed in the US. PRIOR RETURN is the six-month stock return before the event 
date (the profit warning date for warning firms and the earnings announcement date for non-warning 
firms). Probits are estimated with robust standard errors. We report the marginal effects, except for the 
constant term where we report the coefficient size. z-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.  
 
 With PD  Without PD  chi2 
COVLOG ‐0.009 (‐0.20)  ‐0.031*** (‐4.06)  0.32 
ES ‐0.324 (‐0.72)  ‐0.349** (‐2.18)   
PERM 3.886*** (3.14)  1.054*** (4.18)  4.37** 
NUMBER 0.053 (0.64)  0.036 (1.41)   
MV 0.054 (1.16)  0.020 (1.30)   
BTM 0.148*** (2.70)  ‐0.008 (‐0.44)   
PUB_Q ‐0.093 (‐0.44)  ‐0.179** (‐2.39)   
CROSS ‐0.187 (‐1.03)  ‐0.031 (‐0.22)   
PRIOR RETURN ‐0.111 (‐0.70)  ‐0.014 (‐0.35)   
Cons ‐2.717*** (‐3.41)  ‐1.536*** (‐5.93)   
Obs. 137   658  
Pseudo R2 0.150  0.103  
Correctly Classified 
Warning 20.00%  7.19%  
Non-Warning 97.06%  98.65%  
Total 77.37%  79.33%  
Variance Inflation Factors (VIF)
COVLOG 1.3  1.06  
ES 1.17  1.04  
PERM 1.17  1.08  
NUMBER 3.02  2.38  
MV 3.68  2.4  
LBTM 1.22  1.06  
PUB_Q 1.64  1.14  
CROSS LISTING 1.9  1.12  
PRIOR RETURN 1.11  1.03  
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3.5.3. Robustness Checks 
3.5.3.1. Interim Management Statements 
Starting from 20 January 2007, the Disclosure and Transparency Rules (DTR) require 
companies admitted to trading on the London Stock Exchange to issue an interim 
management statement (IMS) every six months (DTR, section 4.3). According to DTR 
4.3, companies must issue an interim management statement after 10 weeks from the 
start of the fiscal period but before 6 weeks from its end. The purpose of issuing the 
interim management statement is to disclose information that explains material events 
and its impact on the firm’s financial position and performance.  
 
The Financial Authority Services (FSA) recognizes the potential overlap between 
interim management statement and profit warnings. In its review of DTR 4.3 it states 
that “It is not an acceptable practice to delay the announcement of price sensitive 
information (DTR2.2) in order for this to be announced within a forthcoming IMS”, 
(FSA, 2010, p.4). To investigate the confounding effects of interim management 
statements on the probability of issuing profit warnings, we re-estimate the results 
reported in Table 3.10 using firm-year observations with fiscal periods before January 
2007. Table 3.14 reports the results. Our results reported in Table 3.14 are similar to the 
ones reported in Table 3.10.  
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Table 3.14: Profit Warnings and Interim Management Statements 
 
Table 3.14 reports probit estimation results for the determinants of profit warnings before 2007. The 
sample consists of UK firms subject to a negative earnings surprise during the period 2001-2008. The 
dependent variable PW is a dummy variable equals 1 if the firm released a profit warning. PD is a dummy 
variable equals 1 if the firm has a public debt issue in its financial structure and zero otherwise. COVLOG 
is the log of 1 plus the interest cover ratio multiplied by -1. COVLOG is re-coded to zero for observations 
with negative EBITD. ES is the difference between actual announced EPS and analysts’ mean consensus 
forecast of EPS deflated by share price. PERM is the permanence of bad news approximated by revisions 
of analysts’ forecasts for one period ahead. NUMBER is the number of analysts publishing EPS forecasts 
for a given sample firm. MV is the natural log of the firm’s market value measured at the second (third) 
fiscal quarter end. BTM is the as book value of assets divided by market value of equity plus book value 
of debt. PUB_Q is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the firm reports quarterly results. CROSS 
is an indicator variable taking the value 1 if the firm is cross-listed in the US. PRIOR RETURN is the six-
month stock return before the event date (the profit warning date for warning firms and the earnings 
announcement date for non-warning firms). The estimation includes industry and time dummies. Probits 
are estimated with robust standard errors. We report the marginal effects, except for the constant term 
where we report the coefficient size. z-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.  
 
 Marginal Effects 
PD  ‐0.034 (‐0.69) 
COVLOG ‐0.028*** (‐3.00) 
ES ‐0.225 (‐0.93) 
PERM 0.958*** (‐3.21) 
NUMBER 0.027 (‐0.90) 
MV 0.038* (‐1.96) 
BTM ‐0.058 (‐1.59) 
PUB_Q ‐0.180*** (‐2.64) 
CROSS ‐0.090 (‐0.82) 
PRIOR RETURN ‐0.030 (‐0.64) 
Cons ‐1.824*** (‐3.11) 
Obs. 600  
Pseudo R2 0.176  
Correctly Classified 
Warning 28.36%  
Non-Warning 96.35%  
Total 81.17%  
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3.5.3.2. Financial Distress 
In this section we examine H2 using another measure for financial difficulties. Namely, 
we estimate the profit-warning model including a measure of the closeness to financial 
distress based on Altman’s Z-score (Z_SCORE). In addition, we examine the 
differential impact of Z_SCORE on the probability of issuing profit warnings for firms 
with and without public debt. 
 
We use Altman’s Z-score as our measure of default risk (Altman, 1968; 1993). 
Altman’s Z-score is specified as follows: 
Z = 1.2X1 + 1.4 X2 + 3.3 X3  + .6 X4 + 0.999 X5 
Where, X1 =  working capital/total assets;  
 X2 =  retained earnings/total assets; 
X3  =  earnings before interest and taxes/total assets; 
X4  =  market value equity/book value of total liabilities; 
X5  =  sales/total assets 
where we use data in year t-1 to calculate the Z score for year t. The higher the 
Z_SCORE value the less close the firm to distress.  
 
Our second hypothesis, H2, predicts that firms facing financial difficulties are less 
willing to disclose negative earnings surprises. Therefore, we expect a positive relation 
between PW and Z_SCORE. We report the results in Table 3.15. 
 
In the first column of Table 3.15, we report estimation results including our proxy of 
financial distress, Z_SCORE.  We find that the coefficient of Z_SCORE is negative and 
statistically significant at the 10% level.20 This, perhaps counter-intuitive, result 
indicates that firms closer to financial distress are more likely to warn the market of bad 
news. To further examine this result we focus on firm-year observations that have the 
highest probability of financial distress. We include an indicator variable, 
Z_DISTRESS, which takes a value of one if firm-year observations have Z_SCORE 
                                            
20 This result is robust to winsorizing data outliers and using an alternative function of Z-score specific to 
the UK market, proposed by Taffler (1984). 
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values in the bottom quartile. We predict that Z_DISTRESS is negatively related to PW, 
which indicates that firm-year observations with high probability of financial distress 
are less likely to warn. We report the results in the second column in Table 3.15. We 
find that Z_DISTRESS is negatively related to PW and statistically significant at the 
10% level.  
 
In the separate models of public debt issuers and non-issuers, we find that the 
coefficients of Z_SCORE and Z_DISTRESS are positive but insignificant for firms 
with public debt. In contrast, we find that Z_SCORE is negative and significant at the 
1% level for firms without public debt. This result indicates that firms without public 
debt are more likely to disclose bad news when they are closer to financial distress. 
However, the Z_DISRESS is negative and significant at the 10% level. This indicates 
that firms without public debt who are in the “bankruptcy zone” are less likely to warn 
the market of negative news. In addition, we find that the coefficients of Z_DISTRESS 
vary significantly at the 5% level between firm-years with and without public debt. 
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Table 3.15: Profit Warnings and Z_SCORE 
 
Table 3.15 reports probit estimation results for the determinants of profit warnings for firm-years with and without public debt. The sample consists of UK firms subject to a 
negative earnings surprise during the period 2001-2008. The dependent variable PW is a dummy variable equals 1 if the firm released a profit warning. PD is a dummy 
variable equals 1 if the firm has a public debt issue in its financial structure and zero otherwise. Z_SCORE is Altman’s Z-score. Z_DISTRESS is an indicator variable that 
takes the value 1 if Z_SCORE values are in the bottom quartile and 0 otherwise. ES is the difference between actual announced EPS and analysts’ mean consensus forecast of 
EPS deflated by share price. PERM is the permanence of bad news approximated by revisions of analysts’ forecasts for one period ahead. NUMBER is the number of analysts 
publishing EPS forecasts for a given sample firm. MV is the natural log of the firm’s market value measured at the second (third) fiscal quarter end. BTM is the as book value 
of assets divided by market value of equity plus book value of debt. PUB_Q is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the firm reports quarterly results. CROSS is an 
indicator variable taking the value 1 if the firm is cross-listed in the US. PRIOR RETURN is the six-month stock return before the event date (the profit warning date for 
warning firms and the earnings announcement date for non-warning firms). Probits are estimated with robust standard errors. We report the marginal effects, except for the 
constant term where we report the coefficient size. z-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
  Full Sample  With PD  Without PD  chi2 
PD  ‐0.054  (‐1.35)  ‐0.043 (‐1.05)  ‐  ‐  ‐ ‐   
Z_SCORE  ‐0.002*  (‐1.86)  ‐0.002** (‐2.08)  0.015  (1.09)  ‐0.002** (‐2.15)  1.67 
Z_DISTRESS  ‐  ‐  ‐0.056* (‐1.83)  0.071  (0.78)  ‐0.124*** (‐3.46)  5.85** 
ES  ‐0.256  (‐1.46)  ‐0.232 (‐1.33)  ‐0.357  (‐0.78)  ‐0.377** (‐2.26)   
PERM  1.316***  (4.19)  1.291*** (4.08)  3.857***  (3.10)  1.070*** (4.37)  4.17** 
NUMBER  0.026  (1.08)  0.027 (1.16)  0.052  (0.64)  0.046* (1.83)   
MV  0.028*  (1.85)  0.025* (1.67)  0.058  (1.28)  0.016 (1.09)   
BTM  ‐0.069***  (‐2.61)  ‐0.062** (‐2.34)  0.143***  (2.74)  ‐0.009 (‐0.51)   
PUB_Q  ‐0.170***  (‐2.92)  ‐0.169*** (‐2.84)  ‐0.075  (‐0.35)  ‐0.176** (‐2.41)   
CROSS LISTING  ‐0.061  (‐0.60)  ‐0.068 (‐0.68)  ‐0.205  (‐1.21)  ‐0.053 (‐0.41)   
PRIOR RETURN  ‐0.020  (‐0.54)  ‐0.011 (‐0.29)  ‐0.128  (‐0.82)  ‐0.001 (‐0.04)   
Cons  ‐0.687**  (‐2.44)  ‐0.624** (‐2.17)  ‐2.970***  (‐3.45)  ‐1.052*** (‐4.36)   
Obs.  829    829   138    691    
Pseudo R2  0.153    0.157   0.159    0.102    
Correctly Classified 
Warning  16.11%    17.78%   25.71%    2.76%    
Non‐Warning  97.38%    97.53%   97.09%  98.90%  
Total  79.73%    80.22%   78.99%    78.73%    
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3.5.3.3. Analysts Following 
In our analysis we use the number of analysts following a company without restrictions 
on the minimum number of analysts. This is because a substantial number of UK firms 
are followed by one analyst only. However, the literature on analysts’ forecasts requires 
minimum number of analysts (for example Barron, Kim, Lim, & Stevens, 1998;  
Clement, Frankel, Miller, 2003). We replicate our estimations using a minimum number 
of analysts’ following of three. We report the results in Table 3.16. We find that our 
results are robust to this restriction. 
 
Table 3.16: Profit Warnings and Minimum Number of Analysts 
 
Table 3.16 reports probit estimation results for the determinants of profit warnings for firm-years with 
and without public debt. The sample consists of UK firms subject to a negative earnings surprise during 
the period 2001-2008. The dependent variable PW is a dummy variable equals 1 if the firm released a 
profit warning. PD is a dummy variable equals 1 if the firm has a public debt issue in its financial 
structure and zero otherwise. COVLOG is the log of 1 plus the interest cover ratio multiplied by -1. 
COVLOG is re-coded to zero for observations with negative EBITD. ES is the difference between actual 
announced EPS and analysts’ mean consensus forecast of EPS deflated by share price. PERM is the 
permanence of bad news approximated by revisions of analysts’ forecasts for one period ahead. 
NUMBER is the number of analysts publishing EPS forecasts for a given sample firm. MV is the natural 
log of the firm’s market value measured at the second (third) fiscal quarter end. BTM is the as book value 
of assets divided by market value of equity plus book value of debt. PUB_Q is an indicator variable 
taking the value of 1 if the firm reports quarterly results. CROSS is an indicator variable taking the value 
1 if the firm is cross-listed in the US. PRIOR RETURN is the six-month stock return before the event 
date (the profit warning date for warning firms and the earnings announcement date for non-warning 
firms). Probits are estimated with robust standard errors. We report the marginal effects, except for the 
constant term where we report the coefficient size. z-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
  Full Sample  With PD  Without PD  chi2 
PD  ‐0.017  (‐0.30)  ‐ ‐  ‐  ‐   
COVLOG  ‐0.048***  (‐3.15)  ‐0.029 (‐0.56)  ‐0.051***  (‐3.09)  0.12 
ES  ‐0.491  (‐1.51)  ‐0.227 (‐0.46)  ‐0.695*  (‐1.85)   
PERM  1.435***  (2.77)  4.526*** (3.06)  1.263***  (2.61)  4.61** 
NUMBER  0.022  (0.38)  ‐0.015 (‐0.14)  0.029  (0.43)   
MV  0.016  (0.62)  0.066 (1.30)  0.001  (0.02)   
BTM  0.083**  (1.96)  0.182*** (2.82)  0.065  (1.26)   
PUB_Q  ‐0.250**  (‐2.13)  ‐0.096 (‐0.41)  ‐0.266*  (‐1.86)   
CROSS LISTING  0.012  (0.07)  ‐0.188 (‐0.94)  0.266  (0.88)   
PRIOR RETURN  0.002  (0.03)  ‐0.153 (‐0.85)  0.032  (0.47)   
Cons  ‐1.395***  (‐3.49)  ‐2.605*** (‐3.07)  ‐1.124**  (‐2.37)   
Obs.  410  125   285     
Pseudo R2  .080  0.166   0.086     
Correctly Classified 
Warning  10.34%  23.53%   10.98%     
Non‐Warning  97.62%  95.60%   97.04%     
Total  72.93%  76.00%   72.28%     
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3.5.3.4. Variations in Size of Earnings Surprise 
We identify companies facing bad news using a proxy of the earnings surprise. Initially, 
we include all firm-years when the reported earnings per share (EPS) falls short of the 
consensus EPS forecast by 1% or more of the share price. We re-estimate our previous 
results by varying the size of the earnings surprise into 0.05% and 2% and report the 
estimation results in Table 3.17. Our previous findings are robust to these variations. 
 
3.5.3.5. Scheduled Profit Warnings 
Collett (2004) documents that some UK firms release trading announcements on 
scheduled dates. Therefore, a firm could release a warning even though the market 
anticipates the surprise. To eliminate this possibility, we identify observations with 
scheduled profit warnings. Following Collett (2004), we define scheduled profit 
warnings as profit warnings made at the same time as the previous year (within 5 
calendar days). We report the estimation results in Table 3.18. Our findings are 
insensitive to recoding scheduled warnings as non-warnings; or if we drop observations 
corresponding to scheduled warning from the sample. 
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Table 3.17: Profit Warnings and Variations in Size of Earnings Surprise 
 
Table 3.17 reports probit estimation results for the determinants of profit warnings when varying the identification criteria for material bad news. The sample consists of UK 
firms subject to a negative earnings surprise during the period 2001-2008. The dependent variable PW is a dummy variable equals 1 if the firm released a profit warning. PD 
is a dummy variable equals 1 if the firm has a public debt issue in its financial structure and zero otherwise. COVLOG is the log of 1 plus the interest cover ratio multiplied by 
-1. COVLOG is re-coded to zero for observations with negative EBITD. ES is the difference between actual announced EPS and analysts’ mean consensus forecast of EPS 
deflated by share price. PERM is the permanence of bad news approximated by revisions of analysts’ forecasts for one period ahead. NUMBER is the number of analysts 
publishing EPS forecasts for a given sample firm. MV is the natural log of the firm’s market value measured at the second (third) fiscal quarter end. BTM is the as book value 
of assets divided by market value of equity plus book value of debt. PUB_Q is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the firm reports quarterly results.  CROSS is an 
indicator variable taking the value 1 if the firm is cross-listed in the US. PRIOR RETURN is the six-month stock return before the event date (the profit warning date for 
warning firms and the earnings announcement date for non-warning firms). Probits are estimated with robust standard errors. We report the marginal effects, except for the 
constant term where we report the coefficient size. z-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
  Firm-Years with Earnings Surprise greater than 2% Firm-Years with Earnings Surprise greater than .5% 
 With PD  Without PD  chi2  With PD  Without PD  chi2 
COVLOG 0.002  (0.04) ‐0.034*** (‐3.80)  0.45  ‐0.010 (‐0.24)  ‐0.029*** (‐4.00)  0.30 
ES ‐0.147  (‐0.32)  ‐0.441** (‐2.28)    ‐0.447 (‐0.98)  ‐0.326** (‐2.11)   
PERM 3.928***  (3.16)  0.831*** (2.85)  5.55**  4.089*** (3.07)  1.050*** (4.14)  4.35** 
NUMBER 0.013  (0.12)  0.005 (0.15)    0.090 (1.20)  0.049** (2.00)   
MV 0.091  (1.63)  0.008 (0.45)    0.024 (0.56)  0.022 (1.50)   
PUB_Q ‐  ‐  ‐ ‐    0.128*** (2.70)  ‐0.007 (‐0.42)   
CROSS ‐  ‐  ‐ ‐    ‐0.170 (‐0.88)  ‐0.174*** (‐2.86)   
BTM 0.200***  (2.75)  ‐0.004 (‐0.17)    ‐0.095 (‐0.48)  ‐0.057 (‐0.45)   
PRIOR RETURN ‐0.061  (‐0.34)  ‐0.011 (‐0.28)    ‐0.137 (‐0.94)  ‐0.006 (‐0.14)   
Cons ‐3.627***  (‐3.61)  ‐1.174*** (‐4.31)    ‐2.193*** (‐3.09)  ‐1.625*** (‐6.64)   
Obs. 89    488     169   769    
Pseudo R2 0.187   0.078    0.138  0.102   
Correctly Classified 
Warning 34.78%   3.92%    27.27%  3.73%  
Non-Warning 93.94%   98.19%    96.80%  98.19%  
Total 78.65%   78.48%    78.70%  78.41%  
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Table 3.18: Profit Warnings and Scheduled Profit Warnings 
 
Table 3.18 reports probit estimation results for the determinants of profit warnings when varying the definition of scheduled profit warnings. The sample consists of UK firms 
subject to a negative earnings surprise during the period 2001-2008. The dependent variable PW is a dummy variable equals 1 if the firm released a profit warning. PD is a 
dummy variable equals 1 if the firm has a public debt issue in its financial structure. COVLOG is the log of 1 plus the interest cover ratio multiplied by -1. COVLOG is re-
coded to zero for observations with negative EBITD. ES is the difference between actual announced EPS and analysts’ mean consensus forecast of EPS deflated by share 
price. PERM is the permanence of bad news approximated by revisions of analysts’ forecasts for one period ahead. NUMBER is the number of analysts publishing EPS 
forecasts for a given sample firm. MV is the natural log of the firm’s market value measured at the second (third) fiscal quarter end. BTM is the as book value of assets 
divided by market value of equity plus book value of debt. PUB_Q is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the firm reports quarterly results. CROSS is an indicator 
variable taking the value 1 if the firm is cross-listed in the US. PRIOR RETURN is the six-month stock return before the event date. Probits are estimated with robust standard 
errors. We report the marginal effects, except for the constant term where we report the coefficient size. z-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
 Scheduled Profit Warnings Eliminated Scheduled Profit Warnings Recoded as Non-Warnings 
 With PD  Without PD  chi2  With PD  Without PD  chi2 
COVLOG ‐0.009  (‐0.20) ‐0.029*** (‐3.84)  0.29  ‐0.009 (‐0.20) ‐0.029*** (‐3.78)  0.28 
ES ‐0.324  (‐0.72)  ‐0.347** (‐2.16)    ‐0.324 (‐0.72)  ‐0.349** (‐2.17)   
PERM 3.886***  (3.14)  1.001*** (4.06)  4.45**  3.886*** (3.14)  0.991*** (4.07)  4.47** 
NUMBER 0.053  (0.64)  0.041 (1.64)    0.053 (0.64)  0.042* (1.67)   
MV 0.054  (1.16)  0.017 (1.10)    0.054 (1.16)  0.016 (1.06)   
BTM 0.148***  (2.70)  ‐0.009 (‐0.47)    0.148*** (2.70)  ‐0.008 (‐0.45)   
PUB_Q ‐0.093  (‐0.44)  ‐0.171** (‐2.37)    ‐0.093 (‐0.44)  ‐0.169** (‐2.36)   
CROSS ‐0.187  (‐1.03)  ‐0.026 (‐0.19)    ‐0.187 (‐1.03)  ‐0.023 (‐0.17)   
PRIOR RETURN ‐0.111  (‐0.70)  ‐0.010 (‐0.25)    ‐0.111 (‐0.70)  ‐0.009 (‐0.23)   
Cons ‐2.717***  (‐3.41)  ‐1.520*** (‐5.82)    ‐2.717*** (‐3.41)  ‐1.517*** (‐5.82)   
Obs. 137    650     137   658    
Pseudo R2 0.150   0.102    0.150  0.100   
Correctly Classified 
Warning 20.00%   4.55%    20.00%  4.55%   
Non-Warning 97.06%   98.65%    97.06%  98.86%  
Total 77.37%   79.54%    77.37%  79.94%   
3.6. Conclusion 
This study investigates the factors that motivate companies to disclose unexpected bad 
news through profit warnings in the context of the UK market, where in contrast to the 
US litigation is unlikely to be a major driver of the decision. We estimate a probit model 
to explain the variation in the probability of issuing a profit warning for a sample of UK 
firms subject to a negative earnings surprise over the period 2001-2008. We focus 
primarily on the effect of the firm’s financial structure on the warning choice. 
Specifically, we examine the impact of the firm’s closeness to financial distress 
approximated by the firm’s interest cover ratio and the presence of outstanding public 
debt in the firm’s capital structure. We aim to highlight the role of possible agency 
conflicts between the firm and third parties and the reduction in agency costs on the 
firm’s decision to warn.  
 
We find that UK firms closer to financial distress are more likely to hide bad news from 
third parties. We also show that this effect is attenuated when the firm has public debt in 
issue. Moreover, we find that UK firms with public debt are more forthcoming with the 
disclosure of permanent bad news. Taken together, these results indicate that UK firms 
without public debt are likely to take advantage of the low threat of litigation to benefit 
shareholders at the expense of third parties. However, UK firms with public debt are 
less likely to engage in this opportunistic behaviour. The latter finding suggests that 
firms with public debt are deterred from hiding negative news as they incur agency 
costs resulting from the damage to their valuable reputations for truthful and timely 
disclosure. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to document reputational 
concerns effects on the decision to voluntarily warn the market of bad news. 
 
 
  115
References 
Altman, E. (1978). Financial ratios, discriminant analysis and the prediction of 
corporate bankruptcy. Journal of Finance, 23, 589-609. 
Altman, E. (1993). Corporate financial distress and bankruptcy, 2nd ed., John Wiley & 
Sons, New York. 
Armour, J., Black, B., Cheffins B., & Nolan, R. (2009). Private enforcement of 
corporate law: an empirical comparison of the United Kingdom and the United 
States. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 6, 687–722. 
Atiase, R., Supattarakul, S., and Tse, S. (2006). Market reaction to earnings surprise 
warnings: the incremental effect of shareholder litigation risk on the warning 
effect.  Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, 21, 191–222. 
Barron, O., Kim, O., Lim, S., & Stevens, D. (1998). Using analysts’ forecasts to 
measure properties of analysts’ information environment. The Accounting 
Review, 73, 421−433. 
Black, B., Cheffins, B., & Klausner, M. (2005). Liability risk for outside directors: a 
cross-border analysis. European Financial Management Journal, 11, 153-171. 
Bulkley, G., & Herrerias, R. (2005). Does the precision of news affect market 
underreaction? Evidence from returns following two classes of profit warnings. 
European Financial Management, 11, 603-624. 
Christensen, H., Lee, E., and Walker, M. (2009). Do IFRS reconciliations convey 
information? The effect of debt contracting. Journal of Accounting Research, 
47, 1167-1199. 
Clinch, G., & Verrecchia, R. (2011). Endogenous disclosure choice. Working paper. 
Clement, M., Frankel, R., & Miller, J. (2003). Confirming management earnings 
forecasts, earnings uncertainty, and stock returns. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 41, 653-679. 
Collett, N. (2004). Reactions of the London Stock Exchange to company trading 
statements announcement. Journal of Business, Finance and Accounting, 31, 3-
35. 
Dedman, E. (2004). Discussion of reactions of the London Stock Exchange to company 
trading statement announcements. Journal of Business, Finance and Accounting, 
31, 37-47. 
Diamond, D. (1989). Reputation acquisition in debt markets. Journal of Political 
Economy, 97, 828-862. 
Diamond, D. (1991). Monitoring and reputation: The choice between bank loans and 
directly placed debt. Journal of Political Economy, 99, 689-721. 
Diamond, D., & Verrecchia, R. (1991). Disclosure, liquidity, and the cost of capital. The 
Journal of Finance, 46, 1325-1359. 
Dye, R. (1984). Proprietary and nonproprietary disclosures. The Journal of Business, 
59, 331-366. 
Dye, R. (1985). Disclosure of nonproprietary information. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 23, 123-145. 
Dye, R. (2001). An evaluation of "Essays on Disclosure" and the disclosure literature in 
accounting. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 32, 181–235. 
Field, L., Lowry, M., & Shu, S. (2005). Does disclosure deter or trigger litigation? 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 39, 487-507. 
Francis, J., Philbrick, D., & Schipper, K. (1994). Shareholder litigation and corporate 
disclosures. Journal of Accounting Research, 32, 137–164. 
  116
FSA. (2000). Financial Services and Market Act. Retrieved. from 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/ukpga_20000008_en_1. 
FSA. (2009a). Disclosure and Control of Insider Information by Issuers. Retrieved. 
from http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/DTR/2. 
FSA. (2009b). Disclosure Rules and Transparency Rules. Retrieved. from 
http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/DTR. 
FSA. (2010). Technical Note: Interim Management Statements. List! 21. Retrieved from  
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/ukla/ims_review.pdf.  
FSA. (2005). Dealing with inside information: Advice on good practice. List! 9. 
Retreived from http://www.liderpress.hr/Default.aspx?sid=12767 
Healy, P., & Palepu, K. (2001). Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and 
capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 31, 405–440. 
Helbok, G., & Walker, M. (2003). On the willingness of UK companies to issue profit 
warnings: regulatory, earnings surprise permanence, and agency cost effects. 
Working Paper (SSRN). 
Jackson, D., & Madura, J. (2003). Profit warnings and timing. The Financial Review, 
38, 497–514. 
Jackson, D., & Madura, J. (2007). Impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure on the 
information flow associated with profit warnings. Journal of Economics and 
Finance, 31, 59-74. 
Kasznik, R., & Lev, B. (1995). To warn or not to warn: Management disclosures in the 
face of an earnings surprise. The Accounting Review, 70, 113–134. 
Kothari, S. P., Shu, S., & Wysocki, P. (2009). Do managers withhold bad news? 
Journal of Accounting Research, 47, 241-276. 
La Porta, R., López-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. 1998. Law and Finance, 
Journal of Political Economy, 106, 1113-1155. 
La Porta, R., López-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. 1999. Corporate 
Ownership Around the World. Journal of Finance, 54, 471-517. 
Lambert, R., Leuz, C., & Verrecchia, R. (2007). Accounting information, disclosure, 
and the cost of capital. Journal of Accounting Research, 45, 385-420. 
Larcker, D., & Rusticus, T. (2010). On the use of instrumental variables in accounting 
research. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 49, 186-205. 
LSE. (1994). Listing Rules. Retrieved. from http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/ukla/GU-
0796.pdf. 
LSE. (1996). Guidance on the Dissemination of Price Sensitive Information. Retrieved. 
from http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/ukla/GU-0796.pdf. 
Sengupta, P. (1998). Corporate disclosure quality and the cost of debt. The Accounting 
Review, 73, 459-474. 
Skinner, D. (1994). Why firms voluntarily disclose bad news? Journal of Accounting 
Research, 32, 38–60. 
Skinner, D. (1997). Earnings disclosure and stockholder lawsuits. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 23, 249–282. 
Taffler, R. (1984). Empirical models for the monitoring of UK corporations. Journal of 
Banking and Finance, 8, 199-227. 
Tucker, J. (2007). Is openness penalized? Stock returns around earnings warnings. The 
Accounting Review, 82, 1055-1087. 
Verrecchia, R. (2001). Essays on disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 32, 
91-180. 
  117
Xu, W. (2008). Market reactions to warnings of negative earnings surprises: further 
evidence. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 35, 818–836. 
Yu, F. (2005). Accounting transparency and the term structure of credit spreads. Journal 
of Financial Economics, 75, 53-84. 
 
  118
Chapter 4 
Initial Public Debt Offering and the Timeliness of Economic 
Loss Recognition21 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This study investigates the impact of the initial public debt offering (IPDO) on the 
timeliness properties of the firm’s accounting income. Issuing public debt for the first 
time presents a shift in the firm’s debt ownership structure from privately to publicly 
owned debt. Firms are more likely to communicate with private lenders on a private, 
insider-basis, while they are more likely to communicate with bondholders using public 
information. Therefore, bondholders, compared to private lenders, are expected to be 
more sensitive to the quality of public information. Timely loss recognition increases 
the efficiency of debt covenants thereby limiting opportunistic managerial actions. In 
addition, it increases the usefulness of financial reports because it provides traders in the 
secondary bond market with a reliable source of information when assessing the firm. In 
this study, we predict that firms will adopt a timelier policy of economic loss 
recognition after their initial public debt offering to address the higher demand for 
public information from larger number of external and dispersed bondholders. We find 
evidence consistent with our prediction using Basu’s (1997) time series measure of 
timely loss recognition. 
 
JEL classification: M4; G32 
Keywords: Conservatism; Timely Loss Recognition; Accruals; Debt Contracts; 
Covenants; Public Debt; Private Debt 
                                            
21 We thank Hans Christensen for providing useful comments. 
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4.1. Introduction 
Positive accounting theory suggests that the evolution of financial reporting attributes is 
influenced by contract agreements such as debt and managerial compensation contracts 
(Leftwich, 1983; Watts, 2003a, 2003b; Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). In this study, we 
examine the development of one attribute of financial reporting, namely asymmetric 
earnings timeliness, when the firm contracts for the first time with bondholders in the 
public debt market. We expect firms to be timelier in recognizing their economic losses 
after accessing the public debt market for the first time to address the higher demand for 
asymmetric timeliness from bondholders compared to private lenders. We also expect, 
ceteris paribus, that the change in the degree of timeliness is permanent since firms are 
expected to repeat borrowing from the public debt markets.  
 
Lenders are subject to the downside risk of the firm but they do not share the upside 
gains. Therefore, they are more sensitive to the firm’s losses than they are to its profits. 
Since timely loss recognition is concerned with how early economic losses are 
recognized in the financial statements, the information demands of the debt market  
determine, at least partially, the timeliness properties of  the borrower’s financial 
statements (Watts, 2003a, 2003b). Lenders are concerned with unexpected events that 
increase the probability of default because of at least two reasons. First, managers are 
more likely to expropriate creditors’ wealth in states of financial distress (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977). Therefore, it is important that lenders are informed 
about events that potentially lead to financial distress in a timely fashion to help lenders 
take appropriate actions in order to protect their rights (Guay, 2008; Watts, 2003a). 
Second, informing current and potential lenders of economic losses in a timely fashion 
enables them to accurately value the debt securities, thereby reducing the adverse 
selection problem. 
 
Although private and public lenders are expected to demand timeliness in the firm’s 
financial accounts, we argue that public lenders are likely to demand a greater degree of 
timeliness compared to private lenders. It is more efficient for firms with a large number 
of lenders to produce public information that is jointly useful to multiple lenders to 
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avoid the duplication of information production costs (Fama, 1985). In addition, firms 
are less willing to share their proprietary information with a large group of dispersed 
bondholders than with one or a limited number of lenders (Bhattacharya & Chisea, 
1995). While private lenders often have access to private information such as quarterly 
and monthly financial disclosure and covenant compliance information bondholders do 
not (Wittenberg-Moerman, 2008). Therefore, bondholders compared to private lenders 
are likely to be more sensitive to the quality of public information, especially to 
accounting attributes that affect how early economic losses are recognized in the firm’s 
financial statements. Consequently, we expect timely loss recognition to increase 
substantially after the firm issues its initial public debt offering.  
 
The extant literature focuses primarily on how timeliness increases the efficiency of 
debt contracts for monitoring reasons. Agency conflicts between creditors and 
shareholders are magnified in times of financial distress. To restrict managers’ 
opportunism and to ensure the payment of capital and interest, creditors write and 
monitor debt contracts. An important event that signals a higher probability of default is 
the violation of debt covenants known as technical default (Beneish & Press, 1993; 
Dichev & Skinner, 2002; Smith, 1993). The transfer of control rights from shareholders 
to creditors in the event of financial distress protects the creditors’ interests in the firm 
(Smith, 1993; Smith & Warner, 1979). However, the efficiency of control rights’ 
transfer depends on how early economic losses are recognized in the financial 
statements (Ball & Shivakumar, 2005; Guay, 2008; Watts, 2003a). Timely loss 
recognition is an asymmetric verification process, which immediately recognizes bad 
events while delaying the recognition of good events until they are verified (Basu, 
1997). Therefore, it ensures that debt covenant violations are triggered in a timely 
fashion by the speedy recognition of economic losses hence allowing the transfer of 
control rights from shareholders to lenders more quickly (Watts, 2003a).  
 
Although timeliness increases the efficiency of private and public debt contracts, 
covenants in public debt contracts are likely to create more demand for timeliness than 
covenants in private debt contracts (Nikolaev, 2010).22 Private debt contracts mostly use 
maintenance covenants that require companies to maintain certain financial ratios 
                                            
22 The following argument is adapted from Nikolaev (2010). 
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(Smith, 1993; Dichev & Skinner, 2002). In addition, private lenders set tighter debt 
covenants compared to bondholders in order to increase the frequency of the firm’s 
(unconditional) violation of private debt covenants (Berlin & Mester, 1992; Rajan & 
Winton, 1995). Consequently, these covenants function as trip-wires that trigger 
subsequent renegotiations of the debt contracts. The need for renegotiation substantially 
increases private lenders’ control over the company hence reducing the scope for 
managerial opportunism. On the other hand, public debt contracts employ negative 
covenants, which managers must meet before they take certain actions. Examples of 
these covenants include restrictions on dividend payouts, acquisitions, and new issuance 
of debt. These covenants rarely require maintenance of accounting ratios and thus do 
not require frequent renegotiation. In case of public debt frequent renegotiation is not 
efficient because of the nature of public debtholders diffused ownership. Therefore, 
timeliness enhances the efficiency of negative covenants by limiting actions that could 
lead to the expropriation of bondholders’ wealth. 
 
In addition, timeliness has other roles valuable benefits to bondholders relating to the 
tradability of public debt in the secondary debt market. Timeliness increases the 
usefulness of the firm’s financial reports, and therefore decreases the information 
asymmetries facing external investors (Lafond & Watts, 2008). With respect to the 
secondary debt market, timely loss recognition provides traders with information to 
evaluate the firm which decreases the adverse selection problem (Qi, Subramanyam, & 
Zhang, 2010; Wittenberg-Moerman, 2009). In addition, reporting economic losses in a 
timely fashion allows investors in public debt securities to value their holdings 
accurately and rebalance their investment decisions accordingly. 
 
In this study we focus on the presence of public debtholders rather than the level of 
public debt in relation to other types of financing. Issuing public debt is subject to a 
large fixed costs component and therefore the absolute size of public debt is large 
(Blackwell & Kidwell, 1988; Smith, 1986). Therefore, the level of public debt is 
expected to be significant enough to induce a change in the firm’s timeliness policy.23  
 
                                            
23 In this study we report a significant increase in the leverage ratio after the IPDO event (figures reported 
in Table 4.2). This supports the argument that the level of issued public debt is substantial enough to 
induce a change in the firm’s timeliness. 
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Although investigating the impact of the level of public debt relative to other financing 
sources on the degree of timeliness might have useful implications for our research, we 
focus on examining the impact of the IPDO event for several reasons. First, the firm 
contracts for the first time with a new type of investors. The information asymmetry 
associated with issuing initial public debt is expected to be greater than when issuing 
seasoned public debt (Cantillo & Wright, 2000). Therefore, IPDOs present an 
interesting context to examine how timeliness properties alleviate information 
asymmetries facing bondholders contracting for the first time with the firm. Second, 
Ball and Shivakumar (2008) note that exploiting an initial public offering (IPO) 
research design mitigates the omitted variable bias since we study the same firm that 
undergoes a transition in status. Third, investigating the degree of timeliness before and 
after issuing IPDO helps to clarify the causality between debt contracting and 
timeliness. An increase in the timeliness level after the IPDO indicates that 
bondhodlers’ demand induces this increase. Fourth, we employ an event-type 
methodology to overcome the criticism raised against Basu’s (1997) timeliness 
measure. Dietrich, Muller, & Riedl (2007) and Patatoukas and Thomas (2010) argue 
that data regularities in the distributions of earnings deflated by price and returns may 
lead to spurious relationship between losses and negative returns. However, in our tests 
we aim to show a significant change in the size of the bad news coefficient after the 
event of IPDO for the same set of sample firms. Data regularities cannot explain the 
significant increase in the strength of the association between losses and returns 
compared to gains and returns after the IPDO event date. 
 
Following Basu (1997), we measure timely loss recognition as the extent to which 
current period earnings asymmetrically incorporate economic losses relative to 
economic gains. Our findings indicate that firms follow timelier economic loss 
recognition after their initial public debt offering. These results are statistically and 
economically significant. Our sample firms increase the degree of economic loss 
recognition by nearly 70% after their initial public debt offering compared to the degree 
of economic loss recognition before their initial public debt offering. We also document 
that the increase in asymmetric timeliness persists up to three years after the first public 
debt issue.  
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This study contributes to the literature on the influence of contracting choices on 
accounting conservatism. The empirical evidence suggested by these studies indicates 
that the demands of the debt market increases the degree of asymmetric timeliness 
across countries (Ball, Kothari, & Robin, 2000; Ball, Robin, & Sadka, 2008). Further, it 
suggests that firms without traded equity compared to the one with traded equity are less 
timely in recognizing economic losses in part due to their debt contracting differences 
(Ball & Shivakumar, 2005, 2008). There is little single-country evidence documenting 
the influence of debt, or the type of debt, on the firm’s reporting behaviour. We find 
that, within a single country, namely the US, financial reporting attributes are 
significantly influenced by the information demands of different types of debt markets.   
 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the literature and 
discuss the hypotheses. Section 3 presents the sample selection process, the 
measurement of timely loss recognition, and the research methodology. We present the 
data and discuss the results in Sections 4 and 5 respectively. In Section 6 we present 
alternative measures for conditional conservatism and discuss the results. We 
summarize the findings and conclude in Section 7. 
 
4.2. Research Background 
4.2.1. Prior Literature and Contribution24 
This study is related to Ball and Shivakumar (2005) who investigate the effect of the 
firm’s equity status, private (not traded) or public (traded), on timeliness. In Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005), the authors find evidence that private equity firms in the UK are 
less timely in recognizing economic losses even though they are subject to formal 
accounting rules that are very similar to public equity firms. Their evidence is consistent 
with the view that financial reporting is significantly different between private and 
public equity firms due to differential market demands. However, our study is different 
from Ball and Shivakumar (2005) in two important ways. First, in this study we 
investigate the impact of accessing the public debt market on the firm’s asymmetric 
                                            
24 In this section we focus on the most related studies to our research questions. For a detailed discussion 
of the literature, please see Chapter 2. 
  124
timeliness. Ball and Shivakumar (2005) note that debt contracting differences between 
private and public equity companies constitute a potentially important determinant of 
financial reporting quality. However, they do not formally examine the influence of debt 
on the firm’s reporting choices. This study investigates the role of debt in inducing a 
demand for timeliness. The second difference relates to the research methodology. Ball 
and Shivakumar (2005) examine the effect of a firm’s current equity status on the 
degree of timeliness, while we examine the effect of two states of the firm: before and 
after it issues its initial public debt offering. We believe our methodology provides 
sharper inferences with regard to how the firm respond to greater demand for certain 
accounting attributes because of its contracting choices. 
 
In Ball and Shivakumar (2008), the authors investigate changes in the properties of 
accounting income for a sample of UK firms who issued an equity initial public offering 
(IPO). They find that the restated accounting income of their sample firms exhibits a 
significant lower earnings management, approximated using abnormal accruals 
measures, compared to the reported accounting income of the same firms for the same 
years. Ball and Shivakumar (2008) investigate the earnings management around the 
equity IPO, specifically in the two years before the equity IPO. Ball and Shivakumar 
(2008) focus on detecting managers’ opportunistic behaviour at the IPO event by 
inflating earnings at the time of the IPO. Therefore, it is difficult to generalize Ball and 
Shivakumar’s (2008) results by inferring that the firm adopts a higher quality 
accounting after its equity IPO due to debt contracting differences. In this study we are 
concerned with the change, and the persistence of the change, in the firm’s asymmetric 
timeliness after its initial public debt event. 
 
Another related study is Bharath, Sunder, and Sunder (2008), who investigate the effect 
of earnings and accruals management on the probability of issuing public debt. The 
authors argue that higher accounting quality firms are more likely to issue public debt, 
while lower accounting firms are more likely to issue private debt. This is because 
private lenders have superior access to private information, and therefore are subject to 
lower information asymmetry problems. Bharath et al. (2008) find that firms with 
higher accounting quality, approximated by lower earnings and accruals management, 
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borrow from public debt market, while firms with lower accounting quality borrow 
from private lenders. 
 
The evidence of Bharath et al. (2008) is consistent with the view that high quality 
accounting facilitates inexpensive monitoring and therefore allows the firm to borrow 
publicly (Armstrong, Guay, & Weber, 2010). In contrast, firms with low quality 
accounting overcome the information asymmetry problems by choosing private lenders 
who invest in costly monitoring technologies. This in turn reduces agency conflicts 
between the firm and its lenders. Bharath et al. implicitly assume that the accounting 
quality of the firm is given, and therefore, the choice of the lender type resolves the 
information asymmetry problems. In this study we expect that the firm actively 
modifies its accounting when it contracts with public debt investors for the first time to 
solve potential information asymmetries resulting from contracting with external and 
dispersed investors. 
 
In summary, we contribute to the literature by providing evidence on the effect of 
issuing public debt for the first time on the level of asymmetric timeliness across firms 
operating within the same reporting environment. This evidence enhances our 
understanding of the impact of debt market demands for timeliness properties of the 
firm’s financial reports. 
 
4.2.2. Hypotheses Development 
The first hypothesis investigates the change in the firm’s degree of timeliness before 
and after issuing public debt for the first time. Formally, Hypothesis 1 (H1) states that: 
H1: Firms follow a timelier policy of economic loss recognition after their initial public 
debt offering (IPDO) than before the IPDO 
The motivation for H1 follows from the assumption that firms with private debt are 
more likely to communicate with banks on an insider basis, while firms with public debt 
are more likely to rely on public information (Fama, 1985). Communicating privately 
becomes inefficient when the firm contracts with a large number of uncoordinated 
investors. Firms with inside debt incur lower costs by communicating with inside 
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debtholders directly, while those with outside debt will incur lower information costs by 
producing public information that is jointly useful for different outside debtholders. 
Communicating with debtholders through public information reduces the duplication of 
information costs incurred by bondholders to monitor their contracts, and therefore, 
leads to lower interest rates.  
 
Similar to Fama (1985), Ball and Shivakumar (2005) suggest that the quality of public 
information is higher for firms with public equity (outside equity) compared to firms 
with private equity (inside equity). The authors argue that communicating on an inside-
basis with a large number of actual and potential investors is inefficient for firms with 
traded equity. Therefore, private equity firms are more likely to communicate with their 
agents on an insider basis while public equity firms communicate through public 
information. Consequently, public traded equity demand higher quality financial 
reporting to resolve the information asymmetries they face. 
 
We build on these foundations by suggesting that firms are more likely to communicate 
with private lenders on a private, insider-basis, while they are more likely to 
communicate with bondholders using public information. Therefore, we expect 
bondholders to be more sensitive to the quality of public information, especially with 
regard to recognizing events that could affect the borrower’s credit quality. We expect 
that public debtholders are more likely to demand a higher degree of timeliness 
compared to private lenders, and therefore, firms respond to this demand by increasing 
their level of timeliness.  
 
The second hypothesis investigates the persistence in the change in the firm’s degree of 
timeliness after issuing public debt for the first time. Formally, Hypothesis 2 (H2) states 
that: 
H2: the change in the degree of timely economic loss recognition after the firm’s debt 
initial public offering is permanent. 
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Asymmetric timeliness reduces the information asymmetry problems facing 
bondholders only if the firm commits to adopt a timely loss recognition policy. In other 
words, it is essential for public debt issuer to promote investors’ confidence in its 
accounting and financial communication policies to manage potential costs of 
information asymmetries. The firm’s failure to commit to timeliness will result in a loss 
of the firm’s reputational capital and consequently to higher interest rates charged by 
bondholders for future borrowings. Therefore, we expect, ceteris paribus, that the 
change in the degree of asymmetric timeliness is permanent since firms are expected to 
repeat borrowing in the public debt market. 
 
4.3. Research Design 
4.3.1. Sample Choice 
We select all US nonfinancial firms that issued public debt for the first time during the 
period 1972-2008. We follow Hale and Santos (2008) by considering the initial public 
debt offering issued on and after 1972 since the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) debt 
list prior to 1972 is incomplete. To identify the date of the initial public debt offer, we 
use the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) new bond issuance database. We construct a 
list of all debt issues by US firms. Then we sort all issues for each firm and select the 
initial public debt offer. Finally, we match the names of the issuers of initial public debt 
offers with the firms’ names in Compustat. The sample selection process is described in 
Table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1: Sample Selection 
 
Table 4.1 reports the sample selection process. The number of firms for reported estimations varies 
depending on the available data needed to construct the conservatism measures. 
Nonfinancial US firms with IPDO and identified in Compustat database until 2008  1,023 
Nonfinancial US firms with IPDO before 1972 (145) 
Debt issues with all required data 878 
Final Sample 878 
We identify a non US firm in the SDC database under the data items “Nation” and “Primary 
Exchange Where Issuer’s Stock Trades”. All firms with a value other than “United States” under the 
data item “Nation” are classified as a non US firms. All firms with a non US stock exchange under the 
data item “Primary Exchange Where Issuer’s Stock Trades” are classified as a non US firms. 
Data Sources:  The Securities Data Company (SDC) Database. 
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Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of initial public debt offers by year. The decrease in 
debt issuance around 1990 could be attributed to uncertainty caused by the large default 
rate of corporate issuers during that period (Fons & Kimball, 1991). 
 
Figure 4.1: Distribution of IPDOs by Year 
 
 
 
4.3.2. Methodology 
4.3.2.1. Measurement of Timely Loss Recognition 
The purpose of this study is to examine the change in the firm’s policies in recognizing 
economic losses in its financial reports after its issuance of its initial public debt. Basu 
(1997) proposes that the recognition of economic losses must be associated with the 
actual presence of adverse economic circumstances. In his article, Basu (1997, p. 7) 
interprets conservatism as the (emphasis added):  
[A]ccountant’s tendency to require a higher degree of verification to recognize good 
news as gains than to recognize bad news as losses. Under my interpretation of 
conservatism, earnings reflect bad news more quickly than good news. 
 
This interpretation of conservatism, known as conditional conservatism, emphasizes 
that the incorporation of losses in reported earnings is conditional on firms experiencing 
contemporaneous economic losses (Ball & Shivakumar, 2005; Watts, 2003a). One 
implication of conditional conservatism is that it will induce an asymmetry in the 
timeliness of recognizing economic gains and economic losses, with economic losses 
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being reflected more promptly than economic gains (Basu, 1997; Givoly & Hayn, 2000; 
Holthausen & Watts, 2001; Pope & Walker, 1999).  
 
We follow Basu  (1997) to assess the firm’s asymmetric timeliness before and after the 
initial public debt offering. Specifically, Basu suggests the following model: 
(1)DRRDRRPE ititit3it2it111itit *     
where Eit is the earnings per share before extraordinary items; Pit-1  is the price per 
share at the beginning of fiscal year t; Rit is the 12-month discrete stock return ending 3 
months after the end of fiscal year t; and DRit  is a dummy variable equal to one if Rit is 
negative and zero otherwise. DRit*Rit is an interaction term between Rit and DRit. We 
use the earnings before extraordinary items since we are most interested in investigating 
the timeliness properties of income from continuing operations. We calculate returns 
ending 3 months after the end of the fiscal year to account for the delay in the 
announcement of financial reports. This ensures that the returns do not reflect the 
previous year’s earnings announcement. 
 
In Basu (1997), stock returns approximate news arrival during the period, positive 
returns reflect a period of economic gains and negative returns reflect a period of 
economic losses. Basu suggests that earnings reflect bad news (negative returns) more 
than it reflects good news (positive returns) if there is asymmetric verification 
requirements of losses and gains. With respect to equation (1), the association between 
earnings and returns is expected to be greater in periods of bad news compared to years 
of good news (Basu, 1997; Givoly, Hayn, & Natarajan, 2007; 2001; Pope & Walker, 
1999). The term 1 in equation (1) measures the sensitivity of earnings to good news, 
and 3 measures the sensitivity of earnings to bad news. Asymmetric timeliness implies 
that there is an incremental response to bad news relative to good news, in other words 
1 + 3 > 1 hence 3 is expected to be greater than zero.  
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4.3.2.2. Asymmetric Timeliness and Initial Public Debt Offering 
Based on Hypothesis 1, we expect the coefficient associated with negative returns to 
increase around the year of the IPDO. To test H1 and H2 we estimate two specifications 
of equation (1). In the first specification we include 11 period dummies: 5 period 
dummies that represent each of the five years before the initial public debt offer, one 
period dummy that represent the year of the initial public debt offer, and 5 period 
dummies that represent five years after the IPDO. We also interact each period dummy 
with the original terms in equation (1). The model is specified as follows: 
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where DPt are the period dummies for years -5 to +5 relative to year 0, the year of the 
IPDO. We expect the coefficients 3,t for the years after the debt IPO to be statistically 
significant and positive. 
 
In the second specification we include a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the 
years after the initial public debt offer and 0 for the years before the initial public debt 
offer. The years before the initial public debt offer include the years -5 up to -1. The 
years after the initial public debt offer firstly include the years 0 to 5. We test the 
timeliness over the two windows using the following specification: 
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where DW is a dummy variable taking the value 1 for the years after the initial public 
debt offer and 0 for the years before the initial public debt offer. According to H1 and 
H2, we expect 3 to be significantly positive. 
 
4.3.2.3. Controlling for Leverage, Size and Book to Market 
The firm’s debt ratio potentially increases significantly after the firm issues its initial 
public debt offering. The increase in debt may induce a timelier policy in the firm’s 
financial reports. This is because higher leverage could amplify agency conflicts and 
  131
therefore the firm could adopt a timelier policy to mitigate those conflicts (Khan & 
Watts, 2009; Watts, 2003a). In addition, the size of the firm may increase after the firm 
issues its initial public debt. To control for these potentially confounding effects we 
estimate equations (2) and (3) including leverage, size, and BTM with their interaction 
terms with the original terms in equation (1). Thus, equation (2) is modified as follows:  
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Likewise, equation (3) is modified to control for the effect of the change in leverage, 
size and BTM as follows: 
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4.4. Data Description 
Table 4.2 reports descriptive statistics for the components of equations (2) to (5). To 
mitigate the influence of outliers we winsorize the top and bottom 1% of the 
observations of each tail of the E/P and Return distributions. Also, we report the firms’ 
leverage and size just before and immediately after the IPDO. The mean leverage ratio, 
Lev, of our sample firms before the initial public debt offer is 0.30, while it is 0.35 after 
the initial public debt offer. The increase in the leverage ratio is statistically significant 
at the 1% level. Likewise, the sample firms’ mean log of total assets, Size, is 
significantly higher after the IPDO at the 1% level.  
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics 
 
Table 4.2 reports descriptive statistics in two panels. Panel 1 reports summary statistics for the 
components of equation (1) as specified in Basu (1997). Panel 2 shows descriptive statistics for firm 
specific characteristics before and after the initial public debt offering.  
Eit/Pit is the earnings per share before extraordinary items divided by the price per share at the beginning 
of fiscal year t. Return is the 12-month discrete stock return ending 3 months after the end of fiscal year t. 
Eit/Pit and Returns are trimmed at 1%. 
Leverage is the long term debt divided by total assets. Assets ($) is the dollar size of total assets. Size is 
the log of total assets. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Variable Obs. Mean Median SD Min Max Skewness Kurtosis
Panel 1: Summary Statistics for the Components of Regression 1 
E/P 6897  0.031  0.062  0.210  ‐1.460  0.407  ‐4.569  29.46 
Return 6897  0.096  0.036  0.474  ‐0.749  2.225  1.599  7.75 
Panel 2: Summary Statistics for Firm Characteristics 
 t = -1 t = 1 
 Obs. Mean Median SD Obs. Mean Median SD 
Leverage 878  0.30  0.26  0.189  805  0.35***  0.32  0.19 
Assets($) 878  4108  1012  11825  805  5014  1247  15480 
Size 878  6.89  6.92  1.666  805  7.16***  7.15  1.62 
 
4.5. Results and Analysis 
4.5.1. Tests of Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 
Incremental Timeliness 
To test H1 and H2 we estimate equations (2) to (5) and report the results in Tables 4.3  
and 4.4. Table 4.3 reports the incremental sensitivity of bad news for each individual 
year around the issuance of the IPDO. We estimate equation (2) using a window of 11 
years around the IPDO. The coefficient of bad news sensitivity 3  is positive and 
statistically significant with a value of 0.099 in line with Basu (1997). The coefficients 
of bad news sensitivity interacted with the period dummies, 3,t, for all the years before 
the initial public debt offer are insignificant, while they are positive and significant at 
the 5% level for years 1 and 5, and at the 1% level for years 2, 3, and 4. This finding 
supports hypothesis H1, which suggests that the coefficient of bad news sensitivity will 
increase after their initial public debt offer. It also supports H2 because the change in 
asymmetric timeliness continues for five years after the initial public debt offer. The 
magnitude of the increase in the coefficient of bad news sensitivity is economically 
significant. After issuing the initial public debt the average asymmetric timeliness of our 
sample firms doubles in magnitude compared to the base year 0.  
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Next, we estimate equation (4) which controls for possible confounding effects of the 
firm’s size, leverage, and BTM and report the results in the second column in Table 4.3. 
The results reported in the second column in Table 4.3 show that the coefficient of the 
bad news sensitivity interacted with the period dummies, 3,t, are still significant for all 
the years after the IPDO. In addition, the results show that bad news sensitivity nearly 
doubles in all specifications. This finding is consistent with the findings of Nikolaev  
(2010) who reports a coefficient of bad news sensitivity of 0.27 for the base model and 
0.49 after controlling for size and leverage. The coefficient of the bad news sensitivity 
interacted with the firm’s size 4 is negative and statistically significant, which indicates 
that smaller firms are more conservative than larger firms. In addition, the estimation 
results of equation (4) shows that the coefficient of the bad news sensitivity interacted 
with the firm’s leverage 8 is positive but statistically insignificant. Finally, the 
coefficient of the bad news sensitivity interacted with the firm’s BTM 12 is positive 
and statistically significant, which indicates that firms with more growth opportunities 
are more conservative than firms with fewer growth opportunities. 
 
Timing of the Change in the Firm’s Timeliness Policy 
In Ball and Shivakumar (2008) the authors find evidence suggesting that UK firms 
begin reporting more conservatively several years before issuing their equity initial 
public offering (IPO). Our findings reported in Table 4.3. show that the adjustment to 
the firm’s asymmetric timeliness does not take place before the initial public debt 
offering event. Hence, our results appear to contradict those reported in Ball and 
Shivakumar. However, we argue that the inconsistencies between the two sets of 
findings emerge because Ball and Shivakumar use restated accounting numbers in the 
firms’ prospectuses while we use the actual reported numbers.  
 
Ball and Shivakumar (2008) focus on the restated accounting numbers in the UK 
companies IPO prospectuses. They find a significant difference between reported 
financials and prospectus financials for the same set of UK companies in the three years 
before they go public.25 This evidence implies that the firm’s reported financials do not 
                                            
25 It is important to note that the UK’s Companies Act requires private companies to file audited annual 
financial statements. Hence, private companies’ reports are publicly available. 
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exhibit significant adjustments before the IPO date, hence it is consistent with our 
findings. In addition, Ball and Shivakumar compare the conditional conservatism in the 
restated prospectus accruals for firms who issued an initial public offering (IPO) with a 
control sample of UK private firms that did not go public during the sample period. The 
authors find that UK firms going public compared to private firms that did not go public 
report the restated prospectus income more conservatively. In this study we use 
reported financials and therefore it is difficult to compare the two sets of results.  
 
We argue that the ambiguity with respect to the IPDO date could explain the reluctance 
of firms in adjusting their reporting policies before the IPDO. As Ball and Shivakumar 
(2008) note, it is difficult to predict when the likelihood of the IPO becomes material 
enough to impact the company’s financials. The ambiguity of the IPDO timing could be 
greater than that of the IPO due to the lower costs of entry of public debt markets 
compared to equity markets (Cantillo & Wright, 2000). In addition, the change in the 
firm’s asymmetric timeliness policy possibly will be costly since it could adversely 
impact the contracts in place. For example, adopting a policy of timelier loss 
recognition may increase the frequency of debt covenant violations for private debt 
contracts already in place. Therefore, the firm may delay modifying its policies until it 
actually contracts with the new investors. 
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Table 4.3: Incremental Timeliness 
 
Table 4.3 reports the incremental timeliness for each year before and after the first public debt offering. 
The base year is year 0.  Model 1 reports the fixed effects estimation results of equation (2) as follows: 
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Model 2 reports the fixed effects estimation results of equation (4) as follows: 
(4)***
*****
******
***
1211
1098765
4321
5,5
,3
5,5
,2
5,5
,1
5,5
,032101




itititititit
ititititititititititit
ititititititititititt
t
t
itt
t
titt
t
tt
t
titititititit
RDRBTMDRBTM
RBTMBTMRDRLevDRLevRLevLev
RDRSizeDRSizeRSizeSizeDRRDP
DRDPRDPDPDRRDRRPE








 
The dependent variable Eit/Pit is the earnings per share before extraordinary items divided by the price per 
share at the beginning of fiscal year t. Rit is the 12-month discrete stock return ending 3 months after the 
end of fiscal year t. DRit is a dummy variable equal to one if Return is negative and zero otherwise. 
Rit*DRit is an interaction term between Rit and DRit. DPt are period dummies. Sizeit is the log of total 
assets. Levit is the long term debt divided by total assets. Eit/Pit and Rit are trimmed at 1%. *, **, *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
DRit 0.0264***  (4.01)  0.0690*  (1.69)  0.0639  (1.38) 
Rit 0.0202***  (2.86)  0.00296  (0.07)  0.0028  (0.06) 
DRit*Rit 0.0992**  (2.25)  0.360***  (3.04)  0.345***  (2.71) 
Sizeit ‐  ‐  0.0204***  (3.29)  0.0189***  (3.04) 
Sizeit*DRit ‐  ‐  ‐0.0044  (‐1.09)  ‐0.0039  (‐0.93) 
Sizeit*Rit ‐  ‐  0.0025  (0.55)  0.0065  (1.38) 
Sizeit*Rit*DRit ‐  ‐  ‐0.0519***  (‐4.60)  ‐0.0573***  (‐5.01) 
Levit ‐  ‐  ‐0.0989***  (‐3.47)  ‐0.0969***  (‐3.39) 
Levit*DRit ‐  ‐  ‐0.0200  (‐0.57)  ‐0.0334  (‐0.94) 
Levit*Rit ‐  ‐  0.0083  (0.25)  0.0060  (0.18) 
Levit*DRit*Rit ‐  ‐  ‐0.0057  (‐0.07)  ‐0.0308  (‐0.37) 
BTMit ‐  ‐  0.0409*  (1.92)  0.0338  (1.58) 
BTMit*DRit ‐  ‐  ‐0.0117  (‐0.43)  ‐0.0126  (‐0.46) 
BTMit*Rit ‐  ‐  ‐0.0054  (‐0.21)  0.0065  (0.25) 
BTMit*Rit*DRit ‐  ‐  0.147**  (2.10)  0.119*  (1.70) 
DP-5 0.0113  (0.98)  0.0201*  (1.65)  0.0361*  (1.96) 
DP-4 0.0080  (0.71)  0.0146  (1.23)  0.0243  (1.37) 
DP-3 0.0108  (0.96)  0.0163  (1.41)  0.0050  (0.28) 
DP-2 0.0091  (0.84)  0.0122  (1.10)  0.0212  (1.24) 
DP-1 0.0131  (1.22)  0.0132  (1.22)  0.0179  (1.07) 
DP+1 ‐0.0069  (‐0.64)  ‐0.0114  (‐1.06)  0.0060  (0.35) 
DP+2 0.0008  (0.07)  ‐0.0058  (‐0.52)  0.0258  (1.46) 
DP+3 ‐0.0124  (‐1.09)  ‐0.0208*  (‐1.82)  ‐0.0200  (‐1.11) 
DP+4 ‐0.0219*  (‐1.89)  ‐0.0333***  (‐2.84)  ‐0.0022  (‐0.12) 
DP+5 ‐0.0208*  (‐1.72)  ‐0.0324***  (‐2.65)  ‐0.0109  (‐0.56) 
  136
 
DP-5*DRit ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐0.0157  (‐0.51) 
DP-4*DRit ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  0.0087  (0.28) 
DP-3*DRit ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  0.0342  (1.15) 
DP-2*DRit ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐0.0005  (‐0.02) 
DP-1*DRit ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐0.0204  (‐0.69) 
DP+1*DRit ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  0.0063  (0.22) 
DP+2*DRit ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  0.0139  (0.48) 
DP+3*DRit ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  0.0490  (1.62) 
DP+4*DRit ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐0.0148  (‐0.48) 
DP+5*DRit ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐0.0159  (‐0.49) 
DP-5*Rit ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐0.0369  (‐1.24) 
DP-4*Rit ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐0.0338  (‐1.19) 
DP-3*Rit ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  0.0180  (0.60) 
DP-2*Rit ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐0.0275  (‐1.03) 
DP-1*Rit ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐0.0002  (‐0.01) 
DP+1*Rit ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐0.0594**  (‐2.02) 
DP+2*Rit ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐0.130***  (‐4.03) 
DP+3*Rit ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐0.0355  (‐1.09) 
DP+4*Rit ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐0.0862***  (‐2.85) 
DP+5*Rit ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐0.0592  (‐1.55) 
DP-5*DRit *Rit 0.0429  (0.75)  0.0191  (0.33)  0.0614  (0.72) 
DP-4*DRit*Rit 0.0491  (0.89)  0.0203  (0.37)  0.049*  (1.84) 
DP-3*DRit*Rit 0.0525  (0.95)  0.0314  (0.57)  0.0733  (0.89) 
DP-2*DRit*Rit 0.0158  (0.27)  ‐0.0059  (‐0.10)  0.0429  (0.50) 
DP-1*DRit*Rit 0.0056  (0.10)  0.0020  (0.03)  ‐0.0379  (‐0.45) 
DP+1*DRit*Rit 0.135**  (2.38)  0.106*  (1.87)  0.187**  (2.19) 
DP+2*DRit*Rit 0.242***  (4.39)  0.218***  (3.98)  0.469***  (5.72) 
DP+3*DRit*Rit 0.256***  (4.65)  0.239***  (4.38)  0.405***  (4.89) 
DP+4*DRit*Rit 0.226***  (4.04)  0.188***  (3.36)  0.324***  (3.87) 
DP+5*DRit*Rit 0.134**  (2.13)  0.133**  (2.14)  0.211**  (2.22) 
Cons 0.0418***  (5.00)  ‐0.103**  (‐2.16)  ‐0.0982**  (‐2.02) 
            
Obs. 6897    6897    6897   
 
Timeliness before and after IPDO 
Table 4.4 reports the results of estimating equation (3). Equation (3) includes a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 for the years after the IPDO and 0 for the years before the 
initial public debt issue. The window before the initial public debt offer includes the 
years -5 up to -1. The window after the first public debt issue initially includes the years 
0 up to 5. In order to test H2, we vary the window of the years after the first public debt 
issue to include the years 1-5; 2-5; 3-5; and 4-5 respectively. According to H2, the 
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change in asymmetric timeliness will persist for more than one year after the first public 
debt issue. Therefore, we expect to find a significant positive 3 coefficient for all the 
specified windows. Each column in Table 4.4 reports the results of estimating equation 
(3) using each of the specified post debt IPO event window. We use each firm as its 
own control, thus, we require each firm to have at least one observation before and after 
the first public debt event. The size of the bad news sensitivity coefficient interacted by 
the window dummy, 3, for the five windows is equal to 0.08, 0.11, 0.09, 0.12, and -
0.029 respectively. The increase in the asymmetric timeliness for all windows is 
statistically significant except for the fifth window, where it is insignificant. These 
findings support hypothesis H1, which suggests that the coefficient of bad news 
sensitivity will increase after their initial public debt offer. It also supports H2 because 
the change in asymmetric timeliness is significant in four windows.  
 
The reported results in Panel 2 show that after controlling for the confounding effects of 
size, leverage, and BTM, the size of the coefficient of bad news sensitivity interacted by 
the window dummy, 3, is positive and significant for the first four windows. The 
increase in the timeliness for all windows is statistically significant at the 1% level. In 
addition, the results indicate that the coefficient of the bad news sensitivity interacted 
with the firm’s size 4 is negative and statistically significant. This finding is similar to 
the one reported in Table 4.3 and indicates that smaller firms are more conservative than 
larger firms. Also, the estimation results of equation (5) shows that the coefficient of the 
bad news sensitivity interacted with the firm’s BTM 12 is significant in all windows. 
 
In conclusion, the results reported in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 suggest that the firm’s 
asymmetric timeliness increases significantly, statistically and economically, after the 
IPDO even after controlling for the confounding effects of the firm size, leverage, and 
BTM. 
Table 4.4: Timeliness and IPDO – Panel 1 
 
This panel shows the fixed effects estimation results of equation (3): 
(3)DRRDWDRDWRDWDWDRRDRRPE ititit3it2it10itit3it2it101itit *****     
The dependent variable Eit/Pit is the earnings per share before extraordinary items divided by the price per share at the beginning of fiscal year t. Rit is the 12-month discrete 
stock return ending 3 months after the end of fiscal year t. DRit is a dummy variable equal to one if Return is negative and zero otherwise. Rit*DRit is an interaction term 
between Rit and DRit. Sizeit is the log of total assets. Levit is the long term debt divided by total assets.  DW is a dummy variable that is coded 1 for the years before the first 
public debt issue and for the years after the first public debt issue. The years before the first public debt issue include -5 to -1. Each column defines the window for the years 
after the first public debt issue. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 Window: (0,5) Window: (1,5) Window: (2,5) Window: (3,5) Window: (4,5) 
DRit 0.0310*** (2.78)  0.0324*** (2.83)  0.0338*** (2.89)  0.0338*** (2.83)  0.0269** (2.45) 
Rit 0.0242** (2.24)  0.0256** (2.30)  0.0244** (2.14)  0.0246** (2.12)  0.0164 (1.52) 
DRit*Rit 0.164*** (5.28)  0.162*** (5.07)  0.170*** (5.15)  0.169*** (5.02)  0.170*** (5.44) 
DW ‐0.0089 (‐1.09)  ‐0.0056 (‐0.65)  ‐0.0053 (‐0.58)  ‐0.0030 (‐0.31)  ‐0.0089 (‐0.90) 
DW*DRit ‐0.0030 (‐0.22)  ‐0.0085 (‐0.58)  ‐0.0156 (‐0.99)  ‐0.0119 (‐0.71)  ‐0.0240 (‐1.39) 
DW*Rit ‐0.0073 (‐0.52)  ‐0.0243 (‐1.61)  ‐0.0198 (‐1.21)  ‐0.0215 (‐1.24)  ‐0.0004 (‐0.02) 
DW*DRit*Rit 0.0845** (2.21)  0.110*** (2.72)  0.0889** (2.03)  0.117** (2.52)  ‐0.0296 (‐0.61) 
Cons 0.0474*** (7.32)  0.0474*** (7.16)  0.0469*** (6.94)  0.0457*** (6.63)  0.0528*** (8.37) 
          
Obs. 6897  6195  5491  4998  4208 
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Table 4.4: Timeliness and IPDO – Panel 2 
 
This panel shows the estimation results of equation (5): 
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 Window: (0,5) Window: (1,5) Window: (2,5) Window: (3,5) Window: (3,5) 
DRit 0.0754*  (1.83)  0.0591 (1.35)  0.0716  (1.51)  0.0856* (1.71)  0.0168 (0.33) 
Rit ‐0.00516  (‐0.13)  ‐0.0047 (‐0.11)  ‐0.0081  (‐0.18)  0.0008 (0.02)  ‐0.0616 (‐1.32) 
DRit*Rit 0.428***  (3.90)  0.391*** (3.34)  0.433***  (3.44)  0.392*** (2.95)  0.316** (2.33) 
Sizeit 0.0033  (0.58)  0.0007 (0.11)  ‐0.0033  (‐0.51)  ‐0.0019 (‐0.26)  ‐0.0112* (‐1.65) 
Sizeit*DRit ‐0.0049  (‐1.18)  ‐0.0028 (‐0.62)  ‐0.0031  (‐0.65)  ‐0.0048 (‐0.93)  0.0012 (0.23) 
Sizeit*Rit 0.0042  (0.92)  0.0047 (0.95)  0.0035  (0.64)  0.0015 (0.26)  0.0049 (0.89) 
Sizeit*Rit*DRit ‐0.0591***  (‐5.16)  ‐0.0527*** (‐4.27)  ‐0.0516***  (‐3.84)  ‐0.0460*** (‐3.22)  ‐0.0332** (‐2.28) 
Levit ‐0.102***  (‐3.56)  ‐0.104*** (‐3.34)  ‐0.111***  (‐3.28)  ‐0.130*** (‐3.61)  ‐0.126*** (‐3.28) 
Levit*DRit ‐0.0204  (‐0.57)  ‐0.0272 (‐0.71)  ‐0.0616  (‐1.48)  ‐0.0680 (‐1.54)  ‐0.0453 (‐0.97) 
Levit*Rit 0.0163  (0.48)  ‐0.0075 (‐0.20)  0.0123  (0.29)  0.0289 (0.65)  0.0568 (1.24) 
Levit*DRit*Rit ‐0.0024  (‐0.03)  ‐0.0292 (‐0.33)  ‐0.166*  (‐1.73)  ‐0.236** (‐2.31)  ‐0.259** (‐2.43) 
BTMit 0.0435**  (2.03)  0.0477** (2.08)  0.0503**  (2.04)  0.0584** (2.21)  0.0140 (0.53) 
BTMit*DRit ‐0.0125  (‐0.46)  ‐0.0058 (‐0.20)  ‐0.0053  (‐0.17)  ‐0.0067 (‐0.20)  0.0131 (0.38) 
BTMit*Rit ‐0.0041  (‐0.16)  0.0027 (0.10)  0.0079  (0.27)  0.0070 (0.23)  0.0387 (1.25) 
BTMit*Rit*DRit 0.160**  (2.28)  0.161** (2.17)  0.158**  (1.97)  0.188** (2.21)  0.178** (2.06) 
DW ‐0.0077  (‐0.87)  ‐0.0033 (‐0.35)  ‐0.0007  (‐0.07)  0.0008 (0.07)  0.0012 (0.11) 
DW*DRit ‐0.0004  (‐0.03)  ‐0.0072 (‐0.48)  ‐0.0117  (‐0.73)  ‐0.0065 (‐0.38)  ‐0.0240 (‐1.37) 
DW*Rit ‐0.0139  (‐0.98)  ‐0.0292* (‐1.89)  ‐0.0247  (‐1.49)  ‐0.0260 (‐1.49)  ‐0.0091 (‐0.50) 
DW*DRit*Rit 0.108***  (2.78)  0.128*** (3.08)  0.116***  (2.60)  0.141*** (2.97)  ‐0.0065 (‐0.13) 
Cons 0.0222  (0.53)  0.0370 (0.82)  0.0635  (1.33)  0.0516 (1.00)  0.154*** (3.06) 
  
Obs. 6897  6195  5491  4998  4208 
4.5.2. Robustness Checks 
4.5.2.1. Varying Size; Leverage; and BTM by Year  
In this section we report a modification of equation (4) whereby we vary the company’s 
size, leverage, and BTM by year according to the following equation: 
(6)*
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We report the results in Table 4.5. Our results are consistent with the ones reported in 
Table 4.3. 
 
4.5.2.2. Alternative Specification of Basu’s Model  
The literature has advanced alternative specifications of the Basu’s (1997) model. In 
this section we examine the specification proposed by Ball and Shivakumar (2005).26 
The authors propose the following specification: 
(7)
11312110
*  itititititit NIDNINIDNINI     
where ∆NIit is the change in income from year t-1 to t, scaled by beginning book value 
of total assets; and ∆NIit-1 is the change in income from year t-2 to t-1, scaled by 
beginning book value of total assets. D∆NIit-1 is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if 
the prior-year change ∆NIit-1 is negative. Timely recognition of economic losses 
implies that losses are recognized as transitory income decreases that tend to reverse. 
Therefore, we expect a negative sign of the coefficient 3. 
                                            
26 Khan and Watts (2009) propose a firm-specific measure based on Basu’s (1997). However, the research 
design of this study does not require a firm-specific measure of timeliness, which is advantageous since 
we overcome the estimation errors associated with measuring a firm-level timeliness proxy.  
  141
Table 4.5: Varying Size; Leverage; and BTM by Year 
 
Table 4.5 reports the incremental timeliness for each year before and after the first public debt offering. 
The base year is year 0.  The Table reports the fixed effects estimation results of the following equation: 
(6)*
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The dependent variable Eit/Pit is the earnings per share before extraordinary items divided by the price per 
share at the beginning of fiscal year t. Rit is the 12-month discrete stock return ending 3 months after the 
end of fiscal year t. DRit is a dummy variable equal to one if Return is negative and zero otherwise. 
Rit*DRit is an interaction term between Rit and DRit. DPt are period dummies. Sizeit is the log of total 
assets. Levit is the long term debt divided by total assets. Eit/Pit and Rit are trimmed at 1%. *, **, *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
DRit 0.0539  (1.17) 
Rit ‐0.0093  (‐0.20) 
DRit*Rit 0.349***  (2.74) 
Sizeit 0.0134*  (1.74) 
Sizeit*DRit ‐0.0025  (‐0.61) 
Sizeit*Rit 0.0077  (1.64) 
Sizeit*Rit*DRit ‐0.0558***  (‐4.86) 
Levit ‐0.0833*  (‐1.78) 
Levit*DRit ‐0.0360  (‐1.00) 
Levit*Rit ‐0.0044  (‐0.13) 
Levit*DRit*Rit ‐0.0168  (‐0.20) 
BTMit 0.0484  (1.38) 
BTMit*DRit ‐0.0129  (‐0.47) 
BTMit*Rit 0.0136  (0.53) 
BTMit*Rit*DRit 0.1040  (1.48) 
DP-5 0.0194  (0.31) 
DP-4 ‐0.0295  (‐0.47) 
DP-3 ‐0.0290  (‐0.47) 
DP-2 0.0186  (0.31) 
DP-1 0.0161  (0.26) 
DP+1 0.0334  (0.53) 
DP+2 0.0303  (0.47) 
DP+3 ‐0.136**  (‐2.03) 
DP+4 ‐0.0675  (‐0.96) 
DP+5 ‐0.0878  (‐1.22) 
Size*DP-5 0.0008  (0.14) 
Size*DP-4 0.0051  (0.84) 
Size*DP-3 0.0022  (0.37) 
Size*DP-2 ‐0.0009  (‐0.15) 
Size*DP-1 ‐0.0027  (‐0.47) 
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Size*DP+1 ‐0.0001  (‐0.01) 
Size*DP+2 0.0089  (1.49) 
Size*DP+3 0.0226***  (3.62) 
Size*DP+4 0.0170***  (2.63) 
Size*DP+5 0.0189***  (2.85) 
Lev*DP-5 0.0170  (0.30) 
Lev*DP-4 0.111**  (1.97) 
Lev*DP-3 ‐0.0201  (‐0.37) 
Lev*DP-2 ‐0.0114  (‐0.21) 
Lev*DP-1 0.0444  (0.84) 
Lev*DP+1 ‐0.0433  (‐0.82) 
Lev*DP+2 ‐0.0935*  (‐1.80) 
Lev*DP+3 ‐0.0115  (‐0.22) 
Lev*DP+4 0.0003  (0.01) 
Lev*DP+5 ‐0.0915  (‐1.53) 
BTM*DP-5 0.0072  (0.18) 
BTM*DP-4 ‐0.0148  (‐0.37) 
BTM*DP-3 0.0291  (0.75) 
BTM*DP-2 0.0159  (0.40) 
BTM*DP-1 0.0146  (0.38) 
BTM*DP+1 ‐0.0181  (‐0.45) 
BTM*DP+2 ‐0.0559  (‐1.39) 
BTM*DP+3 ‐0.0656  (‐1.57) 
BTM*DP+4 ‐0.0827*  (‐1.94) 
BTM*DP+5 ‐0.0589  (‐1.29) 
DP-5*DRit ‐0.0143  (‐0.47) 
DP-4*DRit 0.0149  (0.48) 
DP-3*DRit 0.0349  (1.18) 
DP-2*DRit ‐0.0010  (‐0.03) 
DP-1*DRit ‐0.0211  (‐0.72) 
DP+1*DRit 0.0076  (0.26) 
DP+2*DRit 0.0157  (0.54) 
DP+3*DRit 0.0539*  (1.78) 
DP+4*DRit ‐0.0127  (‐0.42) 
DP+5*DRit ‐0.0036  (‐0.11) 
DP-5*Rit ‐0.0378  (‐1.26) 
DP-4*Rit ‐0.0311  (‐1.08) 
DP-3*Rit 0.0228  (0.76) 
DP-2*Rit ‐0.0277  (‐1.02) 
DP-1*Rit ‐0.0072  (‐0.26) 
DP+1*Rit ‐0.0572*  (‐1.93) 
DP+2*Rit ‐0.123***  (‐3.76) 
DP+3*Rit ‐0.0297  (‐0.90) 
DP+4*Rit ‐0.0843***  (‐2.77) 
DP+5*Rit ‐0.0451  (‐1.16) 
DP-5*Rit 0.0661  (0.77) 
DP-4*DRit*Rit 0.043*  (1.76) 
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DP-3*DRit*Rit 0.0721  (0.88) 
DP-2*DRit*Rit 0.0466  (0.55) 
DP-1*DRit*Rit ‐0.0266  (‐0.32) 
DP+1*DRit*Rit 0.199**  (2.32) 
DP+2*DRit*Rit 0.438***  (5.30) 
DP+3*DRit*Rit 0.387***  (4.67) 
DP+4*DRit*Rit 0.300***  (3.56) 
DP+5*DRit*Rit 0.184*  (1.93) 
Cons ‐0.0718  (‐1.08) 
    
Obs. 6897   
 
 
We modify equation (6) to incorporate DW, which is a dummy variable that takes the 
value 1 for the years after the initial public debt offer and 0 for the years before the 
initial public debt offer. According to H1 and H2, we expect 3 to be significantly 
negative in all windows. We also modify equation (6) to incorporate the confounding 
effects of size, leverage and BTM. The equation is specified as follows: 
(8)
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We report the estimation results in Table 4.6. The reported results are consistent with 
our previous findings as 3 is significant in all specified windows.  
 
Table 4.6: Alternative Specification of Basu’s Model 
 
Table 4.6 shows the estimation results of regression (7) using an alternative window for the years before the first public debt offering. This window includes the years -5 to -1. 
The regression specification is given by equation (7): 
(8)
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 Window: (0,5) Window: (1,5) Window: (2,5) Window: (3,5) Window: (3,5) 
D∆NIit-1 ‐0.0134 (‐1.12)  ‐0.0149 (‐1.18)  ‐0.0128 (‐0.95)  ‐0.0151 (‐1.06)  ‐0.0180  (‐1.17) 
∆NIit-1 0.187* (1.75)  0.148 (1.32)  0.1220 (1.06)  0.0883 (0.73)  ‐0.1450  (‐1.09) 
D∆NIit-1*∆NIit-1 ‐0.827*** (‐4.51)  ‐0.777*** (‐4.05)  ‐0.613*** (‐3.05)  ‐0.586*** (‐2.81)  ‐0.525**  (‐2.24) 
Sizeit ‐0.0026 (‐1.47)  ‐0.0029 (‐1.57)  ‐0.0027 (‐1.37)  ‐0.0034 (‐1.60)  ‐0.0007  (‐0.34) 
Sizeit*D∆NIit-1 0.0020* (1.75)  0.00219* (1.80)  0.0023* (1.80)  0.0025* (1.79)  0.0026*  (1.73) 
Sizeit*∆NIit-1 ‐0.0208* (‐1.75)  ‐0.0166 (‐1.33)  ‐0.0101 (‐0.78)  ‐0.0069 (‐0.51)  0.0096  (0.67) 
Sizeit*∆NIit-1*D∆NIit-1 0.0254 (1.26)  0.0189 (0.90)  0.0058 (0.26)  0.0062 (0.27)  0.0019  (0.07) 
Levit ‐0.0642*** (‐7.36)  ‐0.0554*** (‐5.92)  ‐0.0541*** (‐5.45)  ‐0.0604*** (‐5.68)  ‐0.0588***  (‐4.79) 
Levit*D∆NIit-1 0.0108 (1.07)  0.0001 (0.01)  0.0025 (0.22)  ‐0.0047 (‐0.39)  0.0130  (0.94) 
Levit*∆NIit-1 ‐0.0904 (‐0.93)  ‐0.147 (‐1.45)  ‐0.0698 (‐0.67)  ‐0.0414 (‐0.37)  0.0330  (0.25) 
Levit*D∆NIit-1*∆NIit-1 0.387*** (2.79)  0.392*** (2.72)  0.189 (1.21)  0.0703 (0.42)  0.2540  (1.36) 
BTMit ‐0.0680*** (‐11.46)  ‐0.0673*** (‐10.73)  ‐0.0678*** (‐10.18)  ‐0.0702*** (‐9.84)  ‐0.0752***  (‐9.70) 
BTMit*D∆NIit-1 ‐0.0113 (‐1.38)  ‐0.0075 (‐0.88)  ‐0.0114 (‐1.24)  ‐0.0067 (‐0.70)  ‐0.0122  (‐1.16) 
BTMit*∆NIit-1 0.0789 (1.07)  0.117 (1.49)  0.0579 (0.69)  0.0656 (0.73)  0.190*  (1.84) 
BTMit*∆NIit-1*D∆NIit-1 ‐0.338*** (‐2.74)  ‐0.360*** (‐2.77)  ‐0.378*** (‐2.73)  ‐0.374** (‐2.57)  ‐0.517***  (‐3.12) 
DW ‐0.0001 (‐0.05)  0.0004 (0.17)  0.0001 (0.04)  0.0006 (0.21)  0.0013  (0.44) 
DW*D∆NIit-1 ‐0.0058 (‐1.46)  ‐0.0065 (‐1.57)  ‐0.0071 (‐1.63)  ‐0.0074 (‐1.59)  ‐0.0115**  (‐2.22) 
DW*∆NIit-1 ‐0.0110 (‐0.27)  ‐0.0137 (‐0.31)  ‐0.0188 (‐0.41)  0.0014 (0.03)  ‐0.100*  (‐1.89) 
DW*D∆NIit-1*∆NIit-1 ‐0.123* (‐1.75)  ‐0.138* (‐1.87)  ‐0.163** (‐2.08)  ‐0.203** (‐2.47)  ‐0.163*  (‐1.78) 
Cons 0.0880*** (6.88)  0.0873*** (6.51)  0.0852*** (6.04)  0.0936*** (6.11)  0.0796***  (4.99) 
  
Obs. 6871  6175  5475  4982  4194 
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4.5.2.3. Definition of Alternative Measures of Conservatism 
So far we have focused only on one attribute of conditional conservatism, namely 
timely loss recognition proposed by Basu (1997). In this section, we use two measures 
of conservatism proposed by Givoly and Hyan (2000). The first measure is the 
accumulated non-operating accruals and the second is the skewness of earnings relative 
to the skewness of cash flows from operations. However, it is important to note that 
these measures capture attributes of conditional and unconditional conservatism. Ryan 
(2006) argues that the accumulation of negative non-operating accruals is likely to be 
driven by unconditional conservatism, i.e. the systematic understatement of book values 
of net assets. Conditional conservatism will lead to transitory negative changes in non-
operating accruals, while unconditional conservatism will likely lead to accumulating 
negative accruals. Therefore, negative accruals may not well identify conditional 
conservatism. In addition, Ryan (2006) note that the recognition of significant bad news 
immediately will result in left skewness of the earnings distribution. However, 
unconditional write-downs of assets in large and significant chunks will have similar 
effect on the earnings distribution.  
 
Following Givoly and Hayn (2000), we define non-operating accruals as total accruals 
minus operating accruals (working capital accruals).  Specifically, total accruals are 
defined as net income (Compustat#172) + depreciation (Compustat#14) - cash flow 
from operations (Compustat#308). Operating accruals are defined as ∆accounts 
receivable (Compustat#2) - ∆inventories (Compustat#3) + ∆accounts payable 
(Compustat #70) + ∆taxes payable (Compustat #71). If Compustat item #308 is missing 
we replace cash flow from operations by the following expression: funds from 
operations (Compustat#110) + ∆current assets (Compustat#4) + ∆debt (Compustat#34) 
- ∆current liabilities (Compustat#5) - ∆cash (Compustat#1). Following Beatty, Weber, 
and Yu (2008), we accumulate accruals and total assets for a minimum of two years.  
 
We construct skewness of earnings relative to the skewness of cash flows from 
operations as follows. First, we calculate earnings deflated by total assets (Compustat 
#18/Compustat#6) and cash flows deflated by total assets (Compustat#308/Compustat 
#6). If Compustat item #308 is missing we replace cash flow from operations by the 
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following expression: funds from operations (Compustat#110) + ∆current assets 
(Compustat#4) + ∆debt (Compustat#34) - ∆current liabilities (Compustat#5) - ∆cash 
(Compustat#1). For each firm, we calculate the skewness of earnings and the skewness 
of cash flows from operations using 11 consecutive observations. We use quarterly 
observations in order to overcome the estimation errors resulting from estimating the 
skewness measure using a small number of yearly observations. Finally, we take the 
difference between the firm’s skewness of earnings and skewness of cash flows from 
operations. 
 
We test H1 and H2 using the accumulated non-operating accruals and the skewness of 
earnings relative to the skewness of cash flows from operations. We examine the 
difference in means of non-operating accruals and relative earnings skewness measured 
using observations from the windows before and after the initial public debt offering. 
The window before the initial public debt offering includes the years -5 up to -2. The 
window after the initial public debt offering originally includes the years 0 up to 5. 
However, we adjust the window after the initial public debt offering to include the years 
1-5; 2-5; 3-5 respectively. We expect to find significantly more negative non-operating 
accruals and more negative earnings skewness after the initial public debt offering. We 
use each firm as its own control, and thus, we require that each firm has observations 
before and after the initial public debt offering. Table 4.6 reports the results.  
 
The difference in means for non-operating accruals measure is statistically insignificant 
between the before and after the initial public debt offering windows. Therefore, there is 
no evidence that our sample firms accumulate more negative non-operating accruals 
after the initial public debt offering. The difference in means for relative skewness of 
earnings is significantly more negative at the 5% level after the initial public debt 
offering using observations from the window (0,5). 
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Table 4.7: Non-Operating Accruals and Relative Skewness; and IPDO 
 
Table 4.7 tests for the equality of means for non-operating accruals and relative skewness before and after 
IPDO. To calculate these proxies before the IPDO, we use observations from the period (-5,-2). To 
calculate these proxies after the IPDO, we use observations from the period (0,5), then we vary this 
window as specified in each panel. The values of these proxies before and after the IPDO are tested for 
equality of means. Non-operating accrual and relative skewness measures are calculated at the firm level. 
Non-operating accrual is accumulated over 2 years at least and relative Skewness is calculated using 11 
observations at least. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 Non-Operating Accruals Relative Skewness 
Window: (0,5) 
Pre -0.024 -0.895 
Post -0.028 -1.198 
Diff 0.004 0.303** 
t-test 1.30 2.06 
obs. 562 252 
Window: (1,5) 
Pre -0.024 -0.913 
Post -0.022 -1.072 
Diff -0.002 0.159 
t-test -0.89 1.00 
obs. 503 207 
 
These findings show that the change in the non-operating accruals and the relative 
earnings skewness before and after the initial public debt offering is insignificant. As 
we discussed previously, non-operating accruals and relative earnings skewness capture 
attributes of conditional and unconditional conservatism. In our hypotheses, however, 
we focus on changes in the firm’s conditional conservatism policy. Therefore, we argue 
that these results may indicate that bondholders do not induce a demand for 
unconditional conservatism hence our findings of insignificant change in non-operating 
accruals and relative earnings skewness. 
 
4.6. Conclusion 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of debt contracting choices on the 
evolution of the firm’s financial reporting choices. Specifically, we study the change in 
the firm’s level of asymmetric timeliness around the issuance of its initial public debt 
offering. Asymmetric timeliness deals with the asymmetry of incorporating economic 
gains and losses into reported earnings, with lower verification requirements and more 
prompt recognition of economic losses. We focus on this accounting attribute because 
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lenders are more sensitive to the firm’s losses than they are to its profits. Therefore, we 
expect lenders to exhibit an asymmetric demand for information, with a higher demand 
for information about economic losses.  
 
It is likely, due to efficiency of information production, that firms communicate with 
private lenders on an inside basis while they communicate with external, dispersed 
lenders on outside basis. In this article, therefore, we propose that public debtholders are 
more concerned than private lenders with the overall quality of financial reporting 
especially conditional conservatism. Specifically, we propose that bondholders induce a 
demand for timelier recognition of events that could lead to a substantial decrease in the 
value of debt securities or could lead to financial distress. Therefore, we expect firms to 
follow a timelier policy in recognizing their economic losses after issuing public debt 
for the first time and to commit to this policy in the long run to promote investor 
confidence.  
 
In this study we examine the change in the degree of timeliness in two states of the firm. 
The first state is before the firm issues its initial public debt and the second state is after 
that issuance. Using Basu’s (1997) measure, we find that US firms that issued public 
debt for the first time during the period 1972-2008 significantly increased their degree 
of asymmetric timeliness. The increase in asymmetric timeliness is statistically and 
economically significant. Our sample firms increase their degree of timeliness by 
almost 70% after their initial public debt offer compared to the degree of timeliness 
before their initial public debt offer. These results suggests that firma contracting with 
external debtholders for the first time modify their accounting to address greater 
demand for higher accounting quality from public debtholders.  
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Chapter 5 
Monitoring the Firm’s Private Loans and the Yield Spread of the 
Initial Public Debt Offering27 
 
 
Abstract 
This study investigates the impact of information associated with previous private 
borrowings on the yield spread of a firm’s initial public debt offering (IPDO). 
Specifically, this study focuses on information produced through monitoring by credit 
rating agencies, as measured by the difference between the credit ratings of the 
company’s IPDO and its private debt prior to the issuance of the initial public debt. It 
also focuses on information produced through monitoring by banks measured by several 
proxies of the strength of banking relationships. The findings of this study indicate that 
IPDOs with upgraded and unchanged credit ratings enjoy significantly lower yield 
spreads. This finding suggests that changes in credit ratings could convey new 
information to investors which signals the true quality of the firm.  In addition, the 
findings indicate that strong banking relationships significantly reduce yield spreads for 
initial public debt offerings. This result suggests that a strong banking relationship 
conveys a positive signal to bondholders regarding the bank’s assessment of the quality 
of the firm.  
 
 
 
JEL classification: D82; G12; G21; G24; N20 
Keywords: Cross Monitoring; Yield Spread; Information Asymmetry; Banking 
Relationships; Loan Rating; Rule 144A; Syndicated Loans 
 
 
                                            
27 We thank participants at the 11th Trans-Atlantic Doctoral Conference for providing useful comments. 
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5.1. Introduction 
Does a firm’s private debt record convey valuable information to prospective 
bondholders when the firm accesses the public debt market for the first time? In this 
study we empirically examine the impact of information produced by monitoring a 
firm’s private debt before its entry to the public debt markets on the yield spread of the 
initial public debt offering. Specifically, we investigate the impact of the monitoring 
provided by rating agencies and by banks. We focus on the firm’s entry to the public 
debt market because initial public debt offers are subject to greater information 
asymmetry in comparison to seasoned bond offers (Cantillo & Wright, 2000; Diamond, 
1989, 1991). Therefore, initial public bond issues present an interesting context for 
investigating the way on how the information asymmetries facing new external 
investors resolve. 
 
Our investigation builds on the cross monitoring hypothesis suggested by Booth (1992). 
According to this hypothesis, cross monitoring between the firm’s investors can reduce 
the overall monitoring costs for all investors. This is because information produced by 
one claimholder for the purposes of monitoring the firm could benefit other 
claimholders by reducing their own monitoring costs. In this study we extend Booth’s 
(1992) hypothesis by suggesting that monitoring by one claimholder could convey the 
true quality of the firm and consequently reduce the adverse selection problem facing 
other claimholders. Specifically, we propose that monitoring of the firm’s private debt, 
namely monitoring by credit rating agencies and banks, conveys valuable information to 
prospective bondholders. We hypothesize that prior private loan ratings are useful in 
evaluating the extent to which the firm is committed to maintain a good credit quality. 
Therefore credit rating upgrades and unchanged credit ratings are negatively related to 
the yield spread of the initial public debt offer. In addition, we hypothesize that a strong 
banking relationship signals the firm’s business and credit quality and therefore is 
negatively related to the yield spread of the initial public debt offer. 
 
In this study, we investigate the impact of credit ratings of private loans raised before 
the firm’s first access to the public debt market, henceforth “prior private loan ratings”, 
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on the spreads of initial public debt offerings. The practice of obtaining credit ratings 
for private loans, in particular for private placements and syndicated loans agreements, 
started in the 1990s (Fenn, 2000; Sufi, 2009). Private placements are credit agreements 
exempted from the registration requirements of the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). Therefore, investors in these securities must qualify according to 
specific rules of the SEC. In addition, investors in private placements are required to 
hold these securities for a minimum period of two years. In 1990, Rule 144A allowed 
private placements issued under this rule to be traded without a minimum period 
restriction. Syndicated loans, on the other hand, are credit agreements under which 
more than one bank agrees to make a joint loan to a borrower. The focus of this study is 
credit ratings assigned to private placements issued under Rule 144A and syndicated 
loans. 
 
Almost all private placements issued under Rule 144A obtain a loan rating (Fenn, 2000; 
Huang & Ramirez, 2010). Also, an increasing number of syndicated loans are obtaining 
a loan rating. For example, Sufi (2009) reports that almost one third of the public equity 
firms in 2004 had obtained a syndicated loan rating. However, there is little research on 
the benefits of credit ratings of private debt. One exception is Sufi (2009) who finds that 
companies with syndicated loan ratings have significantly higher debt ratios. Sufi 
argues that syndicated loan ratings reduce information asymmetries, and therefore 
companies with syndicated loan ratings gain increased access to less-sophisticated and 
uninformed investors in the syndicated loan market. In this study we investigate the 
impact of loan ratings to claimholders other than investors in the private placements and 
syndicated loans markets, specifically the impact of prior ratings of the issuer’s private 
debt on the investors in initial public debt offerings (IPDOs).  
 
Another aspect of this study is the investigation of the effect of the strength of banking 
relationships on the yield spread of the initial public debt offer. We use several 
measures to approximate the strength of banking relationships. Our main objective is to 
capture the relative importance of borrowing from the firm’s relationship bank 
compared to its non-relationship banks. Hence, we characterize a stronger banking 
relationship with greater dependence on the relationship bank relative to the non-
relationship banks. 
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There is a comprehensive body of literature examining the effect of banking 
relationships on the cost of bank loans (for  surveys of the literature see Boot, 2000; and 
Elyasiani & Goldberg, 2004). Also, a number of studies examine the effect of banking 
relationships on equity returns (James & Wier, 1990; Slovin, Sushka, & Hudson, 1990; 
Slovin & Young, 1990). However, there is little research on the value of banking 
relationships in the public debt markets. One exception is Datta, Iskandar-Datta, & Patel 
(1999) who investigate the effect of the presence of a bank loan at the time of issuing 
public debt on bond yield spreads. We complement Datta’s et al. (1999) study by 
examining the effect of the strength of banking relationships rather than the presence of 
a banking relationship. This is because the value of banking relationships to other 
claimholders, including bondholders, rests on the relationship bank’s ability to assess 
the firm’s long-term viability. This in turn is determined by the capacity of the 
relationship bank to acquire private, firm-specific information over the course of 
multiple interactions. Therefore, we expect that only multiple interactions over long 
time horizon will signal information to other investors in other markets. In addition, 
Datta’s et al. (1999) investigation is consistent with reducing more hazard problems 
since it investigates the impact of information associated with contemporaneous bank 
monitoring. Our study, on the other hand, is consistent with reducing adverse selection 
facing prospective bondholders since we conjecture that prior bank monitoring signals 
the quality of the firm.  
 
To perform our analysis we focus on the difference between the credit rating assigned to 
the firm’s private debt and the credit rating assigned to its IPDO. Our findings indicate 
that firms enjoy significantly lower yield spreads when their IPDOs are assigned credit 
ratings better than or equal to the credit rating assigned to their prior private loans.  In 
addition, we find that strong banking relationships significantly reduce yield spreads. 
This result is robust to using different proxies for banking relationship strength. 
Banking relationships could reduce prospective bondholders’ screening and 
investigation costs since the relationship bank’s assessment of the quality of the firm 
takes into consideration information that is not publicly available. Therefore, the 
strength of banking relationships may signal the firm’s business and credit quality. The 
findings presented in this study suggest that prior private loan ratings and banking 
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relationships potentially mitigate the information asymmetries facing prospective 
bondholders, and therefore, are negatively related to yield spreads.  
 
The overall evidence presented in this chapter contributes to the existence body of 
research on the role of information transparency across asset classes in reducing 
information asymmetry in the debt markets (Booth, 1992; Mansi, Maxwell, & Miller, 
2010). It also corroborates existing evidence on the benefits of bank loans in producing 
valuable information about the borrower (Datta, Iskandar-Datta, & Patel, 2000; James, 
1987; Lummer & McConnell, 1989). 
 
The rest of this study is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe two types of 
private lending agreements that are frequently rated and discuss how ratings originated 
in these agreements. In Section 3 we discuss related research and how we propose to 
contribute to this literature. Section 4 outlines the hypotheses, the sample, and the 
specification of the regression model. The descriptive statistics are presented in Section 
5, and the results of our analysis are reported in Section 6. We summarize the findings 
and conclude in Section 7. 
 
5.2. Overview of 144A Private Placements and Syndicated 
Loans 
The purpose of this section is to identify the private debt agreements that often obtain 
credit ratings, namely 144A private placements and syndicated loans. In what follows, 
we describe each of these agreements with an emphasis on the role of ratings in the 
private debt markets. 
 
5.2.1. Private Placements and Rule 144A 
Private (bond) placements involve the selling of securities exempted from the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) registration requirements to qualified institutional 
investors. Regulation D enacted by the SEC in 1982 defines a qualified institutional 
investor as “one who can understand or can employ those who understand the return 
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and the risk of securities and can bear the risks”. Examples of these investors include 
investment companies, pension funds, and insurance companies. Notably, private 
placements cannot be resold for at least 2 years. However, in April 1990, the SEC 
enacted Rule 144A which permitted qualified institutional investors to trade 144A 
bonds at any time without the two years holding requirements. Similar to non-144A 
private placements, securities issued under 144A are not registered with the SEC and 
the issuer only prepares a memorandum to potential investors.28 
 
Fenn (2000) notes that Rule 144A facilitated the creation of a liquid domestic private 
bond market as an alternative to the regulated bond market. The creation of this market 
is particularly useful for firms seeking speed of issuance and liquidity (Fenn, 2000). 
However, the speedy issuance of 144A bonds implies that investors may not have 
sufficient time to examine the firm in order to screen low quality issuers. Firms can 
overcome this problem by obtaining a credit rating for their 144A securities that 
provides certification by a credible third party. Also, Rule 144A issues are eligible for 
trading in the secondary market and credit ratings can facilitate greater liquidity. 
Findings by extant studies show that the frequency of ratings among 144A securities is 
high. Huang and Ramirez (2010) and Arena (2010) report that more than 90% of their 
sample of 144A issues are rated. In contrast, Kwan & Carleton (2010) document that 
non-144A private placements go largely un-rated.  
 
5.2.2. Syndicated Loans 
In this section we present an overview of the structure of the syndicated loans and the 
syndicated loan markets. The purpose of this discussion is to highlight the role of the 
lead bank in the syndicated loans since we base our measures of the strength of the 
banking relationship on identifying the relationship lead bank. In addition, we present 
an overview of the syndicated loan markets with the aim of underlying the importance 
of loan ratings in those markets. 
In syndicated loans two or more banks agree to make a joint loan to a borrower. 
Although there is a single loan agreement for all syndicate members, every syndicate 
                                            
28 In this study we focus on securities issued under Rule 144A. Therefore, our sample period starts from 
the year 1990. We briefly discuss the traditional private placements for the sake of completeness. 
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member has a separate claim on the borrower (Dennis & Mullineaux, 2000). The loan is 
syndicated between the lead bank/banks and the participant members (Standard & 
Poor’s, 2006). This categorization of the syndicated loan members is based on their 
roles in the syndicate. The first group of members, the lead arrangers or agents, acts as 
managing agents for the group, negotiating the loan terms, marketing the loan and 
administering the loan repayments and they receive fees in exchange (Sufi, 2007). The 
number and allocations of the roles among the lead bank/banks varies between the 
syndicated credit agreements. The agency section of the syndicated loan agreement 
names the agent bank/banks and stipulates their roles (Dennis & Mullineaux, 2000). 
The second group, the non-lead banks, consists of participating banks whose role is to 
fund part of the syndicated loan.29  
 
The syndication process starts when the borrower appoints a lead bank, which is often 
the borrower’s relationship bank (Gadanecz, 2004). Then the lead bank issues a 
commitment letter to the borrower. In a commitment letter the lead bank commits to 
fund an entire loan facility, or a proportion of it, with a promise to use good faith effort 
to arrange funding for the remainder of the loan from other participants (Standard & 
Poor’s, 2006; Wittenberg-Moerman, 2008). This letter determines when the syndication 
starts relative to the closure of the loan. If the lead bank funds the entire loan, then the 
syndication could start after the loan is closed. However, if the lead bank funds only a 
proportion of the loan, then the loan must be syndicated before the loan is closed. 
 
At the marketing stage, the agent bank prepares an information memorandum that 
contains financial and nonfinancial information about the current and future prospects 
of the borrower (Sufi, 2007). This memorandum is prepared with the help of the 
borrower and contains confidential information, and therefore, the recipients of the 
memorandum usually sign a confidentiality agreement (Dennis & Mullineaux, 2000). 
The memorandum is accompanied by presentations by the borrower and by meetings 
with potential participant members. After the marketing stage, the lead bank drafts all 
loan documents including the loan agreement. After the close of the deal the lead bank 
is responsible for obtaining waivers and amendments to loan documents.  
                                            
29 In the rest of this discussion we use the term lead bank in a singular form. 
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The transferability of syndicated loans is determined by the borrower’s consent and as 
specified by the transferability clauses in the loan agreement (Gadanecz, 2004). 
Gadanecz (2004) reports that only 25% of the US syndicated loans between 1993 and 
2003 allow the transferability of the syndicated loan to other creditors. The explicit 
restrictions on the ability of syndicate members to sell loans affects, to some extent, the 
size of the syndicated loan secondary market compared to the primary market. For 
example, Sufi (2007) reports that the total volume of syndicated loans secondary market 
amounted to $120 billion compared to the aggregate syndicated loans outstanding of 
over $2 trillion. Nonetheless, the syndicated loans are increasingly traded on secondary 
market. Wittenberg-Moerman (2009) reports a significant trading volume of $510 
billion in the US syndicated loan market in 2008. 
 
The rapid growth in the primary and secondary syndicated loan markets prompted the 
introduction of syndicated loan ratings in the 1990s by Moody’s and Standard and 
Poor’s (S&Ps). Sufi (2009) reports that in 2004 almost 30% of companies with publicly 
traded equity had obtained a loan rating. Arguably, loan ratings boost liquidity in the 
secondary debt market by reducing information asymmetries facing market participants 
(Moody’s, 1995). In fact, Yi and Mullineaux (2006) and Sufi (2009) suggest that the 
introduction of loan ratings could be driven by the demand of non-bank institutional 
investors who are not as informed as the originating banks.  
 
Also, Sufi (2009) argues that loan ratings play an important role in the syndicated loans 
primary market by reducing the information asymmetries between the syndicate 
members. Syndicate participants delegate most of the monitoring activities to the lead 
bank at the loan origination and post-closing loan stages. However, the lead bank owns 
only a fraction of the loan, and thus, has fewer incentives to monitor once the loan is 
closed. Further, the lead bank obtains private information about the borrower since it is 
usually the borrower’s relationship bank. Therefore, the lead bank has incentives to use 
its private information to gain at the expense of other syndicate members by, for 
example, syndicating riskier loans. Credit ratings provide evaluations of the credit 
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quality of the issue by an independent third party, which could minimize the potential 
agency conflicts between syndicate members.  
 
5.3. Related Literature and Contribution 
This study attempts to model the impact of information produced by rating agencies and 
banks by monitoring the firm’s private debt on the yield spread of its initial public debt 
offer. The majority of the relevant literature examines the role of information produced 
by the firm, especially accounting information, in reducing information asymmetry 
between the firm and its lenders.  It also investigates the resulting price, and to a lesser 
extent non-price, terms of debt contracts. For example, the extant evidence shows that 
the quality of the firm’s disclosure policy is negatively related to the level and term 
structure of yield spreads (Sengupta, 1998; Yu, 2005). It also shows that the quality of 
the firm’s accruals are negatively related to the price and non-price terms of debt 
contracts (Bharath, Sunder, & Sunder, 2008; Francis, LaFond, Olssona, & Schipper, 
2005).  
 
However, there is little research on the impact of information produced by the firm’s 
agents on reducing information asymmetries in the debt markets. One important 
exception is the research that investigates the effect of the arrival of new information 
about the firm on mitigating information asymmetries and consequently reducing the 
cost of bank loans. This body of research builds on the premise that insider (informed) 
banks have an informational advantage over outsider creditors and therefore they could 
exploit this advantage by charging higher interest rates (Rajan, 1992; Sharpe, 1990). If 
the firm wants to borrow from another bank, the outside bank will be at an information 
disadvantage because it does not know the firm’s project type while the inside bank 
does. Therefore, the outside bank will offer high interest rates leading the firm to be 
held-up by its inside bank. Hence, an increase in public information about the firm, due 
to equity listing or debt listing for example, reduces significantly the insider bank’s 
information advantage and as a result reduces the firm’s borrowing costs (Hale & 
Santos, 2009; Schenone, 2010; Sunder, 2002).  
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Schenone (2010) notes that when firms issue shares for the first time they have to 
provide higher levels of disclosure which reduces the informational asymmetry between 
the firm’s insiders and outsiders. According to Schenone, when a new source of 
information becomes available, outside banks learn about the firm and therefore the cost 
of new debt is expected to fall. Using a sample of US bank loans pre and post equity 
IPO Schenone (2010) finds that bank loans’ interest rates pre equity IPO are higher than 
post equity IPO. Similarly, Hale and Santos (2009) show that interest rates on bank 
loans decrease after an initial public debt offering (IPDO) compared to interest rates 
before a debt IPDO. They argue that an IPDO releases new information about the firm, 
through new credit ratings for example. Consequently, other banks learn new 
information about the firm and this weakens the inside bank information monopoly and 
increases the firm’s bargaining power. 
 
Booth (1992) examines more general aspects of the impact of information flow between 
asset classes in reducing information asymmetry in the debt markets. He suggests that 
observing the monitoring activities by claimholders could result in reducing the 
information costs among investors in the capital markets because it eliminates the 
duplication of monitoring activities. He finds evidence that firms with rated public debt 
enjoy lower costs of bank borrowing compared to firms without public debt. This 
evidence is consistent with the view that the monitoring activities by credit rating 
agencies reduce the monitoring costs of banks (Booth, 1992). Also, Mansi, Maxwell, & 
Miller (2010) document evidence on the value of information contained in analysts’ 
forecasts in the debt markets. They find that the information contained in the analysts’ 
forecast is significantly negatively related to bond yield spreads.  
 
The current study contributes to this literature by suggesting that information produced 
for the purposes of monitoring the firm’s private loans may convey valuable 
information to prospective bondholders. Private loans are largely ignored in the 
literature because of the data limitations, although they constitute an important source 
of corporate financing. Recently, and in line with developments in Dealscan and 
Securities Data Corporation’s data coverage, a growing number of studies have focused 
on the syndicated loan and private placement markets. However, most of these studies 
examine issues related to these markets. This study focuses on the interaction between 
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the markets of syndicated loan and private placement agreements on the one hand and 
the public debt market on the other. Specifically, the analysis presented in this study 
sheds light on the benefits of information related to the firm’s record of private debt 
financing in mitigating the information asymmetries facing bondholders. This analysis 
enhances our understanding of the learning process that takes place between investors in 
the debt markets and the resulting economic value in terms of reducing the information 
asymmetries facing investors.   
   
In addition, this study is related to the literature examining the firm’s decision to enter 
the public debt markets for the first time. The extant evidence shows that the speed of 
entry to the public debt market is negatively influenced by the degree of the firm’s 
information asymmetry (Hale & Santos, 2008). In addition, the evidence shows that the 
announcements of issuing public debt for the first time is associated with a significant 
negative stock market reaction (Datta, Iskandar-Datta, & Patel, 2002), potentially due to 
the large information asymmetry associated with public debt securities (Smith, 1986). 
Taken together, these results suggest that information asymmetry has economic 
consequences that could delay the firm’s entry to the public debt market. We 
complement this research by investigating factors that might reduce the information 
asymmetry facing bondholders contracting with the firm for the first time and 
consequently reducing the cost of public debt.  
 
In this respect, our study is related to Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Patel (1999) who 
estimate a model of the cost of debt for initial public debt offers. The authors select a 
sample of 98 initial public offers of straight debt issued over the period 1971-1994. Out 
of their initial sample, 64 firms had bank debt at the time of bond issue while the 
remaining 34 firms did not. They measure yield spread as the difference between the at 
the issue yield for the initial public debt offer and the yield for a matching treasury. 
Their main finding is that the presence of a bank loan at the time of issuing public debt 
bank relation reduces the spread by around 84 basis points.  
 
Our study complements the evidence in Datta et al. (1999) by identifying two factors 
relevant to the cost of initial public debt offers: the difference between the credit rating 
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assigned to the firm’s private debt and the credit rating assigned to its IPDO; and the 
strength of banking relationships. The latter factor is similar to Datta’s et al. bank 
relationship variable because both variables approximate the degree of bank monitoring. 
However, our bank relationship variable goes beyond measuring the presence of a bank 
relationship by quantifying the degree of strength of this relationship.  
 
5.4. Research Design 
5.4.1. Hypotheses 
Our hypotheses build on the cross monitoring hypothesis proposed by Booth (1992). In 
cross monitoring, a claimholder may reduce her monitoring costs by observing 
information produced through monitoring activities by other claimholders. In this study 
we suggest that prior monitoring activities provided for one security may convey 
information regarding the true quality of the firm and therefore could be beneficial to 
investors in other securities in the form of mitigating their adverse selection. 
Specifically, we propose that monitoring of the firm’s private debt by rating agencies 
and banks conveys valuable information to prospective bondholders about the quality of 
the firm’s business and creditworthiness. This in turn reduces the yield spreads charged 
by prospective bondholders.  
 
Our first hypothesis focuses on monitoring the firm’s private loans by rating agencies. 
We examine credit ratings assigned to the firm’s syndicated loans and Rule 144A’s 
private placements issued before its entry to the public debt market. Before an IPDO, 
some firms are assigned credit ratings to their private debt and at the time of the IPDO 
firms are assigned credit ratings that arguably take into account all historical 
information including information contained in any previous loan rating. In this study, 
we examine if the firm’s maintenance of its credit rating provides additional 
information content regarding the change in the firm’s default risk. Diamond (1991) 
shows that the firm establishes a reputation of a clean track record when it borrows and 
repays successfully monitored private debt. When the firm issues public debt, 
bondholders observe the firm’s history of non-default and assign low probability of 
default for reputable firms and lend to those firms at low interest rates. Therefore, firms 
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issuing public debt face incentives to maintain their credit quality by choosing safe 
projects. This is because costs of risking the firm’s creditworthiness (in the form of 
higher interest rates for future borrowings) are potentially higher than the payoffs from 
undertaking risky projects.  
 
Bondholders may find a favourable change in the firm’s credit rating valuable since it 
signals the firm’s commitment to sustain a high quality credit record and hence 
bondholders demand lower interest rate. Therefore, firms face incentives to obtain 
higher ratings or to sustain their current ratings. We predict that IPDOs that are assigned 
credit ratings above (below) their loan ratings will enjoy a lower (higher) yield spreads. 
We also predict that IPDOs that are assigned the same credit ratings as their loan ratings 
will enjoy lower yield spreads since this signals the companies’ commitments to 
maintain the same credit quality. Therefore, our first hypothesis H1 states that: 
H1: IPDOs with credit ratings similar to or above (below) their loan ratings will enjoy  
lower (higher) yield spreads. 
 
Our second hypothesis focuses on the effect of the strength of banking relationship on 
the yield spread of the initial public debt offer. The intermediation literature suggests 
that in relationship banking the bank invests in gathering borrower-specific information 
beyond what is publicly available over multiple periods of time (Boot, 2000; Boot & 
Thakor, 2000). Thus, the bank’s assessment of the current and future creditworthiness 
of the borrower is based on information that is probably not available to other creditors 
who do not invest in monitoring and information production. Although, the information 
obtained by banks in relationship lending remains confidential, other types of creditors 
could infer the bank’s assessment of the quality of the firm through the maintenance of 
this relationship. Thus, the firm’s multiple interactions with the same lender could 
indicate that the bank’s long-term assessment of the borrower is favourable, which 
would result in a decrease in other creditors’ screening costs. Relationship banking may 
well be more valuable for companies borrowing publicly for the first time than repeat 
borrowers since these companies are subject to great information asymmetry. Formally, 
our second hypothesis H2 states that: 
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H2: The strength of the banking relationship is negatively related to the yield spread of 
the initial public debt offer. 
 
5.4.2. Sample Selection and Data Sources 
We select all US nonfinancial firms who issued public debt for the first time during the 
period 1990-2009. We select 1990 as our sample start date because the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) enacted Rule 144A in that year. To identify the date of 
the debt IPO we use the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) new bond issuance 
database. We construct a list of all debt issues in the US market. Then we sort all issues 
for each firm and select the first public debt issue. Finally, we match the names of the 
debt IPO issuers with firms’ names identified in Compustat. The sample selection 
process is described in Table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1: Sample Selection 
 
Table 5.1 reports the sample selection process.  
All nonfinancial US firms identified in Compustat and with an IPDO in the SDC database 
until the year 2009 
1,042a 
Nonfinancial US firms with IPDO after 1990 505 
Firms with missing SDC data (106) 
Debt issues with all required data 431 
  
Final Sample 431 
We identify a non US firm in the SDC database under the data items “Nation” and “Primary 
Exchange Where Issuer’s Stock Trades”. All firms with a value other than “United States” under the 
data item “Nation” are classified as a non US firms. All firms with a non US stock exchange under the 
data item “Primary Exchange Where Issuer’s Stock Trades” are classified as a non US firms. 
a There is an increase in the number of firms in the initial sample used in this chapter compared to 
Chapter 4. This is because the period ends in 2009 in this chapter while it ends in 2008 in Chapter 4.  
Data Sources:  The Securities Data Company (SDC) Database. 
 
We collect data related to public debt issues and 144A issues from the Securities Data 
Company database30. We also collect data related to syndicated loans from the 
DealScan database. Although 144A issues and syndicated loans are private agreements, 
public data is available from credit agreements contained in public filings with the 
                                            
30 DealScan database provides information related to 144As private placements, however, based on our 
investigation we find that the SDC database coverage is significantly better.  
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Securities and Exchange Commission. The information contained in these sources is 
related to the terms of these agreements (interest, maturity, collateral); and in case of 
syndicated loans the structure of the loan (lead bank; number and identity of 
participants; loan ownership).  
 
5.4.3. Regression Model 
We estimate a multivariate regression model with the gross yield spread, SPREAD, as 
the dependent variable. The yield spread is defined as the difference in the yield to 
maturity of the initial public debt offer at the issue time and the yield of a matched 
Treasury bond (matched in terms of maturity and coupon). We calculate the yield 
spread using at the issue gross proceeds (total dollar proceeds) from the sale of the 
bond. This implies that we do not deduct the floatation costs such as the underwriting 
fees and marketing expenses. We focus on the gross yield spread since we are most 
interested in bondholders’ valuation of the bond’s risk. In the rest of this section we 
define and motivate the inclusion of the independent variables in our model. 
 
5.4.3.1. Prior Private Loan Ratings 
The first variables of interest in this study are calculated based on loan ratings of private 
debt agreements before firms’ access to the public debt market. To construct these 
variables we retrieve a list of 144A issues from the Securities Data Corporation 
database and a list of syndicated loans from the DealScan database. Then, we identify 
the 144A securities and syndicated loans issued by our sample companies just before 
their initial public debt offer. We require that private loans are issued within a time 
horizon of a minimum of six months and a maximum of five years before the 
company’s initial public debt offer. Next, we identify the last loan issued within the 
predetermined time horizon for each company. For each loan we record its assigned 
credit rating. Then, we compare the credit rating assigned for the firm’s prior private 
loan and the one assigned for the firm’s IPDO. We have three possible outcomes:31 
- Upgrade, this is when the credit rating assigned to the firm’s IPDO is higher 
than the firm’s prior private loan. 
                                            
31 This is similar to Tang (2009). 
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- Downgrade, this is when the credit rating for the firm’s IPDO is lower than the 
firm’s prior private loan. 
- Unchanged, this is when the credit rating for the firm’s IPDO and the firm’s 
private rating are the same.  
 
Finally, we define three dummy variables as follows. RATING_UPGRADE equals one 
if the IPDO’s credit rating is upgraded and zero otherwise; RATING_DOWNGRADE 
equals one if the credit rating is downgraded and zero otherwise; and 
RATING_UNCHANGED equals one if the credit rating is unchanged. 
 
5.4.3.2. Relationship Banking 
Our second variable of interest is the strength of the bank-firm relationship. We are 
particularly interested in capturing two aspects of banking relationship strength: i) the 
number of interactions between the company and its relationship bank (the frequency); 
and ii) the relative instances of borrowing from the relationship bank compared to all 
other banks (the dependency). Our measures of banking relationship strength require 
data regarding the identity of the lender which is not readily available, except for 
syndicated loans data available from DealScan database. Therefore, we construct our 
banking relationship measures using syndicated loans data. We retrieve a list of 
syndicated loans from the DealScan database. Then, we identify syndicated loans issued 
by our sample companies within five years before the company’s initial public debt 
offer. For each syndicated loan we identify the lead bank(s) as identified in the 
Dealscan database.  
 
To construct our measures of banking relationship strength we follow Bharath, Dahiya, 
Saunders, & Srinivasan (2009) who define three different proxies of banking 
relationship strength. The first measure, RELATION_DUMMY, is a binary variable 
that is coded 1 if the firm had borrowed more than once from the same lead bank. For 
the second measure, RELATION_NUMBER, we identify the lead bank with the 
greatest number of loans extended to the company, and refer to it as the relationship 
bank. Then, we divide the number of loans extended by the relationship bank by the 
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total number of bank loans issued to the company. This measure approximates the 
relative dependence of the company on a certain bank. The final measure, 
RELATION_AMOUNT, serves a similar purpose as RELATION_NUMBER, by 
approximating the company’s dependence on one bank but in terms of dollar value. To 
construct this measure, we identify the relationship bank as the lead bank with the 
largest amount of loans extended to the company. Then, we divide the amount, in terms 
of dollar value, of loans issued by the relationship bank by the total amount of bank 
loans issued to the company. According to our second hypothesis H2, we expect all our 
proxies for relationship banking to be negatively related to the yield spread. 
 
5.4.3.3. Control Variables 
Bond Rating 
Credit rating opinions provide a measure of the relative creditworthiness of companies, 
i.e., their ability and willingness to serve their debt in full and on time. We convert bond 
ratings into an ordinal scale that is coded 6 if Standard and Poor’s rating is AAA, AAA-
, AA+; 5 if S&P’s rating is AA; AA-, A+ etc. Similarly the bond rating is coded 6 if 
Moody’s rating is Aaa, Aaa1, Aaa2, AA3; 5 if Moody’s rating is Aa, Aa1, Aa2, Aa3 
etc. Table 5.2 documents the numerical equivalent used to code all of Moody’s and 
Standard and Poor’s credit ratings (Nordena & Webera, 2004). We expect bonds with 
higher credit quality, alternatively lower default risk, to be assigned higher ratings. 
Hence, we expect bond ratings to be negatively associated with yield spreads. 
 
Table 5.2: Mapping of Credit Ratings 
 
Table 5.2 shows the numerical equivalent used in this study to code Moody’s and Standard and 
Poor’s credit ratings.  
 Moody’s Standard & Poor’s  
Above Investment Grade: 
Aaa, Aaa1, Aaa2, Aaa3  AAA, AAA‐, AA+ 6
Aa, Aa1, Aa2, Aa3  AA, AA‐, A+ 5
A, A1, A2, A3  A, A‐, BBB+ 4
Baa, Baa1, Baa2, Baa3  BBB, BBB‐, BB+ 3
Below Investment Grade:  
Ba, Ba1, Ba2, Ba3  BB, BB‐, B+ 2
B, B1, B2, B3 and below  B, B‐, CCC+ and below 1
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The ratings of Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s do not match all the time. To account 
for this we create two variables. The first, BOND_RATING_HIGH, is coded with the 
equivalent value of the higher rating of Standard and Poor’s of Moody’s. The second, 
BOND_RATING_LOW, is coded with the equivalent value of the lower rating of 
Standard and Poor’s of Moody’s. Table 5.3 reports the distribution of bond ratings. 
 
Table 5.3: Distribution of Bond Ratings 
 
Table 5.3 reports the distribution of bond ratings when they are recorded with the higher (lower) of 
S&P’s or Moody’s. 
Code of the 
Bond Rating 
Bond Ratings Recoded  
with the Higher of  
S&P’s or Moody’s 
Bond Ratings Recoded  
with the Lower  
of S&P’s or Moody’s 
Difference 
6  4  8  4 
5  12  23  11 
4  68  106  38 
3  154  132  22 
2  67  78  11 
1  126  84  36 
 
 
Bond Issue Size 
We include the natural logarithm of the dollar amount of the bond issue size, 
ISSUE_SIZE. The bond issue size can affect the yield spread in one of two ways. It 
could be negatively related to yield spreads because the economies of scale on 
floatation costs are greater for larger issues (Blackwell & Kidwell, 1988; Smith, 1986). 
On the other hand, because ISSUE_SIZE measures the increase in the firm’s total dollar 
value of debt it could approximate the increase in the firm’s financial risk, and thus, be 
positively related to yield spreads. Since we calculate the yield spreads net of floatation 
costs, it is unlikely that ISSUE_SIZE will capture the economies of scale effect, 
therefore, we expect ISSUE_SIZE to be positively related to yield spreads.  
 
Bond Maturity 
Bond maturity, MATURITY, is defined as at-the issue years to maturity. Longer 
maturities expose bondholders to greater uncertainty regarding the firm’s condition and 
overall economic status (Blackwell & Kidwell, 1988; Flannery, 1986). Therefore, we 
expect the bond maturity to be positively related to its yield spread. However, previous 
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studies findings’ indicate an ambiguous relationship between the cost and maturity of 
debt (see for example Beatty, Weber, & Yu, 2008; Bharath et al., 2009; and Fenn, 
2000). Thus, we leave the sign of MATURITY coefficient to be empirically resolved.  
 
Bond Sinking Fund Provisions 
Although sinking fund provisions increase the bondholder’s likelihood of receiving the 
principal amount of the bond (Blackwell & Kidwell, 1988), they are usually attached to 
riskier bonds (Smith & Warner, 1979). Therefore, we expect, all else equal, bonds with 
sinking fund provisions to have higher yield spread. We define a binary variable, 
SINKING_FUND, which we code one if the debt contract has a sinking fund provision 
and zero otherwise. 
 
Bond Callable Provision 
Callable provisions allow the firm to redeem the bond before its maturity, typically to 
take advantage of future low interest rates. Therefore, callable bonds expose 
bondholders to the risk of investing their funds at unfavourable rates (Blackwell & 
Kidwell, 1988; Mansi et al., 2010). Hence, we expect that callable bonds to have higher 
yield spreads. We define a binary variable, CALLABLE, which we code one if the debt 
contract has callable provisions and zero otherwise. 
 
Bond Listing 
We also include LISTED_DEBT, which is a binary variable that we code one if the 
firm’s initial public bond is listed in an organized exchange and zero if it is traded over 
the counter. In order to list a security in an organized exchange the firm and the security 
must meet minimum requirements relating to size, profitability, disclosure etc. This in 
turn could reduce the information asymmetry regarding the new issue. Thus, we expect 
bond issues traded in an organized exchange to have lower yields, given everything else 
is equal.  
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Firm Size 
As for the firm characteristics, we include the firm’s assets size, SIZE, defined as the 
natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets at time t-1. Larger firms are less information-
opaque compared to smaller firms because they are older, have more analysts following, 
and greater investor recognition (Bharath et al., 2009; Blume, Lim, & Mackinlay, 1998; 
Mansi et al., 2010). Thus, we expect firm size to be negatively related to the yield 
spread. 
 
Leverage 
We also include the ratio of the book value of long-term debt over the book value of 
total assets at time t-1, LEVERAGE, in our model. The probability of default is likely to 
increase with the increase of debt in the firm’s capital structure (Bharath et al., 2009; 
Mansi et al., 2010). Therefore, we expect investors in corporate debt to demand higher 
yield spreads from companies with high leverage. 
 
Tangible Assets 
Investors in corporate debt generally consider firm’s with larger tangible assets safer 
investments because they provide collateral and they are easy to liquidate in the event of 
default (Bharath et al., 2009). We measure the firm’s tangibility as the ratio of fixed 
assets over total assets, FIXED_ASSETS. We expect the ratio of fixed assets to be 
negatively related to yield spreads.  
 
High Technology Firms 
We also include a dummy variable, HIGH_TECH, that is coded one if the bond offer is 
issued by a firm operating in a high technology industry, and zero otherwise. We 
classify the industries with the following Standard Industrial Classifications (SIC) codes 
as high technology industries: high-tech manufacturing (3571-3579, 3651, 3652, 3661, 
3663, 3669, 3671, 3672, 3674-3679, 3812, 3821-3829, 3844, 3845, 3861); high-tech 
communications services (4812; 4813; 4822; 4841; 4899); and high-tech software and 
computer-related services (7371-7379). Firms operating in high technologies are subject 
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to significant business risk. Therefore, we expect, all else is equal, investor of bonds 
issued by these firms to demand higher bond yields.  
 
Equity Listing 
We expect firms with equity listed in the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) to be 
subject to a lower degree of information asymmetry. Listed equity on the NYSE must 
meet minimum listing requirements, which is likely to screen-out risky firms. In 
addition, it requires stringent disclosure requirements which increase the amount of 
public available information about the firm. We include LISTED_EQUITY, which is a 
binary variable that is coded is coded one if the firm’s equity is listed on the NYSE and 
zero otherwise. The next Table summarizes the variable Definitions. 
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Table 5.4: Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition
RATING_UPGRADE A binary variable that is coded 1 if the company IPDO’s credit rating is 
assigned an improved credit rating compared to the last private debt 
agreement before the company’s initial public debt issue. 
RATING_DOWNGRADE A binary variable that is coded 1 if the company IPDO’s credit rating is 
assigned a worse credit rating compared to the last private debt 
agreement before the company’s initial public debt issue. 
RATING_UNCHANGED A binary variable that is coded 1 if the company IPDO’s credit rating is 
assigned the same credit rating as its last private debt agreement before 
the company’s initial public debt issue. 
RELATION_DUMMY A binary variable that is coded 1 if the firm had borrowed more than once 
from the same lender in the last five years before the firm’s first access to 
the public debt. 
RELATION_NUMBER The number of loans extended by the relationship bank divided by the total 
number of loans issued to the company in the last 5 years before the firm’s 
first access to the public debt. 
RELATION_AMOUNT The amount, in terms of dollar value, of loans extended by the relationship 
bank divided by the total amount of loans issued to the company in the last 
5 years before the firm’s first access to the public debt. 
SIZE The natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets. 
SIZE ($) Total assets in dollar value. 
LEVERAGE The ratio of long-term debt over total assets. 
FIXED_ASSETS The ratio of property, plant and equipment over total assets. 
HIGH_TECH A binary variable that is coded 1 if the firm operates in a high technology 
industry and 0 otherwise. 
LISTED_EQUITY A binary variable that is coded 1 if the firm’s shares are listed in the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and 0 otherwise. 
SPREAD Yield spread is the difference between the yield of initial public debt offer 
and the yield of a matched treasury at the issue date. 
BOND_RATING BOND_RATING is coded 6 if S&P’s rating is AAA, AAA-, AA+; 5 if S&P’s 
rating is AA; AA-, A+ etc. Similarly, RATING is coded 6 if Moody’s rating is 
Aaa, Aaa1, Aaa2, AA3; 5 if Moody’s rating is Aa, Aa1, Aa2, Aa3 etc. We 
create two variables to account for the mis-match in S&P’s and Moody’s 
ratings. BOND_RATING_LOW indicates that the bond rating is recoded 
with the lower of S&P’s or Moody’s. BOND_RATING_HIGH indicates that 
the bond rating is recoded with the higher of S&P’s or Moody’s. 
ISSUE_SIZE The natural logarithm of the issue size. 
ISSUE_SIZE ($) The issue size in dollar value. 
MATURITY The number of years until maturity. 
SINKING_FUND A binary variable that is coded 1 if the debt contract has a sinking fund 
provision and 0 otherwise. 
CALLABLE A binary variable that is coded 1 if the debt contract has call provisions and 
0 otherwise. 
LISTED_DEBT A binary variable that that is coded 1 if the firm’s first debt issue is listed in 
an organized stock exchange and 0 if its traded over the counter. 
Data Sources:  Data related to public debt and 144A securities is collected from the Securities Data 
Company Database (SDC). Data related to syndicated loans is collected from DealScan. Financial data is 
collected from Compustat. 
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5.5. Descriptive Statistics 
The first panel in Table 5.5 reports the characteristics of companies issuing public debt 
for the first time, issuers thereafter, at time t-1. Our sample issuers are smaller 
compared to the average repeating bond issuer. We report an average assets size of 
$5,371 million, while recent studies by Kwan and Carleton (2010) and Arena (2010) 
report an average assets’ size of $12,246 million and $15,086 million respectively. 
However, our sample issuers have similar leverage and fixed assets ratios compared to 
the average repeating bond issuer. We report leverage and fixed assets ratios of 36% 
and 76% respectively. Similarly, Arena (2010) reports leverage and fixed assets ratios 
of 37% and 71% respectively. Finally, 22% of our sample firms operate in a high 
technology industry, and 71% have their equity listed in the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE). The assets size of our sample firms makes it likely that they face greater 
information asymmetry compared to the repeating bond issuer, which is consistent with 
Cantillo & Wright’s (2000) finding. 
 
The first panel in Table 5.5 also reports the characteristics of our sample of initial public 
debt offerings. The average issue size is $234 millions, and the average term to maturity 
is approximately 11 years. Also, 72% of the new public debt issues are callable, 2% 
have sinking funds provisions, and 8% are listed in an organized stock exchange 
(mostly the New York Stock Exchange). The average rating roughly corresponds to a 
Standard & Poor’s rating of BBB and a Moody’s rating of Baa. Out of our initial public 
debt offers, 258 bonds are investment grade representing around 60% of the sample. In 
comparison, Datta et al. (1999) report an average issue size of $81 millions, with 12.5 
years to maturity. They also report that around 84% of their initial bonds have call 
provisions, while 44% have sinking fund provisions. Finally, they report that less than 
30% of their sample consists of investment grade bonds.  
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Table 5.5: Issuers and Issues Characteristics 
Table 5.5 reports descriptive statistics for a sample of nonfinancial public US companies who 
announced an initial public debt offering during the period 1990-2009 and for their initial bonds. 
RATING_UPGRADE is a binary variable that is coded 1 if the company IPDO’s credit rating is 
assigned an improved credit rating compared to its last private debt agreement before its IPDO. 
RATING_DOWNGRADE is a binary variable that is coded 1 if the company IPDO’s credit rating is 
assigned a worse credit rating compared to last private debt. RATING_UNCHANGED is a binary 
variable that is coded 1 if the company IPDO’s credit rating is assigned the same credit rating as its 
last private debt. RELATION_DUMMY is a binary variable that is coded 1 if the firm had borrowed 
more than once from the same lead bank in the last five years before the firm’s IPDO. RELATION 
_NUMBER is the number of loans extended by the relationship bank divided by the total numbers of 
loans issued to the company. RELATION_AMOUNT the amount of loans extended by the 
relationship bank divided by the total amount of loans issued to the company. SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of the firm’s total assets. SIZE ($) is total assets in dollar value. LEVERAGE is the ratio 
of long-term debt over total assets. FIXED_ASSETS is the ratio of property, plant and equipment 
over total assets. HIGH_TECH is a binary variable that is coded 1 if the firm operates in a high 
technology industry. LISTED_EQUITY is a binary variable that is coded 1 if the firm’s shares are 
listed in the NYSE. SPREAD is the difference between the yield of the initial public debt offer and 
the yield of a matching Treasury. BOND_RATING is coded 6 if S&P’s rating is AAA, AAA-, AA+; 
5 etc, and is coded 6 if Moody’s rating is Aaa, Aaa1, Aaa2, AA3 etc. BOND_RATING_LOW the 
bond rating is recoded with the lower of S&P’s or Moody’s. BOND_RATING_HIGH the bond 
rating is recoded with the higher of S&P’s or Moody’s. ISSUE_SIZE is the natural logarithm of the 
issue size. ISSUE_SIZE($) is the principal size in dollar value. MATURITY is the number of years 
until maturity. SINKING_FUND is a binary variable that is coded 1 if the debt contract has a 
sinking fund provision. CALLABLE is a binary variable that is coded 1 if the debt contract has call 
provisions. LISTED_DEBT is a binary variable that is coded 1 if the firm’s initial bond is listed in 
an organized stock exchange. All ratios are expressed in decimal points. 
Panel 1: Prior Private Loan Ratings Sample (Obs. 431) 
 Obs. Mean Med SD Min Max Skew Kurt 
Issuers:                
RATING_UPGRADE 431  0.016  0  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
RATING_DOWNGRADE 431  0.020  0  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
RATING_UNCHANGED 431  0.088  0  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
RELATION_DUMMY 431  0.246  0  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
RELATION_NUMBER 431  0.203  0  0.368  0  1  1.38  3.142 
RELATION_AMOUNT 431  0.216  0  0.387  0  1  1.30  2.821 
SIZE 431  7.65  7.68  1.32  4.32  12.46  0.21  2.76 
SIZE ($) 431  5,371  2,169  14,542  74  257,819  12.82  214.03 
LEVERAGE 431  0.36  0.32  0.20  0.04  1.85  2.18  12.89 
FIXED_ASSETS 431  0.76  0.73  0.44  0.01  3.06  0.98  6.08 
HIGH_TECH 431  0.22  0  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
LISTED_EQUITY 431  0.71  1  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
Issues:                
SPREAD 431  261.02  202  191.93  20  902  0.99  3.41 
BOND_RATING_LOW 431  2.501  3  1.197  1  6  0.234  2.35 
BOND_RATING_HIGH 431  2.838  3  1.251  1  6  0.102  2.375 
ISSUE_SIZE 431  5.46  5.30  0.90  1.61  6.89  ‐1.73  10.41 
ISSUE_SIZE ($) 431  234  200  156.1  5  800  1.18  4.21 
MATURITY 431  10.94  10.01  6.60  1.01  49.05  2.39  9.02 
SINKING_FUND 431  0.02  0  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
CALLABLE 431  0.72  1  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
LISTED_DEBT 431  0.08  0  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
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Table 5.5: Continued. 
Panel 2: Banking Relationship Strength Sample (Obs. 184) 
Description Obs. Mean Med SD Min Max Skew Kurt 
Issuers:         
RELATION_DUMMY 184  0.56  1  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
RELATION_NUMBER 184  0.46  0.60  0.43  0  1  0.05  1.27 
RELATION_AMOUNT 184  0.49  0.61  0.45  0  1  ‐0.06  1.15 
SIZE 184  7.66  7.71  1.23  5.07  10.73  0.16  2.56 
SIZE ($) 184  4,511  2,240  7105  160  45,789  3.47  16.61 
LEVERAGE 184  0.35  0.33  0.17  0.05  0.98  0.81  3.96 
FIXED_ASSETS 184  0.72  0.68  0.44  0.01  3.06  1.04  6.07 
HIGH_TECH 184  0.17  0  0.38  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
LISTED_EQUITY 184  0.85  1  0.36  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
Issues:                
SPREAD 184  240.24  197.50  172.27  20  902  1.03  3.82 
BOND_RATING_LOW 184  2.489  3  1.289  1  6  0.083  2.165 
BOND_RATING_HIGH 184  2.799  3  1.200  1  6  0.122  2.087 
ISSUE_SIZE 184  5.35  5.30  0.82  0  6.86  ‐1.99  13.49 
ISSUE_SIZE ($) 184  236  200  145  1  800  1.23  4.66 
MATURITY 184  10.25  10.01  5.83  1.01  40.02  2.61  10.75 
SINKING_FUND 184  0.02  0  0.13  0  1  7.64  59.35 
CALLABLE 184  0.75  1  0.43  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
LISTED_DEBT 184  0.07  0  0.26  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
 
The second panel of Table 5.5 reports summary statistics for companies with prior 
syndicated loans. We identified 184 companies that issued a syndicated loan within five 
years before the company issued its initial public debt offering. More than half of these 
companies repeated borrowing from the same lead bank. The average percentage rate of 
the times the company borrows from the same relationship bank relative to all of its 
borrowings is about 46%. Similarly, the percentage rate of the amount the company 
borrows from the same relationship bank relative to all of its borrowing is around 49%.  
 
In addition, the number of companies who had a credit rating for their syndicated loans 
is 25 companies. The summary statistics for companies who had a previous syndicated 
loan is similar to the statistics of the full sample. However, the percentage rate of 
companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) for the sample consisting 
of firms with previous syndicated loans is 85%, which is higher than the 71% rate for 
the full sample. In addition, the characteristics of the initial bonds issued by companies 
who had a previous syndicated loan are comparable to the initial bonds issued by 
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companies in the full sample. However, the yield spread mean for bonds issued by 
companies who had a previous syndicated loan is 240 basis points, which is lower than 
the full sample average of 261 basis points. 
 
Table 5.6 reports descriptive statistics for companies with and without previous ratings 
and for their bond issues. It also reports difference in means test results between 
characteristics of companies with and without prior private loan ratings and between 
characteristics of their initial bond offers. In terms of issuer characteristics, companies 
with prior private loan ratings are significantly larger with higher leverage and are listed 
more frequently in the NYSE compared to companies without prior private loan ratings. 
Bonds issued by companies with prior private loan ratings compared to the ones without 
have significantly larger issue sizes with lower bond ratings and more frequent callable 
provisions. Table 5.6 shows that the yield spreads of bonds issued by companies with 
prior private loan ratings are not statistically different from the yield spreads of bonds 
issued by companies without prior private loan ratings. However, this finding might be 
mechanical since companies with prior private loan ratings are riskier than the ones 
without prior private loan ratings evident by their significantly lower bond ratings. 
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Table 5.6: Characteristics of Companies with and without Prior Private Loan Ratings  
 
Table 5.6 reports descriptive statistics for the sample companies with loan ratings and for the sample companies without loan ratings and the corresponding difference 
in means test results. The sample consists of 431 nonfinancial public US companies who announced an initial public debt offering during the period 1990-2009. SIZE 
is the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets. SIZE ($) is total assets in dollar value. LEVERAGE is the ratio of long-term debt over total assets. FIXED_ASSETS 
is the ratio of property, plant and equipment over total assets. HIGH_TECH is a binary variable that is coded 1 if the firm operates in a high technology industry. 
LISTED_EQUITY is a binary variable that is coded 1 if the firm’s shares are listed in the NYSE. SPREAD is the difference between the yield of the initial public 
debt offer and the yield of a matching Treasury. BOND_RATING is coded 6 if S&P’s rating is AAA, AAA-, AA+; 5 if S&P’s rating is AA; AA-, A+ etc. Similarly, 
BOND_RATING is coded 6 if Moody’s rating is Aaa, Aaa1, Aaa2, AA3; 5 if Moody’s rating is Aa, Aa1, Aa2, Aa3 etc. BOND_RATING_LOW indicates that the 
bond rating is recoded with the lower of S&P’s or Moody’s. BOND_RATING_HIGH indicates that the bond rating is recoded with the higher of S&P’s or Moody’s. 
ISSUE_SIZE is natural logarithm of the issue size. ISSUE_SIZE($) is the principal size in dollar value. MATURITY is the number of years until maturity. 
SINKING_FUND is a binary variable that is coded 1 if the debt contract has a sinking fund provision. CALLABLE is a binary variable that is coded 1 if the debt 
contract has call provisions. LISTED_DEBT is a binary variable that is coded 1 if the firm’s initial bond is listed in an organized stock exchange. All ratios are 
expressed in decimal points. Wilcoxon is the Wilcoxon rank-sum test. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.  
 Without Prior Private Loan Ratings (Obs. 377) With Prior Private Loan Ratings (Obs. 54) 
 Mean Med SD Min Max Skew Kurt Mean Med SD Min Max Skew Kurt t-test Wilcoxon 
SIZE 7.60  7.56  1.34  4.32  12.46  0.25  2.76  8.00  8.09  1.14  5.73  10.73  0.12  2.87  ‐2.11**  ‐2.20** 
SIZE ($) 5,313  1,924  15198  74.86  257819  12.76  205.18  5,780  3,257  8763  308.88  45789  3.36  14.83  ‐   
LEVERAGE 0.35  0.32  0.21  0.04  1.85  2.34  13.96  0.41  0.37  0.18  0.09  0.98  0.98  4.05  ‐1.92*  ‐2.62*** 
FIXED_ASSETS 0.75  0.73  0.42  0.01  2.73  0.80  5.21  0.79  0.74  0.52  0.09  3.06  1.62  8.09  ‐0.58  ‐0.150 
HIGH_TECH 0.21  1  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  0.22  1  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  0.12  0.12 
LISTED_EQUITY 0.69  1  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  0.85  1  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐2.43**  ‐2.42** 
SPREAD 259.16  190  197.04  32.00  902.00  1.03  3.39  274.00  272  152.41  20.00  670.00  0.50  2.95  ‐0.53  ‐1.36 
BOND_RATING_LOW 2.544  3  1.22  1  6  0.21  2.34  2.203  2  1.02  1  4  0.13  1.76  1.96**  1.89* 
BOND_RATING_HIGH 2.891  3  1.26  1  6  0.08  2.38  2.463  3  1.11  1  5  0.09  1.99  2.37**  2.33** 
ISSUE_SIZE 5.26  5.30  0.92  0.00  6.89  ‐1.76  10.41  5.57  5.65  0.69  3.22  6.80  ‐0.60  4.09  ‐2.45**  ‐2.65*** 
ISSUE_SIZE ($) 228  200  156.05  1.00  750.00  1.23  4.27  280  250  149.49  25.00  800  1.04  4.53  ‐   
MATURITY 11.10  10.01  6.70  1.01  49.05  2.28  8.32  9.77  10.01  5.77  2.02  40.02  3.51  17.79  1.39  0.30 
SINKING_FUND 0.02  0  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  0.00  0  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  1.15  1.15 
CALLABLE 0.70  1  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  0.89  1  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐2.92***  ‐2.90*** 
LISTED_DEBT 0.08  0  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  0.07  0  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  0.27  0.27 
  179
Table 5.7 reports the mean yield spreads for observations with upgraded, downgraded 
and unchanged credit ratings. It also reports the mean yield spreads for the full sample 
in Panel 1 and for a matching sample in Panel 2.32 Out of a total number of 431 
companies issuing public debt for the first time, only 54 companies had had a prior 
private loan rating. Out of 54 observations with prior private loan rating we find that 7 
observations are assigned an IPDO credit rating above their loan rating; 8 observations 
are assigned an IPDO credit rating below their loan rating; while the majority of 39 
observations are assigned the same rating for their IPDOs and private loans.  
 
Table 5.7: Univariate Analysis for Companies with and without Prior Loan Rating 
 
Table 5.7 reports the difference of means in yield spreads of the initial public debt offers for 
observations with and without prior loan ratings. The sample consists of 431 nonfinancial public US 
companies who announced an initial public debt offering during the period 1990-2009. The 
dependent variable, SPREAD, is the difference between the yield of the initial public debt offer and 
the yield of a matching Treasury. RATING_UPGRADE is a binary variable that is coded 1 if the 
company IPDO’s credit rating is assigned an improved credit rating compared to last private debt 
agreement before its first public debt issue. RATING_DOWNGRADE is a binary variable that is 
coded 1 if the company IPDO’s credit rating is assigned a worse credit rating compared to last 
private debt agreement before its first public debt issue. RATING_UNCHANGED is a binary 
variable that is coded 1 if the company IPDO’s credit rating is assigned the same credit rating as its 
last private debt agreement before its first public debt issue. Wilcoxon is the Wilcoxon rank-sum 
test. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
Panel 1: Full Sample 
 Without Loan Rating With Loan Rating   
 No. Mean Yield Spread No. 
Mean Yield 
Spread t-test Wilcoxon 
RATING_UPGRADE 377  259.16  7  185  0.988  1.25 
RATING_DOWNGRADE 377  259.16  8  339.5  ‐1.14  ‐1.65* 
RATING_UNCHANGED 377  259.16  39  276.54  ‐0.54  ‐1.42 
Panel 2: Matched Sample
RATING_UPGRADE 7  231.14  7  185  0.643  0.831 
RATING_DOWNGRADE 8  314  8  339.5  ‐0.868  ‐0.105 
RATING_UNCHANGED 39  309.41  39  276.54  1.081  0.360 
 
                                            
32 We match companies based on their industry; default risk approximated by Altman’s Z-score; and 
assets size. Matched observations from the control group and the treated group are required to have the 
same HIGH_TECH value. Observations are classified into 10 risk groups based on their Altman’s Z-
score values at t-1. Matched observations are required to belong to the same risk group. Finally, 
observations from the control group must have an assets size within a 10% range of the matching 
observation in the treated group.  
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We find that the mean yield spread for observations with upgraded credit ratings 
compared to the ones without loan ratings is lower but statistically insignificant. In 
panel 2, we also find that the mean yield spread for observations with upgraded credit 
ratings compared to a matched control group without loan ratings is lower but 
statistically insignificant.  In addition, we find that the difference of means in the yield 
spreads for observations with downgraded credit ratings compared to the ones without 
loan ratings is insignificant, but the Wilcoxon test result is significant. However, in the 
matched sample the t-test and Wilcoxon test results are insignificant. 
 
Finally, we find that the mean yield spread for observations with unchanged credit 
ratings is higher than the one for observations without prior loan ratings. However, 
companies with private loan ratings are significantly riskier than the ones without 
private loan ratings. As a result, companies with private loan ratings might have higher 
spreads compared to the ones without ratings to reflect the higher default risk. In panel 
2, we find that for a matched sample the mean yield spread for companies with 
unchanged credit ratings is actually lower than the one for their matched companies 
without prior loan ratings. However, the t-test and Wiclcoxon test results are 
insignificant.  
 
Table 5.8 presents test results for the difference in yield spread means and the Wilcoxon 
rank-sum tests for RATING_UPGRADE, RATING_DOWNRADE, and 
RATING_UNCHANGED for the sub-sample of observations with prior private loan 
ratings.   
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Table 5.8: Univariate Analysis for Companies with Prior Loan Rating 
 
Table 5.8 reports the difference of means in yield spreads of the initial public debt offers for 
observations with prior loan ratings. The sample consists of 431 nonfinancial public US companies 
who announced an initial public debt offering during the period 1990-2009. The dependent variable, 
SPREAD, is the difference between the yield of the initial public debt offer and the yield of a 
matching Treasury. RATING_UPGRADE is a binary variable that is coded 1 if the company 
IPDO’s credit rating is assigned an improved credit rating compared to last private debt agreement 
before its first public debt issue. RATING_DOWNGRADE is a binary variable that is coded 1 if the 
company IPDO’s credit rating is assigned a worse credit rating compared to last private debt 
agreement before its first public debt issue. RATING_UNCHANGED is a binary variable that is 
coded 1 if the company IPDO’s credit rating is assigned the same credit rating as its last private debt 
agreement before its first public debt issue. Wilcoxon is the Wilcoxon rank-sum test. ***, **, * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 Control Group Treated Group   
 No. Mean Yield Spread No. 
Mean  
Yield Spread t-test Wilcoxon 
RATING_UPGRADE 47  287.25  7  185  1.68*  1.65* 
RATING_DOWNGRADE 46  262.61  8  339.5  ‐1.33  ‐1.16 
RATING_UNCHANGED 15  267.40  39  276.54  ‐0.196  ‐0.319 
 
We find that both the t-test and Wiclcoxon test results are significant for the difference 
of means/rank in the yield spreads for observations with upgraded credit ratings 
compared to the rest of observations with prior loan ratings. However, we do not find 
evidence of a significant difference for the downgraded and unchanged observations. 
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Table 5.9: Correlation Matrix 
 
Table 5.9 reports correlations between the variables used in the study. The sample consists of nonfinancial public US firms who announced an initial public debt 
offering during the period 1990-2009. RATING_UPGRADE is a binary variable that is coded 1 if the company IPDO’s credit rating is assigned an improved credit 
rating compared to last private debt agreement before its first public debt issue. RATING_DOWNGRADE is a binary variable that is coded 1 if the company IPDO’s 
credit rating is assigned a worse credit rating compared to last private debt agreement before its first public debt issue. RATING_UNCHANGED is a binary variable 
that is coded 1 if the company IPDO’s credit rating is assigned the same credit rating as its last private debt agreement before its first public debt issue.  
RELATION_DUMMY is a binary variable that is coded 1 if the firm had borrowed more than once from the same lead bank in the last five years. 
RELATION_NUMBER is the number of loans extended by the relationship bank divided by the total numbers of loans issued to the company in the last 5 years 
before the firm’s first access to the public debt market. RELATION_AMOUNT the amount of loans extended by the relationship bank divided by the total amount of 
loans issued to the company in the last 5 years before the firm’s first access to the public debt market. SIZE ($) is total assets in dollar value. LEVERAGE is the ratio 
of long-term debt over total assets. FIXED_ASSETS is the ratio of property, plant and equipment over total assets. HIGH_TECH is a binary variable that is coded 1 if 
the firm operates in a high technology industry. LISTED_EQUITY is a binary variable that is coded 1 if the firm’s shares are listed in the NYSE. SPREAD is the 
difference between the yield of the initial public debt offer and the yield of a matching Treasury. BOND_RATING is coded 6 if S&P’s rating is AAA, AAA-, AA+; 5 
if S&P’s rating is AA; AA-, A+ etc. Similarly, BOND_RATING is coded 6 if Moody’s rating is Aaa, Aaa1, Aaa2, AA3; 5 if Moody’s rating is Aa, Aa1, Aa2, Aa3 
etc. BOND_RATING_LOW indicates that the bond rating is recoded with the lower of S&P’s or Moody’s. BOND_RATING_HIGH indicates that the bond rating is 
recoded with the higher of S&P’s or Moody’s. ISSUE_SIZE is the natural logarithm of the issue size. ISSUE_SIZE($) is the principal size in dollar value. 
MATURITY is the number of years until maturity. SINKING_FUND is a binary variable that is coded 1 if the debt contract has a sinking fund provision. 
CALLABLE is a binary variable that is coded 1 if the debt contract has call provisions. LISTED_DEBT is a binary variable that is coded 1 if the firm’s initial bond is 
listed in an organized stock exchange. ** denotes significance at the 5% level or better.   
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Table 5.9: Continued.  
 
Panel 1: Prior Private Loan Ratings Sample (Obs. 431) 
 SPREAD RATING_ UPGRADE 
RATING_
DOWN 
GRADE 
RATING_
UN 
CHANGED 
BOND
RATING 
(L) 
BOND
RATING 
(H) 
ISSUE 
SIZE 
MAT- 
URITY 
SINKING 
FUND 
CALL- 
ABLE 
LISTED 
DEBT SIZE 
LEVE- 
RAGE 
FIXED 
ASSET 
HIGH 
TECH 
LISTED 
EQUITY 
SPREAD 1.00                               
RATING_ 
UPGRADE ‐0.05  1.00                             
RATING_ 
DOWNGRADE 0.03  ‐0.04  1.00                           
RATING_ 
UNCHANGED 0.06  ‐0.02  ‐0.04  1.00                         
BOND 
RATING (L) ‐0.72**  0.02  ‐0.09  ‐0.06  1.00                       
BOND 
RATING (H) ‐0.72**  ‐0.01  ‐0.09  ‐0.06  0.92**  1.00                     
ISSUE 
SIZE 0.04  0.08  0.08  0.05  0.06**  0.10**  1.00                   
MATURITY ‐0.24**  ‐0.05  ‐0.07  0.03  0.27**  0.24**  0.02**  1.00                 
SINKING 
FUND 0.07  ‐0.02  ‐0.05  ‐0.02  ‐0.05  ‐0.06  ‐0.06  0.00  1.00               
CALLABLE 0.46**  0.08  0.09  0.08  ‐0.38**  ‐0.39**  0.23**  ‐
0.10**  ‐0.06  1.00             
LISTED 
DEBT 0.13**  ‐0.04  ‐0.01  0.02  ‐0.17**  ‐0.16**  0.03  0.03  0.19**  0.06  1.00           
SIZE ‐0.35**  0.12**  0.05  0.04  0.52**  0.53**  0.55**  0.10**  ‐0.09  ‐0.05  ‐0.07  1.00         
LEVERAGE 0.41**  0.03  0.09  0.01  ‐0.50**  ‐0.53**  ‐0.01  ‐
0.12**  0.11**  0.23**  0.14**  ‐0.43**  1.00       
FIXED 
ASSETS ‐0.09  ‐0.02  0.03  0.03  0.10**  0.12**  ‐0.04  0.11**  0.10**  ‐0.05  ‐0.02  0.09  0.08  1.00     
HIGH_TECH 0.02  0.07  ‐0.07  0.07  0.02  0.04  0.13**  ‐0.01  ‐0.04  0.03  0.07  0.06  ‐0.02  ‐0.32**  1.00   
LISTED 
EQUITY ‐0.25**  0.04  0.09  0.05  0.22**  0.25**  0.04  0.00  0.02  ‐0.15**  ‐0.09  0.19** 
‐
0.23**  0.06  ‐0.08  1.00 
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  Table 5.9: Continued.  
 
Panel 2: Banking Relationship Strength Sample (Obs. 184) 
 SPREAD RELATION DUMMY 
RELATION 
NUMBER 
RELATION 
AMOUNT 
BOND 
RATING 
(L) 
BOND 
RATING 
(H) 
ISSUE 
SIZE 
MAT- 
URITY 
SINKING 
FUND 
CALL- 
 ABLE 
LISTED 
DEBT SIZE 
LEVE- 
RAGE 
FIXED 
ASSET 
HIGH 
TECH 
LISTED 
EQUITY 
SPREAD 1.00                               
RELATION 
DUMMY ‐0.04  1.00                             
RELATION 
NUMBER ‐0.03  0.97**  1.00                           
RELATION 
AMOUNT ‐0.03  0.98**  0.99**  1.00                         
BOND 
RATING (L) ‐0.70**  ‐0.06  ‐0.07  ‐.05  1.00                       
BOND 
RATING (H) ‐0.72**  ‐0.10  ‐0.11  ‐.08  0.91**  1.00                     
ISSUE 
SIZE 0.04  0.09  0.07  0.08  0.14**  0.18**  1.00                   
MATURITY ‐0.24**  ‐0.11**  ‐0.09**  ‐0.10**  0.09  0.11  0.02  1.00                 
SINKING 
FUND 0.07  0.03  0.05  0.04  ‐0.13**  ‐0.16**  ‐0.06  0.00  1.00               
CALLABLE 0.46**  0.11**  0.10**  0.10**  ‐0.30**  ‐0.35**  0.23**  ‐0.10**  ‐0.06  1.00             
LISTED 
DEBT 0.13**  ‐0.06  ‐0.05  ‐0.05  ‐0.25**  ‐0.27**  0.03  0.03  0.19**  0.06  1.00           
SIZE ‐0.35**  0.04  0.03  0.02  0.50**  0.53**  0.55**  0.10**  ‐0.09  ‐0.05  ‐0.07  1.00         
LEVERAGE 0.41**  0.02  0.02  0.02  ‐0.54  ‐0.59**  ‐0.01**  ‐0.12**  0.11**  0.23**  0.14**  ‐0.43**  1.00       
FIXED 
ASSETS ‐0.09  ‐0.03  ‐0.03  ‐0.04  ‐0.01  0.00  ‐0.04  0.11**  0.10**  ‐0.05  ‐0.02  0.09  0.08  1.00     
HIGH_TECH 0.02  0.00  0.00  ‐0.01  0.02  0.07  0.13**  ‐0.01  ‐0.04  0.03  0.07  0.06  ‐0.02  ‐0.32**  1.00   
LISTED 
EQUITY ‐0.25**  0.16**  0.14**  0.15**  0.32**  0.36**  0.04  0.00  0.02  ‐0.15**  ‐0.09  0.19**  ‐0.23**  0.06  ‐0.08  1.00 
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5.6. Results and Analysis 
5.6.1. Bond Yield Spreads and Prior Private Loan Ratings 
To test our first hypothesis H1, we estimate several regression models using two 
different samples. In our regressions the yield spread, SPREAD, is the dependent 
variable. Also, our main variables of interest are RATING_UPGRADE, 
RATING_UNCHANGED and RATING_DOWNGRADE.  
 
First, we estimate a regression model using the full sample. The purpose of estimating 
this regression is to analyze if the difference between the IPDO credit rating and the 
prior loan rating conveys additional information regarding the credit quality of the firm. 
According to our first hypothesis H1, we expect that firms who maintain the same or 
obtain higher credit ratings signal information on their commitment to keep a clean 
credit record. Therefore, we expect RATING_UPGRADE, and 
RATING_UNCHANGED to be negatively related to the yield spreads and 
RATING_DOWNGRADE to be positively related to the yield spreads of the IPDOs. 
We report the results in Table 5.10.  
 
We find that RATING_UPGRADE and RATING_UNCHANGED are negatively 
related to the yield spread at the 5% level, while RATING_DOWNGRADE is not 
significantly related to the yield spread. The results indicate that IPDOs with upgraded 
credit ratings could convey positive signal about the firm’s true credit quality, thereby 
reducing the yield spread significantly. However, we do not find evidence of 
information transmission in the case of IPDOs with downgraded credit ratings. The 
negative significant relation of RATING_UNCHANGED to yield spread indicates that 
maintaining the same rating could signal the firm’s commitment to its credit quality. 
However, we find that the size of the coefficient of RATING_UPGRADE is larger than 
the one of RATING_UNCHANGED. This result indicates that the impact of assigning 
a higher credit rating for the IPDO is greater than the impact of maintaining the same 
rating.  
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Table 5.10: Bond Yield Spreads and Prior Private Loan Ratings for Full Sample 
 
Table 5.10 reports estimation results with yield spreads of the initial public debt offers as the 
independent variable and the changes in credit ratings between IPDOs and prior loan ratings as the 
main test variables. The sample consists of nonfinancial public US companies who announced an 
initial public debt offering during the period 1990-2009; and for their initial bonds. SPREAD is the 
difference between the yield of the initial public debt offer and the yield of a matching Treasury. 
RATING_UPGRADE is a binary variable that is coded 1 if the company IPDO’s credit rating is 
assigned an improved credit rating compared to last private debt agreement before its first public 
debt issue. RATING_DOWNGRADE is a binary variable that is coded 1 if the company IPDO’s 
credit rating is assigned a worse credit rating compared to last private debt agreement before its first 
public debt issue. RATING_UNCHANGED is a binary variable that is coded 1 if the company 
IPDO’s credit rating is assigned the same credit rating as its last private debt agreement before its 
first public debt issue. BOND_RATING is coded 6 if S&P’s rating is AAA, AAA-, AA+; 5 if S&P’s 
rating is AA; AA-, A+ etc. Similarly, BOND_RATING is coded 6 if Moody’s rating is Aaa, Aaa1, 
Aaa2, AA3; 5 if Moody’s rating is Aa, Aa1, Aa2, Aa3 etc. BOND_RATING_LOW the bond rating 
is recoded with the lower of S&P’s or Moody’s. BOND_RATING_HIGH the bond rating is recoded 
with the higher of S&P’s or Moody’s. ISSUE_SIZE is the natural logarithm of the issue size. 
ISSUE_SIZE($) is the principal size in dollar value. MATURITY is the number of years until 
maturity. SINKING_FUND is a binary variable that is coded 1 if the debt contract has a sinking 
fund provision. CALLABLE is a binary variable that is coded 1 if the debt contract has call 
provisions. LISTED_DEBT is a binary variable that is coded 1 if the firm’s initial bond is listed in 
an organized stock exchange. All ratios are expressed in decimal points. SIZE ($) is total assets in 
dollar value. LEVERAGE is the ratio of long-term debt over total assets. FIXED_ASSETS is the 
ratio of property, plant and equipment over total assets. HIGH_TECH is a binary variable that is 
coded 1 if the firm operates in a high technology industry. LISTED_EQUITY is a binary variable 
that is coded 1 if the firm’s shares are listed in the NYSE. All specifications include a time trend 
variable. Regressions are estimated with robust standard errors. t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, 
**, * indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
 I II 
RATING_UPGRADE ‐120.34** (‐2.51)  ‐150.39***  (‐3.06) 
RATING_UNCHANGED ‐51.02** (‐2.25)  ‐55.81**  (‐2.37) 
RATING_DOWNGRADE ‐8.84 (‐0.25)  ‐17.63  (‐0.41) 
BOND_RATING_LOW ‐93.55*** (‐11.57)  ‐  ‐ 
BOND_RATING_HIGH ‐ ‐  ‐90.11***  (‐12.18) 
ISSUE_SIZE 5.86 (0.74)  15.80**  (2.11) 
MATURITY ‐1.48** (‐2.12)  ‐2.04***  (‐2.80) 
SINKING_FUND 80.14** (2.48)  66.83**  (2.26) 
CALLABLE 62.81*** (5.09)  59.98***  (4.69) 
LISTED_DEBT 0.14 (0.01)  8.81  (0.43) 
SIZE ‐4.65 (‐0.58)  ‐9.29  (‐1.24) 
LEVERAGE 63.80* (1.74)  32.94  (0.88) 
FIXED_ASSETS ‐12.38 (‐0.80)  ‐5.39  (‐0.34) 
HIGH_TECH  11.54 (0.71)  15.28  (0.96) 
LISTED_EQUITY ‐34.08** (‐2.53)  ‐27.58*  (‐1.97) 
YEAR_IPDO 6.15*** (3.21)  5.92***  (2.96) 
Cons 435.70*** (9.27)  452.87***  (9.88) 
Obs. 431   431   
R2 0.582   0.585   
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Table 5.10 continued. 
 
 
The correlation matrix reported in Table 5.9 shows that some of the explanatory 
variables are significantly correlated with each other, which raises the possibility that 
mutlicollinearity is present. In order to quantify the impact of correlations among the 
independent variables in the regression reported in Table 5.10, we compute the 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for each variable and report the findings in Table 5.10. 
The literature suggests that values of VIF that exceed five may be a cause of concern. 
The results of the VIF reported in Table 5.10 show that all the VIF values are less than 
three which indicates that multicollinearity does not seem to pose a problem in our 
model. 
 
In the regression reported in Table 5.10 we assign a value of zero for observations 
without prior private loan ratings. Therefore, the variables RATING_UPGRADE,  
RATING_UNCHANGED, and RATING_DOWNGRADE also pick up the effects 
relating to the presence of a prior private loan rating, while we are interested in 
estimating the effects of changes in the credit ratings. In order to eliminate this 
possibility we examine the re-estimate the same model using the sub-sample of firms 
with prior private ratings. Within the sub-sample of observations with prior private 
ratings we expect that IPDOs which are assigned higher credit ratings or maintain their 
ratings will be negatively related to the yield spread. In contrast, we expect IPDOs 
Variance Inflation Factors (VIF)
RATING_UPGRADE 1.07   1.07   
RATING_UNCHANGED 1.12   1.12   
RATING_DOWNGRADE 1.04   1.04   
BOND_RATING_LOW 2.14   ‐   
BOND_RATING_HIGH ‐   2.07   
ISSUE_SIZE 1.77   1.8   
MATURITY 1.1   1.12   
SINKING_FUND 1.08   1.08   
CALLABLE 1.49   1.47   
LISTED_DEBT 1.08   1.09   
SIZE 2.63   2.73   
LEVERAGE 1.69   1.63   
FIXED_ASSETS 1.22   1.21   
HIGH_TECH  1.17   1.17   
LISTED_EQUITY 1.13   1.13   
YEAR_IPDO 1.56   1.56   
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which are assigned lower credit ratings will be positively related to the yield spread. We 
report the results in Table 5.11.  
 
Similar to the results reported in Table 5.10, we find that RATING_UPGRADE is 
negatively related to the yield spread at the 5% level, while RATING_UNCHANGED 
is not significantly related to the yield spread. In unreported results we find that 
RATING_DOWNGRADE is not significantly related to the yield spread.  
 
In relation to the VIF figures, we find that some of the reported VIF values are close to 
five, which might raise the possibility that multicollinearity is present and influences the 
results derived from the model. In order to assess the impact of multicollinearity in the 
regression, we identify the explanatory variable with the highest level of correlations 
with the other variables. We find that SIZE is significantly correlated with many of the 
explanatory variables. We estimate the regression without SIZE and find qualitatively 
similar result with VIF values less than 2.5 (results not reported).     
 
It is important to note that caution is required when making inferences based on the 
results presented in Tables 5.10 and 5.11. A main and a valid concern regarding these 
results is that the evidence could be unreliable due to the very small number of 
upgraded IPDOs observations. We discuss this point in the Limitations section 
presented in Chapter 6. 
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Table 5.11: Bond Yield Spreads and Prior Private Loan Ratings for the Sub-Sample of 
Observations with Prior Loan Ratings 
 
Table 5.11 reports estimation results with yield spreads of the initial public debt offers as the 
independent variable and the changes in credit ratings between IPDOs and prior loan ratings as the 
main test variables. The sample consists of nonfinancial public US companies who announced an 
initial public debt offering during the period 1990-2009 and who had a prior private loan rating. 
SPREAD is the difference between the yield of the initial public debt offer and the yield of a 
matching Treasury. RATING_UPGRADE is a binary variable that is coded 1 if the company 
IPDO’s credit rating is assigned an improved credit rating compared to last private debt agreement 
before its first public debt issue. RATING_DOWNGRADE is a binary variable that is coded 1 if the 
company IPDO’s credit rating is assigned a worse credit rating compared to last private debt 
agreement before its first public debt issue. RATING_UNCHANGED is a binary variable that is 
coded 1 if the company IPDO’s credit rating is assigned the same credit rating as its last private debt 
agreement before its first public debt issue. BOND_RATING is coded 6 if S&P’s rating is AAA, 
AAA-, AA+; 5 if S&P’s rating is AA; AA-, A+ etc. Similarly, BOND_RATING is coded 6 if 
Moody’s rating is Aaa, Aaa1, Aaa2, AA3; 5 if Moody’s rating is Aa, Aa1, Aa2, Aa3 etc. 
BOND_RATING_LOW the bond rating is recoded with the lower of S&P’s or Moody’s. 
BOND_RATING_HIGH the bond rating is recoded with the higher of S&P’s or Moody’s. 
ISSUE_SIZE is the natural logarithm of the issue size. ISSUE_SIZE($) is the principal size in dollar 
value. MATURITY is the number of years until maturity. SINKING_FUND is a binary variable that 
is coded 1 if the debt contract has a sinking fund provision. CALLABLE is a binary variable that is 
coded 1 if the debt contract has call provisions. LISTED_DEBT is a binary variable that is coded 1 
if the firm’s initial bond is listed in an organized stock exchange. All ratios are expressed in decimal 
points. SIZE ($) is total assets in dollar value. LEVERAGE is the ratio of long-term debt over total 
assets. FIXED_ASSETS is the ratio of property, plant and equipment over total assets. 
HIGH_TECH is a binary variable that is coded 1 if the firm operates in a high technology industry. 
LISTED_EQUITY is a binary variable that is coded 1 if the firm’s shares are listed in the NYSE. All 
specifications include a time trend variable. Regressions are estimated with robust standard errors. t-
statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
 I II 
RATING_UPGRADE ‐143.25* (‐1.83)  ‐185.01**  (‐2.27) 
RATING_UNCHANGED ‐27.68 (‐0.58)  ‐37.84  (‐0.76) 
BOND_RATING_LOW ‐89.07*** (‐2.69)  ‐  ‐ 
BOND_RATING_HIGH ‐ ‐  ‐64.94**  (‐2.20) 
ISSUE_SIZE ‐2.20 (‐0.07)  0.99  (0.03) 
MATURITY ‐2.62 (‐1.41)  ‐3.78*  (‐1.97) 
CALLABLE 100.31*** (3.02)  99.10**  (2.52) 
LISTED_DEBT ‐24.42 (‐0.70)  ‐40.00  (‐0.97) 
SIZE 34.32 (1.02)  26.52  (0.77) 
LEVERAGE 111.00 (0.84)  183.35*  (1.67) 
FIXED_ASSETS ‐13.92 (‐0.45)  ‐26.56  (‐0.87) 
HIGH_TECH  47.52 (1.03)  51.80  (1.12) 
LISTED_EQUITY ‐49.17 (‐1.07)  ‐52.11  (‐1.10) 
YEAR_IPDO 0.11 (0.02)  1.51  (0.24) 
Cons 203.18 (1.41)  202.11  (1.34) 
Obs. 54   54   
R2 0.403   0.358   
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Table 5.11 continued. 
 
5.6.2. Bond Yield Spreads and Banking Relationships 
To test our second hypothesis H2, we estimate several regression models with yield 
spread, SPREAD, as the dependent variable and several proxies for the strength of 
banking relationship as our main variables of interest. According to our second 
hypothesis H2, we expect companies with strong banking relationships to significantly 
have lower yield spreads than companies with weak banking relationships. Therefore, 
we expect our three proxies of the banking relationship to be negatively related to the 
yield spread. Table 5.12 reports the estimation results. 
 
Our first proxy of the strength of banking relationships, RELATION_DUMMY, is 
negative and significant at the 1% level. Companies that repeat borrowing from the 
same lead bank enjoy lower yield spreads for their initial public debt offer by 40.81 
(48.33) basis points. Similarly, RELATION_NUMBER is negative and significant at 
the 1% level. Companies who borrow all their funds from the same lead bank have 
lower yield spreads by almost 45.35 (51.98) basis points compared to companies who 
borrow from a different lead bank each time they require debt financing. Our final 
proxy for the strength of relationship, RELATION_AMOUNT, is negative and 
significant at the 1% level with a coefficient size of 39.73 (47.80). As for 
mutlicollinearity, the reported VIF values indicate that multicollinearity does not seem 
to pose a problem in our model as all values are less than three which is below the 
threshold value of five used in the literature.  
Variance Inflation Factors (VIF)
RATING_UPGRADE 2.12   1.96   
RATING_UNCHANGED 1.98   1.95   
BOND_RATING_LOW 3.63   ‐   
BOND_RATING_HIGH ‐   3.49   
ISSUE_SIZE 2.26   2.26   
MATURITY 1.36   1.34   
CALLABLE 1.32   1.33   
LISTED_DEBT 1.38   1.38   
SIZE 4.43   4.53   
LEVERAGE 2.09   1.87   
FIXED_ASSETS 1.5   1.48   
HIGH_TECH  1.64   1.63   
LISTED_EQUITY 1.38   1.41   
YEAR_IPDO 2.23   2.3   
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Table 5.12: Yield Spreads and the Strength of Banking Relationships for the Full Sample 
 
Table 5.12 reports regression estimation results with yield spreads of the initial public debt offers as the independent variable. The sample consists of nonfinancial 
public US companies who announced an initial public debt offering during the period 1990-2009; and for their initial bonds. SPREAD is the difference between the 
yield of the initial public debt offer and the yield of a matching Treasury. RATING_UPGRADE is a binary variable that is coded 1 if the company IPDO’s credit 
rating is assigned an improved credit rating compared to last private debt agreement before its first public debt issue. RATING_DOWNGRADE is a binary variable 
that is coded 1 if the company IPDO’s credit rating is assigned a worse credit rating compared to last private debt agreement before its first public debt issue. 
RATING_UNCHANGED is a binary variable that is coded 1 if the company IPDO’s credit rating is assigned the same credit rating as its last private debt agreement 
before its first public debt issue. RELATION_DUMMY is a binary variable that is coded 1 if the firm had borrowed more than once from the same lead bank in the 
last five years. RELATION_NUMBER is the number of loans extended by the relationship bank divided by the total numbers of loans issued to the company in the 
last 5 years before the firm’s first access to the public debt market. RELATION_AMOUNT the amount of loans extended by the relationship bank divided by the total 
amount of loans issued to the company in the last 5 years before the firm’s first access to the public debt market. BOND_RATING is coded 9 if S&P’s rating is AAA, 
AAA-, AA+; 8 if S&P’s rating is AA; AA-, A+ etc. Similarly, BOND_RATING is coded 9 if Moody’s rating is Aaa, Aaa1, Aaa2, AA3; 8 if Moody’s rating is Aa, 
Aa1, Aa2, Aa3 etc. BOND_RATING_LOW indicates that the bond rating is recoded with the lower of S&P’s or Moody’s. BOND_RATING_HIGH indicates that the 
bond rating is recoded with the higher of S&P’s or Moody’s. ISSUE_SIZE is the natural logarithm of the issue size. MATURITY is the number of years until 
maturity. SINKING_FUND is a binary variable that is coded 1 if the debt contract has a sinking fund provision. CALLABLE is a binary variable that is coded 1 if the 
debt contract has call provisions. LISTED_DEBT is a binary variable that is coded 1 if the firm’s initial bond is listed in an organized stock exchange. SIZE is the 
natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets. LEVERAGE is the ratio of long-term debt over total assets. FIXED_ASSETS is the ratio of property, plant and equipment 
over total assets. HIGH_TECH is a binary variable that is coded 1 if the firm operates in a high technology industry. LISTED_EQUITY is a binary variable that is 
coded 1 if the firm’s shares are listed in The NYSE. All specifications include a time trend variable. Regressions are estimated with robust standard errors. t-statistics 
are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 5.12: Continued. 
 
 RELATION_DUMMY RELATION_NUMBER RELATION_AMOUNT 
RELATION_DUMMY ‐40.81*** (‐2.76) ‐48.33***  (‐3.20)  ‐ ‐  ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐  ‐ 
RELATION_NUMBER ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐45.35***  (‐2.65)  ‐51.98***  (‐2.98)  ‐ ‐ ‐  ‐ 
RELATION_AMOUNT ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐  ‐ ‐ ‐39.73**  (‐2.40)  ‐47.80***  (‐2.84) 
RATING_UPGRADE ‐108.1** (‐2.34) ‐136.0***  (‐2.88)  ‐107.5**  (‐2.35)  ‐135.8***  (‐2.90)  ‐108.7**  (‐2.36)  ‐136.6***  (‐2.90) 
RATING_UNCHANGED ‐33.48 (‐1.41) ‐35.23  (‐1.42)  ‐38.59*  (‐1.65)  ‐41.71*  (‐1.70)  ‐38.34  (‐1.63)  ‐40.72*  (‐1.65) 
RATING_DOWNGRADE 2.058 (0.06) ‐5.173  (‐0.11)  ‐0.507  (‐0.01)  ‐8.435  (‐0.20)  ‐0.621  (‐0.02)  ‐8.16  (‐0.19) 
BOND_RATING_LOW ‐93.29*** (‐11.66) ‐ ‐ ‐93.63***  (‐11.66)  ‐ ‐ ‐93.52***  (‐11.65)  ‐  ‐ 
BOND_RATING_HIGH ‐ ‐ ‐90.68***  (‐12.42)  ‐ ‐  ‐90.82***  (‐12.44)  ‐ ‐ ‐90.84***  (‐12.43) 
ISSUE_SIZE 6.942 (0.89) 16.98**  (2.30)  6.76  (0.86)  16.79**  (2.28)  6.832  (0.87)  16.91**  (2.29) 
MATURITY ‐1.675** (‐2.38) ‐2.258***  (‐3.09)  ‐1.607**  (‐2.28)  ‐2.181***  (‐2.99)  ‐1.608**  (‐2.28)  ‐2.186***  (‐2.99) 
SINKING_FUND 88.46*** (2.62) 76.60**  (2.48)  90.48***  (2.65)  78.57**  (2.52)  88.84***  (2.63)  77.19**  (2.50) 
CALLABLE 65.40*** (5.33) 62.51***  (4.95)  64.46***  (5.26)  61.48***  (4.88)  64.61***  (5.26)  61.66***  (4.88) 
LISTED_DEBT ‐3.233 (‐0.15) 4.517  (0.22)  ‐3.143  (‐0.15)  4.858  (0.23)  ‐2.824  (‐0.13)  5.00  (0.24) 
SIZE ‐5.361 (‐0.68) ‐9.768  (‐1.30)  ‐5.374  (‐0.68)  ‐9.871  (‐1.32)  ‐5.419  (‐0.68)  ‐9.904  (‐1.32) 
LEVERAGE 63.28* (1.71) 31.06  (0.82)  62.94*  (1.70)  30.93  (0.82)  62.91*  (1.70)  30.67  (0.81) 
FIXED_ASSETS ‐14.04 (‐0.91) ‐7.212  (‐0.46)  ‐14.1  (‐0.91)  ‐7.238  (‐0.46)  ‐14.21  (‐0.92)  ‐7.45  (‐0.47) 
HIGH_TECH  12.06 (0.74) 15.93  (1.01)  12.11  (0.74)  15.97  (1.01)  ‐12.3  (‐0.75)  16.23  (1.02) 
LISTED_EQUITY ‐28.94** (‐2.15) ‐21.33  (‐1.53)  ‐29.78**  (‐2.23)  ‐22.51  (‐1.62)  ‐29.71**  (‐2.21)  ‐22.16  (‐1.59) 
YEAR_IPDO 6.304*** (3.33) 6.086***  (3.07)  6.382***  (3.36)  6.174***  (3.11)  6.326***  (3.33)  6.117***  (3.08) 
Cons 439.7*** (9.33) 458.3***  (9.92)  441.3***  (9.36)  459.8***  (9.98)  440.9***  (9.34)  459.7***  (9.97) 
    
No. of Firms 431    431    431    431    431    431   
Ad_R2 0.592    0.591    0.591    0.590    0.590    0.589   
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Table 5.12: Continued. 
 
 Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) 
RELATION_DUMMY 1.19    1.19    ‐    ‐    ‐    ‐   
RELATION_NUMBER ‐    ‐    1.13    1.13    ‐    ‐   
RELATION_AMOUNT ‐    ‐    ‐    ‐    1.15    1.15   
RATING_UPGRADE 1.08    1.08    1.08    1.08    1.08    1.08   
RATING_UNCHANGED 1.22    1.22    1.17    1.17    1.18    1.18   
RATING_DOWNGRADE 1.05    1.05    1.04    1.05    1.05    1.05   
BOND_RATING_LOW 2.07    ‐    2.07    ‐    2.07    ‐   
BOND_RATING_HIGH ‐    2.14    ‐    2.15    ‐    2.15   
ISSUE_SIZE 1.8    1.77    1.8    1.77    1.8    1.77   
MATURITY 1.13    1.11    1.13    1.11    1.13    1.11   
SINKING_FUND 1.09    1.09    1.09    1.09    1.09    1.09   
CALLABLE 1.48    1.49    1.47    1.49    1.48    1.49   
LISTED_DEBT 1.09    1.09    1.09    1.09    1.09    1.09   
SIZE 2.73    2.63    2.73    2.63    2.73    2.63   
LEVERAGE 1.63    1.69    1.63    1.69    1.63    1.69   
FIXED_ASSETS 1.22    1.22    1.22    1.22    1.22    1.22   
HIGH_TECH  1.17    1.17    1.17    1.17    1.17    1.17   
LISTED_EQUITY 1.15    1.16    1.14    1.15    1.15    1.15   
YEAR_IPDO 1.56    1.56    1.56    1.57    1.56    1.57   
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Similar to the concern outlined in the previous section, we only use observations with 
syndicated loans in order to measure the strength of the banking relationship and assign 
a value of zero for observations without syndicated loans. Therefore, the variables 
measuring the strength of banking relationship could also pick up the effects of the 
presence of syndicated loans rather than the strength of banking relationship.  
 
To check the robustness of our results reported in Table 5.12, we estimate the same 
regressions using the sub-sample of observations with syndicated loans. We report the 
estimation results in Table 5.13. The results reported in Table 5.13 are similar to the 
ones reported in Table 5.12. All our proxies of the strength of banking relationships are 
significant with the expected negative signs. The VIF values reported in Table 5.13 
indicate that multicollinearity does not raise a concern in our regression since all values 
are less than three. 
 
Our results suggest that the strength of the relationship between the firm and its lead 
bank significantly reduces yield spreads of initial public debt offerings. This result is 
consistent with the previously documented evidence on the value of banking 
relationships in the equity market (James, 1987; James & Wier, 1990; Lummer & 
McConnell, 1989) and the debt market (Datta et al., 2000). 
 
5.6.3. Other Control Variables 
Our estimations include different proxies for default risk: BOND_RATING; 
ISSUE_SIZE; and LEVERAGE. The coefficient of bond rating, BOND_RATING, is 
negatively related to yield spreads at the 1% level in all of our estimations. This implies 
that a full letter upgrade in the bond rating, for example from Aa to Aaa, would result in 
a significant decrease in the yield spread. The coefficient of ISSUE_SIZE is positive 
and significant at the 5% level in a number of estimations reported in Tables 10 and 12. 
Issuing new bonds increases the total dollar value of debt and consequently the firm’s 
riskiness, hence the positive coefficient. Also, the LEVERAGE coefficient has the 
expected positive sign, indicating that higher leverage increases the firm’s financial risk 
and consequently yield spreads. However, LEVERAGE is not significant in most of our 
estimations and significant at the 10% level in the reminding estimations.  
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Table 5.73: Yield Spreads and the Strength of Banking Relationships for Observations with Prior Syndicated Loans 
 
Table 5.13 reports regression estimation results with yield spreads of the initial public debt offers as the independent variable. The sample consists of 184 
nonfinancial public US companies who issued a syndicated loan in the last five years before they announced an initial public debt offering during the period 1990-
2009. The dependent variable, SPREAD, is the difference between the yield of the initial public debt offer and the yield of a matching Treasury.  
RELATION_DUMMY is a binary variable that is coded 1 if the firm had borrowed more than once from the same lead bank in the last five years. 
RELATION_NUMBER is the number of loans extended by the relationship bank divided by the total numbers of loans issued to the company in the last 5 years 
before the firm’s first access to the public debt market. RELATION_AMOUNT the amount of loans extended by the relationship bank divided by the total amount of 
loans issued to the company in the last 5 years before the firm’s first access to the public debt market. BOND_RATING is coded 9 if S&P’s rating is AAA, AAA-, 
AA+; 8 if S&P’s rating is AA; AA-, A+ etc. Similarly, BOND_RATING is coded 9 if Moody’s rating is Aaa, Aaa1, Aaa2, AA3; 8 if Moody’s rating is Aa, Aa1, Aa2, 
Aa3 etc. BOND_RATING_LOW indicates that the bond rating is recoded with the lower of S&P’s or Moody’s. BOND_RATING_HIGH indicates that the bond 
rating is recoded with the higher of S&P’s or Moody’s. ISSUE_SIZE is the natural logarithm of the issue size. MATURITY is the number of years until maturity. 
SINKING_FUND is a binary variable that is coded 1 if the debt contract has a sinking fund provision. CALLABLE is a binary variable that is coded 1 if the debt 
contract has call provisions. LISTED_DEBT is a binary variable that is coded 1 if the firm’s initial bond is listed in an organized stock exchange. SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of the firm’s total assets. LEVERAGE is the ratio of long-term debt over total assets. FIXED_ASSETS is the ratio of property, plant and equipment over 
total assets. HIGH_TECH is a binary variable that is coded 1 if the firm operates in a high technology industry. LISTED_EQUITY is a binary variable that is coded 1 
if the firm’s shares are listed in The NYSE. All specifications include a time trend variable. Regressions are estimated with robust standard errors. t-statistics are in 
parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
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Table 5.13: Continued. 
 
 RELATION_DUMMY RELATION_NUMBER RELATION_AMOUNT 
RELATION_DUMMY ‐39.91**  (‐2.05)  ‐44.50**  (‐2.22)  ‐ ‐  ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐  ‐ 
RELATION_NUMBER ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐46.35**  (‐2.12)  ‐49.70**  (‐2.23)  ‐ ‐ ‐  ‐ 
RELATION_AMOUNT ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐  ‐ ‐ ‐36.97*  (‐1.72)  ‐42.90*  (‐1.96) 
BOND_RATING_LOW ‐86.64***  (‐6.46)  ‐ ‐ ‐86.81***  (‐6.43)  ‐ ‐ ‐86.68***  (‐6.43)  ‐  ‐ 
BOND_RATING_HIGH ‐ ‐ ‐91.00***  (‐8.23)  ‐ ‐  ‐90.83***  (‐8.23)  ‐ ‐ ‐91.12***  (‐8.24) 
ISSUE_SIZE ‐3.711  (‐0.25)  4.79  (0.35)  ‐4.109  (‐0.28)  4.399  (0.32)  ‐3.61  (‐0.24)  4.901  (0.36) 
MATURITY ‐1.881  (‐1.53)  ‐1.533  (‐1.37)  ‐1.744  (‐1.43)  ‐1.378  (‐1.27)  ‐1.755  (‐1.45)  ‐1.398  (‐1.28) 
SINKING_FUND 120.4**  (2.48)  110.9**  (2.37)  129.7***  (2.65)  120.0**  (2.54)  121.6**  (2.50)  113.2**  (2.42) 
CALLABLE 82.73***  (5.56)  66.66***  (4.31)  81.04***  (5.46)  64.94***  (4.21)  81.51***  (5.47)  65.29***  (4.21) 
LISTED_DEBT 34.83  (0.95)  24.49  (0.70)  35.08  (0.95)  25.23  (0.72)  35.72  (0.98)  25.25  (0.72) 
SIZE 5.873  (0.41)  5.769  (0.44)  5.845  (0.41)  5.573  (0.43)  5.32  (0.37)  5.193  (0.40) 
LEVERAGE 88.09*  (1.66)  47.71  (0.86)  85.51  (1.60)  45.47  (0.82)  85.27  (1.60)  44.58  (0.80) 
FIXED_ASSETS ‐20.11  (‐0.87)  ‐21.76  (‐0.93)  ‐21.12  (‐0.91)  ‐22.92  (‐0.97)  ‐21.69  (‐0.92)  ‐23.51  (‐0.99) 
HIGH_TECH  5.206  (0.24)  19.00  (0.84)  6.123  (0.27)  20.28  (0.88)  7.669  (0.34)  21.54  (0.93) 
LISTED_EQUITY ‐33.08  (‐1.53)  ‐18.88  (‐0.85)  ‐36.02*  (‐1.69)  ‐22.06  (‐1.01)  ‐33.22  (‐1.53)  ‐19.14  (‐0.86) 
YEAR_IPDO 1.197  (0.53)  1.026  (0.42)  1.262  (0.56)  1.07  (0.44)  1.094  (0.48)  0.939  (0.38) 
Cons 408.0***  (6.24)  421.2***  (6.47)  413.1***  (6.26)  425.9***  (6.56)  410.7***  (6.20)  424.8***  (6.50) 
                        
No. of Firms 184             184             184             184             184             184            
Ad_R2 0.543             0.545             0.543             0.544             0.539             0.541            
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Table 5.13: Continued. 
 
 Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) 
RELATION_DUMMY 1.13    1.13    ‐    ‐    ‐    ‐   
RELATION_NUMBER ‐    ‐    1.13    1.13    ‐    ‐   
RELATION_AMOUNT ‐    ‐    ‐    ‐    1.11    1.12   
BOND_RATING_LOW 2.07    ‐    2.07    ‐    2.07    ‐   
BOND_RATING_HIGH ‐    2.52    ‐    2.52    ‐    2.53   
ISSUE_SIZE 1.86    1.84    1.86    1.84    1.86    1.84   
MATURITY 1.12    1.12    1.11    1.12    1.12    1.12   
SINKING_FUND 1.13    1.13    1.15    1.15    1.14    1.14   
CALLABLE 1.36    1.42    1.36    1.42    1.36    1.42   
LISTED_DEBT 1.16    1.18    1.16    1.18    1.16    1.18   
SIZE 2.59    2.59    2.59    2.58    2.59    2.58   
LEVERAGE 1.59    1.7    1.58    1.69    1.58    1.69   
FIXED_ASSETS 1.23    1.23    1.22    1.22    1.22    1.22   
HIGH_TECH  1.23    1.23    1.23    1.23    1.22    1.23   
LISTED_EQUITY 1.18    1.22    1.19    1.23    1.19    1.22   
YEAR_IPDO 1.55    1.55    1.55    1.56    1.55    1.55   
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We also include a number of variables that capture the firm’s information risk. Larger 
firms are expected to be subject to less information asymmetries compared to smaller 
firms. We include SIZE to approximate the information risk. The coefficient of SIZE is 
insignificant in all estimations. Also, we include two measures of firm visibility due to 
the listing of debt (LISTED_DEBT) or equity (LISTED_EQUITY) in an organized 
exchange. The coefficient of LISTED_DEBT is negative but insignificant in all 
estimations. On the other hand, the coefficient of LISTED_EQUITY is negative and 
significant at the 5% level for the estimations that use the full sample. This finding 
suggests that the visibility of the firm, in terms of its listing in the NYSE, has a 
significant impact on the yield spread.  
 
Other control variables include MATURITY which we expect to have a positive 
association with yield spread. However, the MATURITY coefficient is negative and 
significant at the 1% level in the estimations using full samples. An increase in debt 
maturity by one year significantly reduces the yield spread. This result is consistent with 
other documented findings in the literature (Beatty et al., 2008; Bharath et al., 2009; and 
Fenn, 2000). The coefficients of the sinking fund and callable provisions have the 
expected positive sign and are significant at the 5% and 1% level respectively. The 
coefficient on the fixed assets ratio, FIXED_ASSETS, has the expected sign but is 
insignificant in all estimations. Finally, our estimations include a variable that captures 
the business risk, HIGH_TECH, which has the expected positive sign but is 
insignificant in all estimations.  
 
5.7. Conclusion 
In this study we investigate the impact of information produced by monitoring activities 
of the firm’s private debt on yield spreads for initial public bond offers. Initial public 
bond offers are ideal setting for studying how information asymmetries resolve in the 
public debt markets because they are subject to greater information asymmetry in 
comparison to seasoned bond offers. In addition, this study allows us to investigate 
elements in the firm’s private debt financing, which is a largely ignored topic in the 
literature.  
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The firm’s private debt is monitored by the banks themselves. Also, some of the firm’s 
private debt is monitored by rating agencies. We approximate monitoring by rating 
agencies by the difference between the credit ratings of IPDOs and prior private loans. 
Also, we approximate monitoring by banks by the strength of the relationship between 
the firm and its bank. To perform our analysis, we estimate a multivariate regression 
model to explain the cross-section variation in yield spreads of initial public debt 
offerings issued by nonfinancial US firms during the period 1990-2009, with the 
difference between the IPDOs and prior private loans credit ratings and the strength of 
banking relationship as our main variables of interest.  
 
Our findings indicate that the IPDOs which are assigned higher or the same ratings 
compared to the ratings assigned for the firms’ prior private loans are negatively and 
significantly related to yield spreads. In addition, we show that strong banking 
relationships reduce yield spreads significantly. This finding is robust to using different 
measures of the strength of the banking relationship. The findings of the present study 
are consistent with our proposition that information related to monitoring the firm’s 
private debt reduces significantly the information asymmetries facing prospective 
bondholders. Obtaining the same or higher credit rating for the firm’s IPDO compared 
to the credit rating of its private loan could signal the firm’s commitment to maintain a 
clean credit track record. In term of the strength of banking relationships, the 
relationship bank’s assessment of the quality of the firm takes into consideration 
information that is not available to bondholders. Therefore, strong banking relationships 
can reduce prospective bondholders’ adverse selection because it signals the firm’s 
business and credit quality. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions 
 
This thesis investigates the role of information in the public debt markets in three 
essays. The first essay examines the impact of the firm’s outstanding public debt on its 
decision to disclose bad news by issuing profit warnings. The second essay analyzes the 
effect of the firm’s issuance of its initial public debt offering (IPDO) on its accounting 
reporting attributes, in particular timely loss recognition. The third essay investigates 
the impact of information produced through monitoring prior private loans by credit 
rating agencies and banks on the yield spreads of IPDOs. In this chapter, I will 
summarise the main findings of each essay, discuss the limitations, and propose future 
research extensions.  
 
6.1. Summary of the Findings 
The first essay, presented in Chapter 3, examines the impact of public debt on the 
decisions of companies to issue profit warnings in the UK. UK companies exhibit a high 
frequency of profit warnings and face low threat of litigation by investors relative to US 
companies. This makes it likely that determinants other than litigation affect the UK 
companies’ decision to warn the market of bad news. I identify a sample of UK 
companies subject to a material negative earnings surprise during the period 2001-2008. 
This identification strategy is chosen because debtholders have an asymmetric loss 
function as they are subject to the firm’s downside risk but they do not share its profits. 
Therefore, debtholders are expected to be more sensitive to bad news than good news 
and therefore will have greater demand for information about bad news compared to 
good news. The final sample consists of 829 firm-year observations, out of which 138 
firm-year observations have outstanding public debt. 
 
Then, I estimate a probit model to explain the variation in the probability of issuing a 
profit warning for our UK sample. The main variables of interest are the firm’s 
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closeness to financial distress, approximated by the firm’s interest cover ratio multiplied 
by -1, and the existence of outstanding public debt in the firm’s capital structure. The 
findings show that the firm’s interest cover ratio, multiplied by -1, is significantly 
negatively related to the probability of issuing a profit warning. This finding suggests 
that firms closer to financial distress are more likely to hide bad news. Also, the 
findings show that the presence of public debt does not have a significant impact on the 
probability of issuing a warning. Further investigation indicates that the firm’s 
outstanding public debt mitigates the negative impact of closeness to financial distress 
on the probability of issuing a profit warning. More specifically, the impact of the 
interest cover ratio is insignificant for firms with public debt, while it is significant for 
those without public debt. Moreover, the findings indicate that the sample firms with, 
compared to those without, public debt are more likely to issue a profit warning in the 
event of permanent bad news. 
 
To check the robustness of these findings, I estimate the profit warning model by 
accounting for the confounding effects of self-interested managers and large 
shareholders. Also, I vary the initial criteria of defining the material earnings surprise. 
Finally, I account for the possibility that some profit warnings may be released on 
scheduled dates and for the confounding effects of interim management statements. The 
results are robust to these checks with qualitatively similar results.  
 
The findings presented in the first essay indicate that UK companies closer to financial 
distress are likely to take advantage of the low threat of litigation by hiding bad news to 
benefit shareholders at the expense of third parties. However, I fail to find similar 
evidence for UK firms with outstanding public debt. The latter finding suggests that 
firms with public debt are deterred from engaging in opportunistic disclosure behaviour 
as they may incur agency costs resulting from damaging their reputations for faithful 
disclosures. In addition, the findings in the first essay suggest that UK firms with public 
debt are more forthcoming than those without in issuing profit warnings in the event of 
permanent bad news. The overall evidence presented in Chapter 3 suggests that firms 
with public debt are concerned with timely and faithful disclosure and are deterred from 
hiding bad news.  
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The second essay, presented in Chapter 4, examines the impact of the initial public debt 
offering (IPDO) on the timeliness properties of the firm’s accounting income. The 
study’s research design overcomes a number of limitations of previous studies. First, it 
allows us to study the change in timeliness over time for the same set of firms and not 
the variation in a cross-section of firms. This overcomes the criticisms levelled against 
Basu’s (1997) model that Basu type regressions capture a spurious relationship between 
bad news and earnings. Second, this setting allows determining the causality direction 
between the existence of public debt and timeliness. The increase in the timeliness 
properties after the event date, the IPDO, is likely to be driven by demands from the 
debt markets. This investigation, therefore, highlights the dynamics of solving potential 
information asymmetries through accounting choices when the firm contracts with 
public debt investors for the first time.  
 
The sample includes nonfinancial US firms who announced an IPDO during the period 
1972-2008. The final sample consists of 878 firms with 6897 firm-year observations. 
Then, I estimate a fixed effect model following Basu’s (1997) model specification 
including individual year dummies. I examine the incremental sensitivity of bad news 
for the years after the IPDO event, where the bad news sensitivity is expected to 
increase significantly after the IPDO date.  
 
The findings of the second essay indicate that the coefficient of bad news sensitivity 
increases, economically and statistically, after the firm’s initial public debt offer. The 
findings also indicate that the increase in asymmetric timeliness continues for several 
years after the initial public debt offer. These results are robust to possible confounding 
effects of the firm’s size and leverage and to alternative specification for the Basu’s 
model. However, they are not robust to using alternative measures of conservatism, 
namely the accumulated non-operating accruals and the skewness of earnings relative to 
the skewness of cash flows from operations. One possible explanation is that these 
alternative measures capture aspects of unconditional conservatism rather than 
conditional conservatism. Since the debt market has a differential demand for 
conservatism, with a greater demand for conditional conservatism, this could result in 
an insignificant impact of the IPDO event on the accumulation of non-operating 
accruals and the skewness of earnings.  
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The findings in the first and second essays are complementary and are consistent with 
the first proposition of the present thesis. The findings show that that firms with public 
debt, outstanding and initial, are likely to adopt a timelier policy of disclosing bad news 
(are more likely to issue profit warnings in the case of permanent bad news) and a 
timelier policy of reporting economic losses (increase their degree of timeliness after 
issuing public debt). They also show that firms with outstanding public debt are not 
likely to engage in opportunistic disclosure behaviour (they are not likely to hide bad 
news when they are closer to financial distress). The overall evidence is consistent with 
the thesis’ first proposition that the public debt markets induce a demand for faithful and 
timely information especially in the event of bad news.  
 
The third essay, outlined in Chapter 5, also utilizes the setting of initial public debt 
offers (IPDOs). Initial public debt offerings are subject to greater information 
asymmetry compared to seasoned bond offerings and therefore provide an ideal setting 
for this study since I am interested in investigating the ways in which information 
asymmetries resolve in the debt markets. I identify a sample of IPDOs issued by US 
nonfinancial firms during the period 1990-2009. The sample consists of 431 of IPDOs, 
out of which 54 bonds are issued by companies with a credit rating assigned for one of 
their previously issued 144A or syndicated loans. In addition, 184 bonds are issued by 
companies with previous syndicated loan.  
 
Then, I estimate a regression model to explain the cross-section variation in the yield 
spreads of our sample of IPDOs. I calculate the yield spreads using the at the issue gross 
proceeds, that is without deducting the underwriting fees and other floatation costs, to 
focus on the cost of debt from the point view of bondholders. The main variables of 
interest are the difference between the credit ratings of the company’s IPDO and its 
prior private loan; and the strength of the pre-IPDO banking relationships. These two 
variables approximate monitoring the firm’s private debt by rating agencies and banks.  
I expect these rating upgrades and strong banking relationships to be negatively related 
to the yield spreads of IPDOs.  
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In order to construct the first variable(s) of interest, I compare the credit rating assigned 
for the firm’s prior private loan and the one assigned for its IPDO. Then I define three 
indicator variables: the first is coded one for IPDOs with higher credit ratings compared 
to the prior private loan ratings; the second is coded one for downgraded IPDOs; and 
the third is coded one if the credit rating is unchanged between IPDOs and the prior 
private loan. The findings indicate that the IPDOs which are assigned the same or 
higher ratings compared to the ratings assigned for the firms’ prior private loans are 
negatively and significantly related to yield spreads.  
    
The second variable of interest is the strength of the banking relationship. I focus on one 
attribute of the banking relationship, namely the dependency of the company on one 
bank relative to other banks. Therefore, our proxy of banking relationships focuses on 
the number, alternatively the amount, of loans a company borrows from its relationship 
bank relative to all its borrowing from all other banks. To perform the analysis I utilize 
bonds issued by companies with previous syndicated loans. This is because the analysis 
requires detailed data about the identity of the banks which is available in machine 
readable form for syndicated loans. I identify the company’s relationship bank as the 
one with the most frequent number, alternatively largest amount, of loans. I find that the 
strength of banking relationship is negatively and significantly related to the yield 
spreads of IPDOs. This finding is robust to using different proxies of the strength of 
banking relationships. 
 
The findings of the third essay suggest that monitoring of the firm’s private debt 
produces information relevant to prospective bondholders. This finding extends the 
extant empirical evidence on the effect of cross monitoring on the cost of debt. In the 
analysis I focus on historical information produced before the firm issues its IPDO, 
whereas the extant empirical evidence focuses on contemporaneous information. 
Obtaining the same or higher credit rating for the firm’s IPDO compared to its private 
loan rating could signal the firm’s commitment to maintain a clean credit track record. 
In addition, the strength of the banking relationship may signal the firm’s business and 
credit quality. This is because relationship banks accumulate private information about 
the company that assess the current and future prospects of the firm. Although this 
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information is not publicly available, the relationship bank’s multiple interactions with 
the firm can signal that its long-term assessment of the bank is favourable.  
 
6.2. Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research 
The main limitation of the first essay, presented in Chapters 3, is the small number of 
treated observations. Specifically, in Chapter 3 the number of firm-year observations 
with outstanding public debt constitutes around 17% of the overall observations. The 
relative small number of treated observations may result in a low variation in the sample 
and therefore weakens the significance of the proposed hypotheses. On the other hand, 
extreme values in small samples may drive the results towards certain directions. In 
either case, the robustness of the results would be enhanced using a greater number of 
treated observations relative to the overall sample.  
 
Another limitation of the first essay is that the profit warning model used in the essay 
does not control for the confounding effects of some variables that could influence the 
company’s disclosure policy. In identifying the profit warning model used in the essay I 
closely followed the literature on event-driven disclosures including Kasznik and Lev 
(1995); Tucker (2007); and Kothari, Shu, & Wysocki (2009). However, the disclosure 
literature has identified variables that influence the company’s disclosure choices, such 
as audit quality, governance and proxies that measure the probability of the threat of 
litigation (Lang & Lundholm, 1996; Dunn & Mayhew, 2004; Ajinkya, Bhojraj & 
Sengupta, 2005; Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005; Atiase, Supattarakul, & Tse, 2006). One 
limitation of the first essay is that I do not control for the impact of these variables on 
the companies’ decisions to issue profit warnings.  
 
With regard to recommended future research, I argue in the first essay that the threat of 
litigation in the UK is weak hence has low impact on the UK companies’ decisions to 
warn. Therefore, I do not attempt to measure the probability of shareholders’ litigation. 
However, some US studies attempt to measure the firm’s specific probability of 
litigation risk. For example, Shu (2000) and Atiase, Supattarakul, & Tse (2006) measure 
the probability of shareholders’ litigation as a function of firm characteristics. One 
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potential research extension for the first essay is to estimate the UK companies’ 
litigation risk and examine its impact on their decisions to issue profit warnings.  
 
In addition, in the first essay I examine the market reaction to profit warning 
announcements. I find that warning firms experience large and statistically significant 
negative returns on the day of the warning. This finding is similar to the evidence 
documented by other UK studies including Collett (2004) and Helbok & Walker (2003). 
A viable research extension is to examine the market reaction to earnings 
announcements for warning and non-warning companies subject to a negative earnings 
surprise. Examining this research is interesting given the recent findings of US studies 
documented in Tucker (2007) and Xu (2008). 
 
The main limitation of the second essay, presented in Chapter 4, relates to the validity 
of the timeliness proxy. In Chapter 4, I focus primarily on Basu’s (1997) measure to 
approximate the timeliness of loss recognition. The Basu model has been challenged on 
several grounds. Some studies question the appropriateness of a reverse regression 
where accounting income is the dependent variable and return is the independent 
variable (Ryan, 2007; Givoly, Hayn & Natarajan, 2007; Dietrich, Muller & Riedl, 
2007). Accounting income explains return and therefore the error term of a reverse 
regression is not independent of returns. Hence, the coefficient of the return term is 
biased. Ball, Kothari & Nikolaev (2010) argue that applying a weaker functional form 
of the Basu regression where income, the independent variable in the Basu model, is the 
expectations of earnings conditional on return realization will lead to an unbiased 
estimate of the return coefficient. Ball et al. (2010) argue that this form is more 
consistent with the logic of Basu’s model that does not intend to identify a causal effect 
of earnings on returns but to identify the timeliness with which earnings reflect public 
information contained in returns.      
 
In terms of the study presented in Chapter 4, the most relevant criticism is the validity 
of the Basu model, i.e., the results from estimating equation (3) can be consistent with 
timeliness although firms are not following a timely policy of economic loss 
recognition. In other words, one may obtain a significant positive bad news sensitivity 
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coefficient due to reasons not related to timeliness. For example, Dietrich et al. (2007) 
propose that the Basu model is subject to a truncation bias. They argue that partitioning 
the data based on negative and positive returns will result in estimating a stronger 
relationship between losses and returns than gains and returns. This is because the 
causality between earnings and returns in conjunction with the asymmetry in the 
earning-return distributions (the negative skewness) may result in a mechanical and 
stronger correlation between losses and negative earnings than gains and positive 
earnings. Similarly, Patatoukas & Thomas (2010) show that it is possible to obtain a 
stronger relationship between losses and returns if the sample contains sub-samples of 
high frequency of losses and negative returns. Ball et al. (2010) argue that the 
endogeniety of the explanatory variable is irrelevant in this instance since partitioning is 
with respect to the dependent variable. Therefore, truncating based on returns does not 
introduce a mechanical negative correlation with the error term hence the truncation 
bias discussed in Dietrich et al. (2007). 
 
In relation to the study presented to Chapter 4, the research design aims to show a 
significant change in the size of the bad news coefficient over time for the same set of 
sample firms. Assuming that the distributions of earnings and returns of our set of firms 
are subject to some data regularities that would result in a stronger relationship between 
losses and returns than gains and returns, then one expect similar bad news coefficient 
before and after the IPDO event date to be found. There is no obvious reason that the 
IPDO event will intensify the data regularities in the earning-return distributions that 
result in even stronger spurious relationship between losses and negative returns. 
 
Another limitation of the second essay is that the robustness checks show that 
alternative measures of conservatism do not produce consistent results with the ones 
produced using Basu’s (1997) timeliness measure. Other studies such as Zhang (2010) 
report consistent empirical findings of Basu’s measure and the accumulated non-
operating accruals and relative skewness measures.  
 
Also, one limitation of the second essay is that I do not account for the impact of the 
firm’s governance on its timeliness policy. In the analysis presented in Chapter 4, I 
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control for the confounding effects of size, leverage and book to market. However, 
recent studies show that the firm’s governance, in addition to these variables, is 
significantly associated with timeliness (Garcia-Lara, Garcia-Osma & Penalva, 2009; 
Bona-Sanchez, Perez-Aleman & Santana-Martin, 2011).  Issuing public debt could lead 
to significant changes in the firm’s size, leverage and growth opportunities set. 
However, it is not clear that issuing public debt will have significant impact on the 
firm’s governance structure.  In the analysis I use each firm as its own control and 
therefore including governance variables is not likely to significantly change the results.  
 
As for suggested future research extensions, I focus in Chapter 4 on the timeliness 
properties of accounting income. The choice of this property is driven by the hypothesis 
that debtholders are concerned with unexpected events that increase the default risk due 
to their asymmetric payoffs (Watts, 2003). For future research I recommend 
investigating the relationship between debt contracting and other dimensions of 
financial reporting quality such as accruals management (Ball and Shivakumar, 2008; 
Bharath, Sunder, and Sunder, 2008).  
 
In Chapter 5 I face important data limitations. The number of IPDOs issued by 
companies with previous loan ratings amounts to only 54 observations. Then, I 
construct three variables based on the difference between the credit rating assigned for 
the firm’s prior private loan and the one assigned for the firm’s IPDO. Out of 54 
observations with prior private loan rating I find 7 upgraded observations; 8 
downgraded observations; and 39 observations with the same rating for their IPDO and 
private loans. The findings of the study show that the upgraded observations enjoy 
significantly lower yield spreads. Due to the small number of upgraded observations the 
evidence could be unreliable and difficult to generalize. However, this evidence could 
be useful for future research that could examine if firms pursue a stable credit rating in 
order to minimize their yield spreads.   
 
In addition, some studies such as Pittmana & Fortin (2004) and Fortin & Pittman (2007) 
show that auditor choice has an impact on debt pricing for newly public firms and for 
private firms.  One limitation of the third essay is that I do not control for the impact of 
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the auditor choice on the yield spread of IPDOs.  Another limitation in Chapter 5 is that 
I limit the analysis to study one dimension in debt contracts, namely spreads. Recent 
studies by Nikolaev (2010) and Bharath et al., (2008) study other dimensions in debt 
contracting such as the maturity of the debt contract and debt covenants.   
 
In summary, this thesis attempts to bring new insights to the extant literature by 
reporting evidence that suggests that there are dynamics in the information supply and 
demand in the public debt markets. The evidence presented in this thesis suggests that 
public debtholders’s demand for information, especially bad news, induces the firm to 
supply profit warnings and timely financial reports. In addition, the reported evidence 
suggests that information regarding one asset class can mitigate the information 
asymmetry facing investors in other claims. Information related to the firm’s private 
debt decreases the yield spreads charged by investors in IPDOs and mitigates the 
information content of ratings assigned to these IPDOs.  
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